27. December 2010 by admin.

Geopolitical Analysis of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, a massive diplomatic entourage and a business delegation representing 100 firms visited India on December 15th for a three-day visit. Wen began the visit by addressing concerns over the growing Sino-Indian rivalry, proclaiming that there need be no essential conflict between the Dragon and the Elephant and that Asia has room enough for both of them. After meeting with Indian Premier Manmohan Singh, Wen visited Pakistan, a staunch Chinese ally and Indian arch-foe, to emphasize where his deepest commitments lie. Wen’s visit comes at a time of revived mutual suspicion. Two major incidents in particular have aggravated sore spots in the relationship. Riots in Lhasa, Tibet, in 2008 caused Beijing to worry more about breakaway tendencies in its far western province, whose exiled government is supported by New Delhi. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s continued support of various militant proxies has put the Sino-Pakistani alliance into renewed focus for New Delhi, especially in light of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. But alongside these signal events, Beijing’s growing economic clout has led it to expand infrastructure and military installations across its western regions in an attempt to bolster its territorial claims and secure its far-flung provinces from separatist or militant influences. India has bulked up its border infrastructure and security in response. And, perhaps most novel, Beijing’s growing dependency on overseas oil and raw materials has driven it to seek land and sea pathways to the Indian Ocean through closer relations with South Asian states generally and port agreements with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar, leading India to worry it will be encircled and someday threatened by China’s navy. Economic growth is one of the primary reasons world powers have courted India this year, with U.S. President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy already having visited. Wen’s trip is no different, and already the two sides claim to have signed nearly 50 deals worth an estimated $16 billion if actualized. But deepening economic relations have not eased tensions, especially given the growing Indian trade deficit with China (from a surplus of $832 million in 2005 to a deficit of nearly $16 billion in 2009), which Wen acknowledged on the first day of his visit needed to be improved while simultaneously asking for greater market access for Chinese exporters. While India is keen on displaying its relationship with China as far more cooperative than confrontational, a serious self-critique is developing within New Delhi over its slow reaction to Chinese moves in the Indian periphery. China’s presence may be much more visible now in places like Kashmir, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, but that presence was built up methodically over several years. India, with no shortage of issues to keep itself occupied at home, is now finding that it is years behind China in countries that New Delhi would like to believe sit firmly within its sphere of influence. In the past, India could rely on its influence in Tibet to send a warning to China. In fact, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna aired this threat in a meeting with his Chinese counterpart in November when he said that just as India has been sensitive to Chinese concerns over Tibet and Taiwan, Beijing too should be mindful of Indian sensitivities on Jammu and Kashmir. The problem India has now is that this warning simply does not carry as much weight as it did. China has made considerable progress in building up the necessary political, economic and military linkages into Tibet to deny the Indians opportunities to needle Beijing in critical buffer territory. Moreover, India has not been able to invest the necessary time and effort into strengthening competitive relationships in more distant places like Southeast Asia and Taiwan — and has only begun with Japan — that would deeply unsettle Beijing. In fact, a discussion is taking place within some military circles in India over how China may be deliberately playing up issues on its land borders in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh to divert India’s attention northward while China pursues its objectives in the Indian Ocean basin.   Yet India is not alone in its alarm. The world is increasingly looking at China not only as a source of growth, but as an independent-minded and potentially unpredictable variable in the international system. Beijing’s increasing boldness has become one of the chief talking points in foreign policy circles, extending beyond international hard bargaining over resources and into China’s conduct around its entire periphery and in international organizations. When India openly worries about China’s intentions in exercising its newly found strengths, it is joined by the likes of Japan, South Korea, Australia, a number of China’s Southeast Asian neighbors and, most important, the United States. The problem for Beijing is that it is ultimately outnumbered, and overpowered, but its attempts to prepare against threats make it appear more threatening. Beijing sees the international coalition forming against it, and in particular fears U.S. attention will soon come to rest squarely on it and that a strategic relationship with India is part of American designs. Hence, Wen has reason to play nice with India, if only to make China appear a more benign player and not hasten India’s moves to counteract it. Nevertheless, Beijing has its mind set on gaining control of land and sea routes to the Indian Ocean and needs internal mobility in its far west to prevent separatism and fortify its borders, and these policies are driving the tensions with India higher. Thus, while India senses Chinese encirclement in South Asia, Beijing senses American encirclement, of which India is only one part. Even with modern technology, the Himalayas remain a gigantic divider. Regardless of growing economic cooperation, both sense a growing security threat from the other that cannot be easily allayed. At the same time Chinese are not irresponsible to wage a war with a $16 billion trade partner, it is time for India to shown some assertiveness and garner more international support against Chinese “perceived” threat. In not too far a future Chine will no doubt prove to be a paper tiger.

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9. November 2010 by admin.

Why Obama’s India Trip Matters? President Barack Obama is on a high-profile diplomatic trip to India this week, furthering Obama’s goal of deepening U.S.-India ties and addressing a number of related issues. Since entering office, Obama has continued President George W. Bush’s emphasis on building a special relationship between the two countries, making Indian Prime Minister Manmohan K. Singh the guest of honor at Obama’s first official state dinner. Here’s what’s happening on the visit, why it matters, and what it could mean for the two countries and beyond.

• Why the U.S. and India Want to Be Best Friends  The New York Times’ Jim Yardley writes, “Both countries are eager to build on their improved ties and set up a unique, special relationship, given that together they represent the world’s richest and largest democracies. Faced with a rising authoritarian China, and an economically wounded Europe, a weakened United States is casting about for global partners. India would seem a nice fit.”

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9. November 2010 by admin.

The other elephant

Barack Obama thinks that the rise of India will be good for American jobs. There is another side to the story

ON THE eve of the 2008 New Hampshire primary Bill Clinton finally gave vent to his fury with the Obama campaign. He dismissed Barack Obama’s message as “the biggest fairy tale” he had ever heard. (“Give…me…a…break,” he roared at the startled crowd.) And he denounced underhand tactics, particularly a description of Hillary Clinton as “the senator from Punjab”.

On November 5th Mr Obama, fresh from his humiliation in the mid-term elections, flies to India accompanied by an entourage of almost 250 businesspeople. His message for the folks back home will be that India could be a goldmine for American jobs. And he will clinch a succession of huge business deals with India—not least a $5.8 billion aircraft sale by Boeing.

Mr Obama’s win-win rhetoric is plausible enough. India is growing at about 8% a year at a time when America can barely manage 2%. It is also set to add 240m people to its working population by 2030. And America produces all sorts of things that Indians crave, from iPads to MBAs to fighter planes.

Yet the rise of new economic powers always brings problems as well as opportunities for incumbents. New companies displace old ones. New business models disrupt established ones. Comfortable workers in the rich world are forced to compete with hungrier ones in the poor world.

India is producing a legion of new global giants that are competing head-to-head with established American companies. Look at Arcelor Mittal and Tata Steel in steelmaking; Bharat Forge and Sundram Fasteners in car parts; Hindalco in aluminium rolling; and a host of companies, including Infosys, Tata Consulting Services (TCS), Cognizant and HCL Technologies, in information services. Twenty years ago India had no global companies worth mentioning. Today the Tata group earns 60% of its revenues abroad, and Indian companies ranging from natural-resource firms, such as Reliance Industries, to health-care companies, such as Pirmal Healthcare, have been snapping up American brands.

American companies are also setting up shop in India. Bangalore and Hyderabad have “electronic cities” crowded with America’s leading companies. In Bangalore Cisco spent $1 billion on its Globalisation Centre East and General Electric (GE) opened a swanky research centre. IBM employs more people in India than in the United States.

For American workers the most worrying thing about all this is the flight of brain-intensive jobs to India. Americans reconciled themselves to the loss of manufacturing jobs with the thought that they would keep the smart jobs. But they reckoned without two things: the power of the internet and the hunger of emerging-market companies.

India has long since turned itself into the world’s back-office—subjecting paper-processing hubs such as Kansas City to the same forces of competition that devastated former industrial cities such as Gary, Indiana. Now Indian-based companies are moving into an wider range of services: reading CT-scans and X-rays, processing legal documents and helping with animation. They are also moving into sophisticated niches. TCS and Infosys compete directly with IBM and Accenture in consulting. American companies are adding to the trend by moving more of their important operations to India: John Chambers, Cisco’s boss, has decreed that 20% of the firm’s leadership should be in Bangalore.

Companies in India are challenging American ones in an area that they have long considered their own—innovation. The Boston Consulting Group’s 2010 survey of innovation notes that the number of American companies on its list of top innovators is declining while the number of Indian companies is rising. It also points out that the Indian firms place a higher value on innovation than the American companies.

Most strikingly, Indian companies have produced a new type of innovation, variously dubbed “frugal”, “reverse” and “Gandhian”. The essence is to reduce the price of a product or service by a breathtaking amount—80% rather than 10%—by removing unnecessary bells and whistles. Tata Motors is selling its “people’s car” for $3,000; GE’s Indian arm offers a medical ECG machine for $400; Bharat Biotech sells a single dose of its hepatitis B vaccine for 20 cents and Bharti Airtel provides one of the cheapest wireless telephone services in the world. These frugal products are likely to disrupt established Western companies (including GE itself) by forcing them to engage in a bloody price war.

Luring them back

To add to this general turbulence Indian-based companies are also on a hiring binge. For decades America has gorged itself on a seemingly limitless supply of brilliant Indian PhD students and entrepreneurs. Half of Silicon Valley’s start-ups were either founded or co-founded by Indians. But these paragons are now returning en masse to the mother country (just as America makes life more difficult for immigrants). Why work for a sluggardly American firm when Infosys is growing at double digits? Why live in a flimsy bungalow in the Valley when an Indian company will provide you with a villa in a gated community, membership of a country club and a chauffeur-driven car?

There is an upside to these downsides. Frugal products will be a godsend for America’s pinched consumers. They may even prevent the American economy from being crushed by the health-care Godzilla. But Americans need to get back on the treadmill. In a recent speech Mr Obama told schoolchildren in Philadelphia that: “When students around the world in Bangalore or Beijing are working harder than ever, and doing better than ever, your success in school is not just going to determine your success, it is going to determine America’s success in the 21st century.” That is not a bad theme for the next two years of his presidency.

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6. November 2010 by admin.

U.S. President Barack Obama begins a four-day visit to India today (on Nov. 6), heading a 375-member entourage of security personnel, policymakers, business leaders and journalists to demonstrate to the world that the U.S.-Indian relationship is serious and growing.Obama will begin his visit in the financial hub of Mumbai, where he will make a symbolic show of solidarity with India on the counterterrorism front by staying at the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, which came under attack in 2008, and highlight corporate compatibility between the two countries. Obama will spend the rest of the trip in New Delhi, where he will address a joint session of Parliament, a reciprocal gesture following Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s address to Congress in November 2009.Most Indians and Americans think and hope that Indo-US relations could be much better and closer than what it is now. However, regardless of what one may want the relations to be like, the geopolitical needs of both the countries are different and there are and will be numerous issues on which India and America will have to agree to disagree on. How did the biggest and largest democracies of the world drifted apart and failed to build close and deep relationship is a matter of historical and geopolitical analysis and beyond the scope of current article. But in spite of that, there is little doubt that the United States and India are sounding a much deeper and strategic relationship, as illustrated by their bilateral civilian nuclear agreement, growing business links, arms deals and a host of military exercises taking place over the next several months. Still, very real and unavoidable constraints on ties remain in place, constraints that will hamper this already uneasy partnership from developing into a robust alliance. The immediate hindrance lies in the U.S. strategic need to bolster Pakistan to shape a U.S. exit strategy from Afghanistan and try to shore up the balance of power on the subcontinent. In the longer term, however, India could use the threat of Chinese expansion in Beijing’s perceived sphere of influence to enhance its relationship with Washington.Strategic MotivationsIndia does not make friends easily (or has failed to recognize and make friends easily), particularly friends with militaries capable of reaching the subcontinent. India grew closer to the Soviets during the Cold War out of fear of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan, but only because Moscow’s military reach into the subcontinent was limited. After the Soviet Union collapsed, India was left without a meaningful ally, all the while becoming deeply resentful of the blind eye Washington turned toward the rise of Pakistan’s Islamist proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan.The 9/11 attacks finally created an opportunity for a U.S.-Indian relationship to materialize. Both countries had common cause to cooperate with each other against Pakistan, neutralize the jihadist threat and embark on a real, strategic partnership. For the United States, this was the time to play catch-up in balance-of-power politics in South Asia. The U.S. interest at any given point on the subcontinent is to prevent any one power from becoming strong to the point that it could challenge the United States, while at the same time protecting vital sea lanes running from East Asia to the Persian Gulf via the Indian Ocean basin. The United States has the naval assets to guard these maritime routes directly, but as it extends itself more and more worldwide, its need for regional proxies grows. Though India’s capabilities remain quite limited given its domestic challenge, it is an aspiring naval power with a deep fear of Chinese encroachment and Islamist militancy.India also has a massive consumer market of 1.2 billion people and has the United States at the top of its list of trading partners. A roughly balanced and diversified relationship exists between the two economies, even as protectionist tendencies run heavily on both sides of the trade divide. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the United States exported $16.4 billion worth of goods and services to India, mostly aircraft, fertilizers, computer hardware, scrap metal and medical equipment, while India exported $21 billion worth of goods and services to the United States, mostly information technology services, pharmaceuticals, textiles, machinery, gems and diamonds, iron and steel products, and food products. India thus makes a strong candidate for a regional U.S. proxy.But this is where a fundamental U.S.-Indian disconnect arises. India is far from interested in molding itself into a proxy of the global hegemon. India’s self-enclosed geography and internal strengths permit it to remain fiercely independent in its foreign policy calculations, unlike much weaker Pakistan, which needs an external patron to feel secure.The United States has been caught off guard every time New Delhi takes a stance that runs counter to U.S. interests, something that has happened despite the U.S. charm offensive toward India that revved up in 2005 with a civilian nuclear deal. India has refused to comply with U.S. sanctions on Iran, still has reservations about allowing U.S. firms into the Indian nuclear market after the bilateral nuclear deal, and protests what New Delhi perceives as U.S. interference in the Kashmir dispute. As a former Indian national security adviser put it, India is happy to have its partnership with the United States, but Washington is going to have to get used to hearing “no” from India on numerous issues.The Pakistan ProblemThe much more urgent misalignment of interests hindering the U.S.-India relationship concerns Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan. In 2001, when al Qaeda struck the United States and Pakistan-backed militants attacked the Indian parliament soon after, India sensed an opportunity. The Cold War shackles on ties were broken as the urgency of a broader Islamist militant threat drove New Delhi and Washington together. India hoped the bond would sustain itself, keeping Pakistan isolated over the long term, but it was only a matter of time before U.S. efforts to balance India against Pakistan disappointed New Delhi.The United States has now reached a saturation point in its war in Afghanistan. While short-term military victories have provided Washington useful political cover as they do in all unpopular wars, they obscure the core disadvantage occupiers face against the insurgents when it comes to on-the-ground intelligence, corruption, population control, and the insurgent luxury of choosing the time and place of battle. Washington is thus shaping an exit strategy from Afghanistan. This necessarily will involve some sort of accommodation with the Taliban that only one power in the region has the relationship to orchestrate: Pakistan.Pakistan has every interest in having the United States as its patron and keeping it involved in the region, but not to the extent that U.S. military activity in the Pakistani-Afghan borderland risks severely destabilizing the Pakistani state. For its part, the United States does not want India to become the unchallenged hegemon of the subcontinent at the expense of a much weaker Pakistan. This means that in return for Pakistani cooperation in tying up loose ends in the jihadist war, Pakistan will expect the United States to facilitate a restoration of Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. This would extend Pakistan’s strategic depth, stifling any Indian attempt to develop a foothold in the region that could see Pakistan wind up in a pincer grip.This naturally upsets New Delhi, which maintains that Islamabad will continue to compensate for its military weakness by backing militant proxies to target the Indian state, something Washington is ignoring to achieve its goals in Afghanistan. India sees a Taliban political comeback in Afghanistan as setting the stage for Pakistan-backed militants to regroup. More worryingly for New Delhi, a number of these militants have been drawn into a much more unpredictable, lethal jihadist network that makes it harder for New Delhi to blame Pakistan for terrorist acts in India.India’s strategic interest calls for taking advantage of Islamabad’s sour relationship with the current Afghan government to build a foothold in Afghanistan with which to create an additional lever against Islamabad along Pakistan’s northwestern rim. India has done so primarily through a number of development projects. Besides being one of the top five bilateral donors to the war-torn country, India has thousands of laborers in Afghanistan building schools, hospitals, roads and power plants. One of the most notable projects India has been involved in is the funding and construction of a 218-kilometer (about 135 miles) highway from Zaranj in Afghanistan’s southwestern Nimroz province to Delaram in Farah province.Since Afghanistan forms a land bridge between South Asia and Central Asia, where vast amounts of energy and mineral resources are concentrated, India has a deeper interest in developing the necessary transit links to access the Central Asian energy market, which the Chinese already have tapped into extensively. India cannot rely on its Pakistani rival to allow Indian goods to flow overland. Under a current arrangement, Afghan goods to India must pass through Pakistan. But Pakistan does not allow Indian goods to transit Pakistan overland to Afghan markets. Instead, India relies on its favorable trading terms with Iran to transport Indian goods via the Iranian port of Chabahar to Afghanistan and on to Central Asia. In creating transit infrastructure in Afghanistan, like the Zaranj-Delaram highway, and between Afghanistan and Iran, India is developing alternative trade routes in the region that will allow it to bypass Pakistan.The Question of Indian Troops for AfghanistanWhether India should elevate its support for Afghanistan, to include deploying Indian forces to the country, has been the subject of quiet debate among Indian defense circles. The public rationale given for such a plan is that insurgents have targeted Indian laborers involved in reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, and that the small contingent of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in Afghanistan has proven insufficient to protect the laborers. In addition to regular attacks on Indian construction crews, the 2008 and 2009 bombings on the Indian Embassy in Kabul highlighted the threat that Pakistan could use its militant connections in Afghanistan to try and drive India out of the country.Those arguing for an Indian military deployment to Afghanistan believe that placing Indian troops in the country would sufficiently alarm Pakistan to divert forces from its east, where Pakistani forces are concentrated in Punjab along the Indo-Pakistani border, to its northwestern border with Afghanistan. This (they hope) would shift some of the focus of Pakistani-Indian conflict away from Kashmir and the Indian homeland. Those calling for Indian troops are making a dangerous assumption, however, that the United States will remain in Afghanistan for the long haul and will be there to contain attempts by Pakistan to act against Indian military overland expansion in the region.There are a number of reasons why this troop scenario is unlikely to play out. The most obvious constraint is the enormous logistical difficulty India would have in supplying troops in Afghanistan. If India cannot convince Pakistan to allow overland trade to Afghanistan, it can certainly rule out Pakistan agreeing to an Indian military supply line to Afghanistan. India is also extremely risk-averse when it comes to military deployments beyond its borders. It already is struggling with a counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir and in Naxalite territory along the country’s eastern belt and remembers the deadly fiasco that followed the Indian deployment of forces to Sri Lanka to counter the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the late 1980s. And Indian troops in Afghanistan would make prime targets for hardened jihadists receiving support from Pakistan.At the same time, India is unwilling to bow to Pakistani pressure by downgrading its presence in Afghanistan. An inevitable U.S. drawdown from the region and a Pakistani return to Afghanistan translates into a bigger security threat for India. The more India can dig its heels in Afghanistan, primarily through reconstruction projects, the better the chances it will develop some say in Afghan affairs with which to check Pakistan’s regional ambitions. For its part, Pakistan will continue to demand that the United States use its leverage with New Delhi to minimize the Indian presence in Afghanistan and hand over the task of shaping the future Afghan government to Islamabad.Though little of this discussion will hit the headlines, the disconnect in U.S.-Indian strategic interests — in which India wants the United States to sustain pressure on Islamabad and serve as a check on Pakistan-backed militancy while Washington needs to bolster Pakistan to withdraw from Afghanistan and maintain some balance in the region between the two nuclear rivals — will put a cloud over Obama’s high-profile visit. India might even have to share the spotlight during Obama’s tour, as rumors are circulating that the U.S. president may make a surprise visit to Afghanistan to show his dedication to the war effort. The U.S. administration has debated whether the president could make such a trip without stopping over in Pakistan to reduce the fallout that could emerge from having Air Force One bypass Pakistan in an Afghan-India trip. The delicate nature of these issues illustrates just how high-maintenance the region is for the United States, and how urgent Washington’s need is to keep relations with Pakistan on steady footing.Leveraging a Mutual Concern Over ChinaWhile Pakistan and Afghanistan are pulling India and the United States apart, China could keep the emerging U.S.-India partnership from derailing. China’s insatiable appetite for resources, heavy reliance on export trade and overarching need to protect those vital commercial supply lines has driven Chinese naval expansion into the Indian Ocean Basin, namely through ports in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan and overland linkages through Pakistan and Myanmar on India’s flanks. Indian fears of Chinese encirclement have prompted New Delhi to modernize and expand the Indian navy. Just as the United States is interested in bolstering Japan’s naval defenses, Washington (along with Japan) views Indian military expansion in the Indian Ocean as a useful hedge against China.India has watched with concern as China has become more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir and has broached the suspect of more robust military assistance to Pakistan during its present time of need. Moreover, while India’s Nepal policy has largely been on autopilot, China has quietly built up its clout in the small Himalayan kingdom, threatening to undermine New Delhi’s influence in a key buffer state. China also has attempted to create a closer relationship with the junta and ethnic factions in Myanmar, where Beijing seeks oil and natural gas pipelines that will give some of its energy imports an overland route that will allow it to replace the Strait of Malacca.Meanwhile, the United States is engaged in a standoff with China as it tries to end Beijing’s currency manipulation policies while Beijing is unwilling to comply due to the social and political costs of rapidly reforming its financial system. As bilateral trade tensions continue to simmer, China has sought to take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation with wars in the Islamic world to assert itself in areas of strategic interest, including the South China Sea and East China Sea and in territories it disputes with India. China’s sovereignty claims and military capability in the South China Sea are of particular concern to the United States. This level of assertiveness can be expected to grow as the People’s Liberation Army Navy continues to increase its clout in political affairs, though Beijing knows it must avoid provoking an outright confrontation with the United States.Though U.S. attention is currently absorbed in trying to work out an understanding with Pakistan on Afghanistan (an understanding that will severely undermine the U.S.-Indian relationship in the near term,) it is only a matter of time before U.S. attention turns back toward countries like China whose interests potentially are on a collision course with U.S. interests. As U.S. attention on China increases, India can highlight its own fears of Chinese expansion in South Asia to bolster the Indian relationship with Washington, especially if China is able to maintain its internal stability long enough to sustain a bold foreign policy. The China factor could prove particularly useful for New Delhi to voice its concerns over more pressing threats, like Pakistan, as India and the United States attempt to work out the kinks of their bilateral relationship. Ultimately, India and the United States will have to agree to disagree on a number of issues, relying on high-profile state visits to keep up appearances. But a mutual concern over China may help reduce some of the current tensions between New Delhi and Washington over Pakistan in the future.

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27. October 2010 by admin.

We are a week away from the 2010 U.S. midterm elections. The outcome is already locked in. Whether the Republicans take the House or the Senate is close to immaterial. It is almost certain that the dynamics of American domestic politics will change. The Democrats will lose their ability to impose cloture in the Senate and thereby shut off debate. Whether they lose the House or not, the Democrats will lose the ability to pass legislation at the will of the House Democratic leadership. The large majority held by the Democrats will be gone, and party discipline will not be strong enough (it never is) to prevent some defections. Should the Republicans win an overwhelming victory in both houses next week, they will still not have the votes to override presidential vetoes. Therefore they will not be able to legislate unilaterally, and if any legislation is to be passed it will have to be the result of negotiations between the president and the Republican Congressional leadership. Thus, whether the Democrats do better than expected or the Republicans win a massive victory, the practical result will be the same. When we consider the difficulties President Barack Obama had passing his health care legislation, even with powerful majorities in both houses, it is clear that he will not be able to push through any significant legislation without Republican agreement. The result will either be gridlock or a very different legislative agenda than we have seen in the first two years. These are not unique circumstances. Reversals in the first midterm election after a presidential election happened to Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. It does not mean that Obama is guaranteed to lose a re-election bid, although it does mean that, in order to win that election, he will have to operate in a very different way. It also means that the 2012 presidential campaign will begin next Wednesday on Nov. 3. Given his low approval ratings, Obama appears vulnerable and the Republican nomination has become extremely valuable. For his part, Obama does not have much time to lose in reshaping his presidency. With the Iowa caucuses about 15 months away and the Republicans holding momentum, the president will have to begin his campaign. Obama now has two options in terms of domestic strategy. The first is to continue to press his agenda, knowing that it will be voted down. If the domestic situation improves, he takes credit for it. If it doesn’t, he runs against Republican partisanship. The second option is to abandon his agenda, cooperate with the Republicans and re-establish his image as a centrist. Both have political advantages and disadvantages and present an important strategic decision for Obama to make.

The Foreign Policy Option

Obama also has a third option, which is to shift his focus from domestic policy to foreign policy. The founders created a system in which the president is inherently weak in domestic policy and able to take action only when his position in Congress is extremely strong. This was how the founders sought to avoid the tyranny of narrow majorities. At the same time, they made the president quite powerful in foreign policy regardless of Congress, and the evolution of the presidency over the centuries has further strengthened this power. Historically, when the president has been weak domestically, one option he has had is to appear powerful by focusing on foreign policy.For presidents like Clinton, this was not a particularly viable option in 1994-1996. The international system was quiet, and it was difficult to act meaningfully and decisively. It was easier for Reagan in 1982-1984. The Soviet Union was strong and threatening, and an aggressive anti-Soviet stance was popular and flowed from his 1980 campaign. Deploying the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile in Western Europe alienated his opponents, strengthened his position with his political base and allowed him to take the center (and ultimately pressured the Soviets into agreeing to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). By 1984, with the recession over, Reagan’s anti-Soviet stance helped him defeat Walter Mondale.Obama does not have Clinton’s problem. The international environment allows him to take a much more assertive stance than he has over the past two years. The war in Afghanistan is reaching a delicate negotiating state as reports of ongoing talks circulate. The Iraq war is far from stable, with 50,000 U.S. troops still there, and the Iranian issue is wide open. Israeli-Palestinian talks are also faltering, and there are a host of other foreign issues, ranging from China’s increasing assertiveness to Russia’s resurgent power to the ongoing decline in military power of America’s European allies. There are a range of issues that need to be addressed at the presidential level, many of which would resonate with at least some voters and allow Obama to be presidential in spite of weak political support.There are two problems with Obama becoming a foreign policy president. The first is that the country is focused on the economy and on domestic issues. If he focuses on foreign policy and the U.S. economy does not improve by 2012, it will cost him the election. His hope will be foreign policy successes, or at least the perception of being strong on national security, coupled with economic recovery or a plausible reason to blame the Republicans. This is a tricky maneuver, but his presidency no longer offers simple solutions. The second problem is that his presidency and campaign have been based on the general principle of accommodation rather than confrontation in foreign affairs, with the sole exception of Afghanistan, where he chose to be substantially more aggressive than his predecessor had been. The place where he was assertive is unlikely to yield a major foreign policy success, unless that success is a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. A negotiated settlement will be portrayed by the Republicans as capitulation rather than triumph. If he continues on the current course in Afghanistan, he will seem to be plodding down an old path and not pioneering a new one. Interestingly, if Obama’s goal is to appear strong on national security while regaining the center, Afghanistan offers the least attractive venue. His choices are negotiation, which would reinforce his image as an accommodationist in foreign policy, or continued war, which is not particularly new territory. He could deploy even more forces into Afghanistan, but then would risk looking like Lyndon Johnson in 1967, hurling troops at the enemy without a clear plan. He could, of course, create a massive crisis with Pakistan, but it would be extremely unlikely that such an effort would end well, given the situation in Afghanistan. Foreign policy presidents need to be successful.There is little to be done in Iraq at the moment except delay the withdrawal of forces, which adds little to his political position. Moreover, the core problem in Iraq at the moment is Iran and its support of disruptive forces. Obama could attempt to force an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, but that would require Hamas to change its position, which is unlikely, or that Israel make massive concessions, which it doesn’t think it has to do. The problem with Israel and the Palestinians is that peace talks, such as those under Clinton at Camp David, have a nasty tendency to end in chaos. The European, Russian and Chinese situations are of great importance, but they are not conducive to dramatic acts. The United States is not going to blockade China over the yuan or hold a stunning set of meetings with the Europeans to get them to increase their defense budgets and commit to more support for U.S. wars. And the situation regarding North Korea does not have the pressing urgency to justify U.S. action. There are many actions that would satisfy Obama’s accomodationist inclinations, but those would not serve well in portraying him as decisive in foreign policy.

The Iranian Option

This leaves the obvious choice: Iran. Iran is the one issue on which the president could galvanize public opinion. The Republicans have portrayed Obama as weak on combating militant Islamism. Many of the Democrats see Iran as a repressive violator of human rights, particularly after the crackdown on the Green Movement. The Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia, is afraid of Iran and wants the United States to do something more than provide $60 billion-worth of weapons over the next 10 years. The Israelis, obviously, are hostile. The Europeans are hostile to Iran but want to avoid escalation, unless it ends quickly and successfully and without a disruption of oil supplies. The Russians like the Iranians are a thorn in the American side, as are the Chinese, but neither would have much choice should the United States deal with Iran quickly and effectively. Moreover, the situation in Iraq would improve if Iran were to be neutralized, and the psychology in Afghanistan could also shift.If Obama were to use foreign policy to enhance his political standing through decisive action, and achieve some positive results in relations with foreign governments, the one place he could do it would be Iran. The issue is what he might have to do and what the risks would be. Nothing could, after all, hurt him more than an aggressive stance against Iran that failed to achieve its goals or turned into a military disaster for the United States. So far, Obama’s policy toward Iran has been to incrementally increase sanctions by building a weak coalition and allow the sanctions to create shifts in Iran’s domestic political situation. The idea is to weaken President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and strengthen his enemies, who are assumed to be more moderate and less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons. Obama has avoided overt military action against Iran, so a confrontation with Iran would require a deliberate shift in the U.S. stance, which would require a justification. The most obvious justification would be to claim that Iran is about to construct a nuclear device. Whether or not this is true would be immaterial. First, no one would be in a position to challenge the claim, and, second, Obama’s credibility in making the assertion would be much greater than George W. Bush’s, given that Obama does not have the 2003 weapons of mass destruction debacle to deal with and has the advantage of not having made such a claim before. Coming from Obama, the claim would confirm the views of the Republicans, while the Democrats would be hard-pressed to challenge him. In the face of this assertion, Obama would be forced to take action. He could appear reluctant to his base, decisive to the rest. The Republicans could not easily attack him. Nor would the claim be a lie. Defining what it means to almost possess nuclear weapons is nearly a metaphysical discussion. It requires merely a shift in definitions and assumptions. This is cynical scenario, but it can be aligned with reasonable concerns. Destroying Iran’s nuclear capability does not involve a one-day raid, nor is Iran without the ability to retaliate. Its nuclear facilities are in a number of places and Iran has had years to harden those facilities. Destroying the facilities might take an extended air campaign and might even require the use of special operations units to verify battle damage and complete the mission. In addition, military action against Iran’s naval forces would be needed to protect the oil routes through the Persian Gulf from small boat swarms and mines, anti-ship missile launchers would have to be attacked and Iranian air force and air defenses taken out. This would not solve the problem of the rest of Iran’s conventional forces, which would represent a threat to the region, so these forces would have to be attacked and reduced as well. An attack on Iran would not be an invasion, nor would it be a short war. Like Yugoslavia in 1999, it would be an extended air war lasting an unknown number of months. There would be American POWs from aircraft that were shot down or suffered mechanical failure over Iranian territory. There would be many civilian casualties, which the international media would focus on. It would not be an antiseptic campaign, but it would likely (though it is important to reiterate not certainly) destroy Iran’s nuclear capability and profoundly weaken its conventional forces. It would be a war based on American strengths in aerial warfare and technology, not on American weaknesses in counter insurgency. It would strengthen the Iranian regime (as aerial bombing usually does) by rallying the Iranian public to its side against the aggression. If the campaign were successful, the Iranian regime would be stronger politically, at least for a while, but eviscerated militarily. A successful campaign would ease the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, calm the Saudis and demonstrate to the Europeans American capability and will. It would also cause the Russians and Chinese to become very thoughtful. A campaign against Iran would have its risks. Iran could launch a terrorist campaign and attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, sending the global economy into a deep recession on soaring oil prices. It could also create a civil war in Iraq. U.S. intelligence could have missed the fact that the Iranians already have a deliverable nuclear weapon. All of these are possible risks, and, according to STRATFOR’s thinking, the risks outweigh the rewards. After all, the best laid military plan can end in a fiasco.We have argued that a negotiation with Iran in the order of President Richard Nixon’s reversal on China would be a lower-risk solution to the nuclear problem than the military option. But for Obama, this is politically difficult to do. Had Bush done this, he would have had the ideological credentials to deal with Iran, as Nixon had the ideological credentials to deal with China. But Obama does not. Negotiating an agreement with Iran in the wake of an electoral rout would open the floodgates to condemnation of Obama as an appeaser. In losing power, he loses the option for negotiation unless he is content to be a one-term president. I am arguing the following. First, Obama will be paralyzed on domestic policies by this election. He can craft a re-election campaign blaming the Republicans for gridlock. This has its advantages and disadvantages; the Republicans, charging that he refused to adjust to the electorate’s wishes, can blame him for the gridlock. It can go either way. The other option for Obama is to look for triumph in foreign policy where he has a weak hand. The only obvious way to achieve success that would have a positive effect on the U.S. strategic position is to attack Iran. Such an attack would have substantial advantages and very real dangers. It could change the dynamics of the Middle East and it could be a military failure. I am not claiming that Obama will decide to do this based on politics, although no U.S. president has ever engaged in foreign involvement without political considerations, nor should he. I am saying that, at this moment in history, given the domestic gridlock that appears to be in the offing, a shift to a foreign policy emphasis makes sense, Obama needs to be seen as an effective commander in chief and Iran is the logical target. This is not a prediction. Obama does not share his thoughts with me. It is merely speculation on the options Obama will have after the midterm elections, not what he will choose to do.

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13. September 2010 by admin.

Western  Freedom

By Susan MacAllen

In 1978-79 I was living and studying in Denmark. But in 1978 - even in Copenhagen, one didn’t see Muslim immigrants. 

The  Danish population embraced visitors, celebrated  the exotic, went   out  of its way to protect each of its citizens. It  was proud of its new brand  of socialist liberalism one in development since  the conservatives had lost power in 1929 - a system where no worker had to  struggle to survive, where one ultimately could count upon the state as in, perhaps, no other western nation at the time. The  rest of  Europe saw the Scandinavians as free-thinking, progressive and infinitely generous in their welfare policies. Denmark boasted low crime rates, devotion to the environment, a superior  educational system and a history of  humanitarianism. Denmark  was also most generous in its immigration  policies - it offered the best welcome in Europe to the new immigrant: generous welfare payments from first arrival plus additional perks in  transportation, housing and  education. It was determined to set a world  example for inclusiveness and multiculturalism. How could it have predicted that one day in 2005 a series of  political cartoons in a newspaper would spark violence that would leave dozens dead in the  streets -all because its commitment to  multiculturalism would come back  to  bite?   

By  the 1990’s the growing urban Muslim population  was obvious - as was its unwillingness to  integrate into Danish society. Years of  immigrants had settled into Muslim-exclusive  enclaves. As the Muslim leadership became more vocal about what they  considered the decadence of Denmark ’s liberal way of life, the Danes  - once so welcoming - began to feel slighted. Many Danes had begun to see Islam as incompatible with their long-standing values:  belief in personal liberty and free speech, in equality for women, in tolerance for other  ethnic groups, and a deep pride in Danish heritage and history. An  article by Daniel Pipes and Lars Hedegaard, in which they accurately forecast, that the growing immigrant problem in Denmark would explode.

In the article they reported: ‘Muslim  immigrants constitute 5 percent of the population but consume  upwards  of 40 percent of the welfare spending.’ ‘Muslims  are only 4 percent of Denmark’s 5.4 million people but make up  a majority of the country’s convicted rapists,  an especially  combustible  issue given that practically all the female  victims are non-Muslim. Similar, if lesser, disproportions are found in other crimes.’ ‘Over  time, as Muslim immigrants increase in numbers,  they wish less   to  mix with the indigenous population. A recent  survey found that only 5 percent of young Muslim  immigrants   would readily marry a Dane.’ 

‘Forced  marriages - promising a newborn daughter in  Denmark to a male   cousin  in the home country, then compelling her to  marry him, sometimes on   pain  of death - are one problem’.  ‘Muslim  leaders openly declare their goal of introducing  Islamic law   once  Denmark’s Muslim population grows large enough-  a not-that-remote prospect.. If present trends  persist, one sociologist estimates, every  third inhabitant of   Denmark  in 40  years will be Muslim.’   It  is easy to understand why a growing number of  Danes would feel that   Muslim  immigrants show little respect for Danish values  and laws.

An example is the phenomenon  common to other European countries and    Canada: some Muslims in  Denmark  who opted  to leave the Muslim faith have been murdered in  the name of Islam, while others hide in fear for  their   lives.  Jews are also threatened and harassed openly by  Muslim leaders in Denmark, a country where once Christian citizens  worked to smuggle out nearly all of their 7,000  Jews by night to Sweden  - before  the Nazis could   invade.  I think of my Danish friend Elsa - who, as a teenager, had dreaded crossing the street to the  bakery every morning under the eyes of occupying Nazi  soldiers - and I wonder what she would say  today.   

In  2001,   Denmark  elected the most  conservative government in some 70 years -one that had some decidedly non-generous ideas  about liberal, unfettered immigration. Today Denmark  has the strictest  immigration policies   in Europe  . ( Its effort to protect  itself has been met with accusations of ‘racism’  by liberal media across Europe - even as other  governments struggle to right the social  problems wrought by years of too-lax  immigration).   

If  you wish to become Danish, you must attend three  years of language classes.  You must pass a test on Denmark ’s  history, culture, and a Danish language test . You must live in Denmark  for 7 years  before applying for citizenship.  You  must demonstrate an intent to work, and have a  job waiting. If you wish to  bring a spouse into Denmark, you  must both be over 24 years of age, and you  won’t find it so easy anymore to move your  friends and family to Denmark with you.You  will not be allowed to build a mosque in Copenhagen. Although your children  have a choice of some 30 Arabic culture and  language schools in Denmark, they will be strongly encouraged to assimilate to Danish society in  ways that past immigrants weren’t.

 In  2006, the Danish minister for employment, Claus  Hjort Frederiksen,   spoke  publicly of the burden of Muslim immigrants on  the Danish welfare   system,  and it was horrifying: the government’s welfare  committee had calculated that if immigration  from Third World countries were blocked, 75 percent  of the cuts needed to sustain the huge welfare  system in coming decades would be unnecessary.  In other words, the welfare system, as it existed,  was being exploited by immigrants to the point  of eventually   bankrupting  the government.

‘We are simply forced to adopt a  new policy on immigration’. ‘The  calculations of the welfare committee are  terrifying and show how   unsuccessful  the integration of immigrants has been up to  now,’ he said.   A  large thorn in the side of   Denmark ’s  imams is the Minister of   Immigration  and Integration, Rikke Hvilshoj.. She makes no  bones about the   new  policy toward immigration, ‘The number of  foreigners coming to the   country  makes a difference,’ Hvilshoj says, ‘There is an  inverse correlation between how many come here  and how well we can receive the foreigners that come’  And on Muslim immigrants needing to demonstrate  a willingness to blend in, ‘In my view,   Denmark  should be a country with room  for different cultures and religions. Some  values, however, are   more  important than others. We refuse to question  democracy, equal rights,  and  freedom of speech.’      

Hvilshoj  has paid a price for her show of backbone.  Perhaps to test her resolve, the leading radical imam in Denmark, Ahmed Abdel Rahman Abu Laban,  demanded that the government pay blood money to  the family of a   Muslim  who was murdered in a suburb of Copenhagen,  stating that the family’s thirst  for revenge could be thwarted for money. When  Hvilshoj dismissed his demand, he argued that in Muslim culture the payment of retribution money was  common, to which Hvilshoj replied that what is done in a Muslim country  is  not necessarily what is done in Denmark. The  Muslim reply came soon after: her house was  torched while she, her husband and children  slept. All managed  to escape unharmed, but she and her family were  moved to a secret location and she and other  ministers were assigned bodyguards for the first time  - in a country where such murderous violence was  once so scarce.

Her  government has slid to the right, and her  borders have tightened.Many believe that  what happens in the next decade will determine whether   Denmark survives as a bastion of good living,  humane thinking and   social  responsibility, or whether it becomes a nation  at civil war with   supporters  of Sharia law.   And  meanwhile, Canadians clamor for stricter  immigration policies, and demand  an end to state welfare programs that allow many  immigrants to live on the public dole. As we in Canada look at the enclaves of Muslims amongst us,  and see those  who enter our shores too easily, dare live on  our taxes, yet refuse to embrace our culture,  respect our traditions, participate in our  legal system, obey our laws, speak our language,  appreciate our history..  we would do  well to look to Denmark, and say a prayer for her future and for our own.  If  you agree with this article, then please pass it  on.

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11. September 2010 by admin.

Rumors are circulating on the Internet and Indian media over the reported presence of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, ostensibly to provide “protection for aid and construction workers”. It is not really unusual that the reports/news might be a bit over blown by the media, BUT China’s growing reassertion of territorial claims in the region will not go ignored by India and will give New Delhi and Washington another cause for cooperation. The prospect of greater U.S.-Indian defense cooperation and diminishing U.S. interest in Afghanistan will meanwhile drive Pakistan closer to China, creating a series of self-perpetuating threats on the subcontinent.Let us analyse the geopolitical implications on the subcontinent and relationship of India, Pakistan and China with each other and with United States. U.S. Pacific Command head Adm. Robert F. Willard is on a two-day visit to India to meet with the Indian defense leadership Sept. 9-10. Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony will follow up his meetings with Willard when he meets with U.S. defense leaders in Washington at the end of September. With an arduous war being fought in Afghanistan and India’s fears growing over Pakistan-based militancy, there is no shortage of issues for the two sides to discuss. But there is one additional topic of discussion that is now elevating in importance: Chinese military moves on the Indian subcontinent.Allegations over a major increase of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in northern Kashmir have been circulating over the past several weeks, with an Op-Ed in The New York Times claiming that as many as 7,000 to 11,000 PLA troops have flooded into the northern part of Pakistani-administered Kashmir, known as the Gilgit-Baltistan region. This is an area through which China has been rebuilding the Karakoram Highway, which connects the Chinese region of Xinjiang by road and rail to Pakistan’s Chinese-built and funded ports on the Arabian Sea. Though Chinese engineers have been working on this infrastructure for some time, new reports suggest that several thousand PLA troops are stationed on the Khunjerab Pass on the Xinjiang border to provide security to the Karakoram Highway construction crews. Handfuls of militants have been suspected of transiting this region in the past to travel between Central Asia, Afghanistan and China’s Xinjiang province, and Chinese construction crews in Pakistan have been targeted a number of times by jihadists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. That said, a large Chinese troop presence in the region is likely to serve a larger purpose than simply stand-by protection for Chinese workers.Pakistan responded by describing the reports as fabricated and said a small Chinese presence was in the area to provide humanitarian assistance in the ongoing flood relief effort. Chinese state media also discussed recently how the Chinese government was shipping emergency aid to Pakistan via Kashgar, Xinjiang province, through the Khunjerab Pass to the Sost dry port in northern Pakistan. India expressed its concern over the reports of Chinese troops in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, said it was working to independently verify the claims, and then claimed to confirm at least 1,000 PLA troops had entered the region.Such claims of troop deployments in the region are often exaggerated for various political aims, and these latest reports are no exception. It is still not known for sure the exact number of PLA troops in and around Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (known as Gilgit-Baltistan) and what percentage of those are combat troops. It has been reported that a convoy of approximately 110 Chinese trucks recently delivered some 2,000 metric tons of mostly food aid through the Khunjerab Pass to the Gojal Valley, an area devastated by recent flooding and landslides. Chinese Bridges and Roads Co. (CBRC) has been working on expanding the Karakoram Highway for the past three years and has roughly 700 Chinese laborers and engineers working on the project. The highway expansion is expected to be completed by 2013, but the deadline is likely to be extended as a result of recent flooding.Though, as per various media sources, on-ground reports so far track closest with the Chinese claims of flood relief operations, such relief and construction work can also provide useful cover for a more gradual buildup and sustained military presence in the region. This prospect is on the minds of many U.S. and Indian defense officials who would not be pleased with the idea of China reinforcing military support for Pakistan through overland supply routes.

What can be the intentions behind this build-up?

Though Pakistan, as per its typical characteristic, has reacted defiantly to the rumors, Islamabad has much to gain from merely having the rumor out in the open. Pakistan’s geopolitical vulnerability cannot be overstated. The country already faces a host of internally wrenching issues but must also contend with the fact that the Pakistani heartland in the Indus River Valley sits near the border with Pakistan’s much bigger and more powerful Indian rival, denying Islamabad any meaningful strategic depth to adequately defend itself. Pakistan is thus on an interminable search for a reliable, external power patron for its security, and its preferred choice is the United States, which has the military might and economic heft to buttress Pakistani defenses. However, Washington must maintain a delicate balance on the subcontinent, moving between its deepening partnership with India and keeping Pakistan on life support to avoid having India become the unchallenged South Asian hegemon.

Though Pakistan will do whatever it can to hold U.S. interest in an alliance with Islamabad — and keeping the militant threat alive is very much a part of that calculus — it will more often than not be left feeling betrayed by its allies in Washington. With U.S. patience wearing thin on Afghanistan, talk of a U.S. betrayal is naturally creeping up again among Pakistani policymakers as Pakistan fears that a U.S. withdrawal from the region will leave Pakistan with little to defend against India, a massive militant mess to clean up and a weaker hand in Afghanistan. China, while unwilling to put its neck out for Pakistan and provoke retaliation by India, provides Islamabad with a vital military backup that Pakistan can not only use to elicit more defense support against the Indians, but also to capture Washington’s attention with a reminder that a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could open the door for Chinese military expansion in South Asia.Chinese motives in the Kashmir affair are more complex. Even before the rumors, India and China were diplomatically sparring over the Chinese government’s recent refusal to issue a visa to a senior Indian army general on grounds that his command includes Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Such diplomatic flare-ups have become more frequent over the past couple of years, as China has used visa issuances in disputed territory in Kashmir and in Arunachal Pradesh along the northern Indian border to assert its territorial claims while trying to discredit Indian claims. Even beyond Kashmir, China has injected life into its territorial claims throughout the East and South China seas, much to the consternation of the Pacific Rim states.China’s renewed assertiveness in these disputed territories can be explained in large part by the country’s resource acquisition strategy. As China has scaled up its efforts to scour the globe for energy resources to sustain its elephantine economy, it has increasingly sought to develop a military that can safeguard vital supply lines running through the Indian Ocean basin to and from the Persian Gulf. Building the Karakoram Highway through Kashmir, for example, allows China to substantially cut down the time it takes to transit supplies between the Pakistani coast and China’s western front.China’s increasing reliance on the military to secure its supply lines for commercial interests, along with other trends, has thus given the PLA a much more prominent say in Chinese policymaking in recent years. This trend has been reinforced by the Chinese government’s need to modernize the military and meet its growing budgetary needs following a large-scale recentralization effort in the 1990s that stripped the PLA of much of its business interests. Over the past decade, the PLA has taken a more prominent role in maintaining internal stability — including responses to natural disasters, riots and other disturbances — while increasing its participation in international peacekeeping efforts. As the PLA’s clout has grown in recent years, Chinese military officials have gone from remaining virtually silent on political affairs to becoming commentators for the Chinese state press on issues concerning Chinese foreign policy.The PLA’s political influence could also be factoring into the rising political tensions in Kashmir. After all, China’s naval expansion into the Indian Ocean basin for its primarily commercial interests has inevitably driven the modernization and expansion of the Indian navy, a process the United States supports out of its own interest to hedge against China. By both asserting its claims to territory in Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir and raising the prospect of more robust Chinese military support for Pakistan, the Chinese military can benefit from having India’s military focus on ground forces, which require a great deal of resources to maintain a large troop presence in rough terrain, while reducing the amount of attention and resources the Indian military can give to its naval modernization plans.

The Indian Response

There may be a number of commercial, political and military factors contributing to China’s military extensions into South Asia, but India is not as interested in the multifaceted purposes behind China’s moves as it is in the actual movement of troops along the Indian border. From the Indian point of view, the Chinese military is building up naval assets and fortifying its alliance with Pakistan to hem in India. However remote the possibility may be of another futile ground war with China (recall the Sino-Indian war of 1962) across the world’s roughest mountainous terrain, India is unlikely to downplay any notable shifts in China’s military disposition and infrastructure development in the region. India’s traditional response is to highlight the levers it holds with Tibet, which is crucial buffer territory for the Chinese. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent visit with the Dalai Lama was certainly not lost on Beijing. Chinese media have already reported recently that India is reinforcing its troop presence in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, which flanks the Tibetan plateau. Singh also recently warned that India would have to “take adequate precautions” against Chinese “pinpricks” in Jammu and Kashmir, while maintaining hope of peaceful dialogue.The Chinese relief work in the area so far does not appear to have reached the level of criticality that would prompt India to reinforce its troop presence in Kashmir. However, tensions are continuing to escalate in the region and any meaningful shift in India’s troop disposition would carry significant military implications for the wider region.India has been attempting at least symbolically to lower its war posture with Pakistan and better manage its territorial claims by reducing its troop presence in select parts of Indian-administered Kashmir. If India is instead compelled to beef up its military presence in the region in reaction to Sino-Pakistani defense cooperation, Pakistan will be tempted to respond in kind, creating another set of issues for the United States to try to manage on the subcontinent. Washington has faced a persistent struggle in trying to convince Pakistan’s military to focus on the counterinsurgency effort in Pakistan and Afghanistan and leave it to the United States to ensure the Indian threat remains in check. Though the Pakistani security establishment is gradually adjusting its threat matrix to acknowledge the war right now is at home and not with India, Pakistan’s troop disposition remains largely unchanged, with 147,000 troops devoted to the counterinsurgency effort in northwestern Pakistan and roughly 150,000 troops in standard deployment formation along the eastern border with India.

The United States, like India, is keeping a watchful eye on China’s military movements on the subcontinent, providing another reason for the two to collaborate more closely on military affairs. Willard was quoted by the Indian state press Sept. 10 as saying that “any change in military relations or military maneuvers by China that raises concerns of India” could fall within U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, while also maintaining this is an issue for the Indian military to handle on its own. 

Though the United States is being exceedingly cautious in defining its role in this affair, it cannot avoid the fact that every time U.S. and Indian defense officials get together to discuss Pakistan and China, Islamabad’s fears of a U.S.-Indian military partnership are reinforced, drawing the Pakistanis closer to China. This combination of insecurities is creating a self-perpetuating threat matrix on the subcontinent with implications for U.S., Indian, Chinese and Pakistani defense strategy.

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7. September 2010 by admin.

Rethinking American Options on Iran

By George FriedmanCourtsey: www.stratfor.comPublic discussion of potential attacks on Iran’s nuclear development sites is surging again. This has happened before. On several occasions, leaks about potential airstrikes have created an atmosphere of impending war. These leaks normally coincided with diplomatic initiatives and were designed to intimidate the Iranians and facilitate a settlement favorable to the United States and Israel. These initiatives have failed in the past. It is therefore reasonable to associate the current avalanche of reports with the imposition of sanctions and view it as an attempt to increase the pressure on Iran and either force a policy shift or take advantage of divisions within the regime.My first instinct is to dismiss the war talk as simply another round of psychological warfare against Iran, this time originating with Israel. Most of the reports indicate that Israel is on the verge of attacking Iran. From a psychological-warfare standpoint, this sets up the good-cop/bad-cop routine. The Israelis play the mad dog barely restrained by the more sober Americans, who urge the Iranians through intermediaries to make concessions and head off a war. As I said, we have been here before several times, and this hasn’t worked. The worst sin of intelligence is complacency, the belief that simply because something has happened (or has not happened) several times before it is not going to happen this time. But each episode must be considered carefully in its own light and preconceptions from previous episodes must be banished. Indeed, the previous episodes might well have been intended to lull the Iranians into complacency themselves. Paradoxically, the very existence of another round of war talk could be intended to convince the Iranians that war is distant while covert war preparations take place. An attack may be in the offing, but the public displays neither confirm nor deny that possibility.

The Evolving Iranian Assessment

STRATFOR has gone through three phases in its evaluation of the possibility of war. The first, which was in place until July 2009, held that while Iran was working toward a nuclear weapon, its progress could not be judged by its accumulation of enriched uranium. While that would give you an underground explosion, the creation of a weapon required sophisticated technologies for ruggedizing and miniaturizing the device, along with a very reliable delivery system. In our view, Iran might be nearing a testable device but it was far from a deliverable weapon. Therefore, we dismissed war talk and argued that there was no meaningful pressure for an attack on Iran.We modified this view somewhat in July 2009, after the Iranian elections and the demonstrations. While we dismissed the significance of the demonstrations, we noted close collaboration developing between Russia and Iran. That meant there could be no effective sanctions against Iran, so stalling for time in order for sanctions to work had no value. Therefore, the possibility of a strike increased. But then Russian support stalled as well, and we turned back to our analysis, adding to it an evaluation of potential Iranian responses to any air attack. We noted three potential counters: activating Shiite militant groups (most notably Hezbollah), creating chaos in Iraq and blocking the Strait of Hormuz, through which 45 percent of global oil exports travel. Of the three Iranian counters, the last was the real “nuclear option.” Interfering with the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf would raise oil prices stunningly and would certainly abort the tepid global economic recovery. Iran would have the option of plunging the world into a global recession or worse. There has been debate over whether Iran would choose to do the latter or whether the U.S. Navy could rapidly clear mines. It is hard to imagine how an Iranian government could survive air attacks without countering them in some way. It is also a painful lesson of history that the confidence of any military force cannot be a guide to its performance. At the very least, there is a possibility that the Iranians could block the Strait of Hormuz, and that means the possibility of devastating global economic consequences. That is a massive risk for the United States to take, against an unknown probability of successful Iranian action. In our mind, it was not a risk that the United States could take, especially when added to the other Iranian counters. Therefore, we did not think the United States would strike.Certainly, we did not believe that the Israelis would strike Iran alone. First, the Israelis are much less likely to succeed than the Americans would be, given the size of their force and their distance from Iran (not to mention the fact that they would have to traverse either Turkish, Iraqi or Saudi airspace). More important, Israel lacks the ability to mitigate any consequences. Any Israeli attack would have to be coordinated with the United States so that the United States could alert and deploy its counter-mine, anti-submarine and missile-suppression assets. For Israel to act without giving the United States time to mitigate the Hormuz option would put Israel in the position of triggering a global economic crisis. The political consequences of that would not be manageable by Israel. Therefore, we found an Israeli strike against Iran without U.S. involvement difficult to imagine.

The Current Evaluation

Our current view is that the accumulation of enough enriched uranium to build a weapon does not mean that the Iranians are anywhere close to having a weapon. Moreover, the risks inherent in an airstrike on its nuclear facilities outstrip the benefits (and even that assumes that the entire nuclear industry is destroyed in one fell swoop — an unsure outcome at best). It also assumes the absence of other necessary technologies. Assumptions of U.S. prowess against mines might be faulty, and so, too, could my assumption about weapon development. The calculus becomes murky, and one would expect all governments involved to be waffling.There is, of course, a massive additional issue. Apart from the direct actions that Iran might make, there is the fact that the destruction of its nuclear capability would not solve the underlying strategic challenge that Iran poses. It has the largest military force in the Persian Gulf, absent the United States. The United States is in the process of withdrawing from Iraq, which would further diminish the ability of the United States to contain Iran. Therefore, a surgical strike on Iran’s nuclear capability combined with the continuing withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq would create a profound strategic crisis in the Persian Gulf.The country most concerned about Iran is not Israel, but Saudi Arabia. The Saudis recall the result of the last strategic imbalance in the region, when Iraq, following its armistice with Iran, proceeded to invade Kuwait, opening the possibility that its next intention was to seize the northeastern oil fields of Saudi Arabia. In that case, the United States intervened. Given that the United States is now withdrawing from Iraq, intervention following withdrawal would be politically difficult unless the threat to the United States was clear. More important, the Iranians might not give the Saudis the present Saddam Hussein gave them by seizing Kuwait and then halting. They might continue. They certainly have the military capacity to try. In a real sense, the Iranians would not have to execute such a military operation in order to gain the benefits. The simple imbalance of forces would compel the Saudis and others in the Persian Gulf to seek a political accommodation with the Iranians. Strategic domination of the Persian Gulf does not necessarily require military occupation — as the Americans have abundantly demonstrated over the past 40 years. It merely requires the ability to carry out those operations. The Saudis, therefore, have been far quieter — and far more urgent — than the Israelis in asking the United States to do something about the Iranians. The Saudis certainly do not want the United States to leave Iraq. They want the Americans there as a blocking force protecting Saudi Arabia but not positioned on Saudi soil. They obviously are not happy about Iran’s nuclear efforts, but the Saudis see the conventional and nuclear threat as a single entity. The collapse of the Iran-Iraq balance of power has left the Arabian Peninsula in a precarious position.King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia did an interesting thing a few weeks ago. He visited Lebanon personally and in the company of the president of Syria. The Syrian and Saudi regimes are not normally friendly, given different ideologies, Syria’s close relationship with Iran and their divergent interests in Lebanon. But there they were together, meeting with the Lebanese government and giving not very subtle warnings to Hezbollah. Saudi influence and money and the threat of Iran jeopardizing the Saudi regime by excessive adventurism seems to have created an anti-Hezbollah dynamic in Lebanon. Hezbollah is suddenly finding many of its supposed allies cooperating with some of its certain enemies. The threat of a Hezbollah response to an airstrike on Iran seems to be mitigated somewhat.

Eliminating Iranian Leverage In Hormuz

I said that there were three counters. One was Hezbollah, which is the least potent of the three from the American perspective. The other two are Iraq and Hormuz. If the Iraqis were able to form a government that boxed in pro-Iranian factions in a manner similar to how Hezbollah is being tentatively contained, then the second Iranian counter would be weakened. That would “just” leave the major issue — Hormuz.The problem with Hormuz is that the United States cannot tolerate any risk there. The only way to control that risk is to destroy Iranian naval capability before airstrikes on nuclear targets take place. Since many of the Iranian mine layers would be small boats, this would mean an extensive air campaign and special operations forces raids against Iranian ports designed to destroy anything that could lay mines, along with any and all potential mine-storage facilities, anti-ship missile emplacements, submarines and aircraft. Put simply, any piece of infrastructure within a few miles of any port would need to be eliminated. The risk to Hormuz cannot be eliminated after the attack on nuclear sites. It must be eliminated before an attack on the nuclear sites. And the damage must be overwhelming. There are two benefits to this strategy. First, the nuclear facilities aren’t going anywhere. It is the facilities that are producing the enriched uranium and other parts of the weapon that must be destroyed more than any uranium that has already been enriched. And the vast bulk of those facilities will remain where they are even if there is an attack on Iran’s maritime capabilities. Key personnel would undoubtedly escape, but considering that within minutes of the first American strike anywhere in Iran a mass evacuation of key scientists would be under way anyway, there is little appreciable difference between a first strike against nuclear sites and a first strike against maritime targets. (U.S. air assets are good, but even the United States cannot strike 100-plus targets simultaneously.) Second, the counter-nuclear strategy wouldn’t deal with the more fundamental problem of Iran’s conventional military power. This opening gambit would necessarily attack Iran’s command-and-control, air-defense and offensive air capabilities as well as maritime capabilities. This would sequence with an attack on the nuclear capabilities and could be extended into a prolonged air campaign targeting Iran’s ground forces.The United States is very good at gaining command of the air and attacking conventional military capabilities (see Yugoslavia in 1999). Its strategic air capability is massive and, unlike most of the U.S. military, underutilized. The United States also has substantial air forces deployed around Iran, along with special operations forces teams trained in penetration, evasion and targeting, and satellite surveillance. Far from the less-than-rewarding task of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, going after Iran would be the kind of war the United States excels at fighting. No conventional land invasion, no boots-on-the-ground occupation, just a very thorough bombing campaign. If regime change happens as a consequence, great, but that is not the primary goal. Defanging the Iranian state is.It is also the only type of operation that could destroy the nuclear capabilities (and then some) while preventing an Iranian response. It would devastate Iran’s conventional military forces, eliminating the near-term threat to the Arabian Peninsula. Such an attack, properly executed, would be the worst-case scenario for Iran and, in my view, the only way an extended air campaign against nuclear facilities could be safely executed. Just as Iran’s domination of the Persian Gulf rests on its ability to conduct military operations, not on its actually conducting the operations, the reverse is also true. It is the capacity and apparent will to conduct broadened military operations against Iran that can shape Iranian calculations and decision-making. So long as the only threat is to Iran’s nuclear facilities, its conventional forces remain intact and its counter options remain viable, Iran will not shift its strategy. Once its counter options are shut down and its conventional forces are put at risk, Iran must draw up another calculus. In this scenario, Israel is a marginal player. The United States is the only significant actor, and it might not strike Iran simply over the nuclear issue. That’s not a major U.S. problem. But the continuing withdrawal from Iraq and Iran’s conventional forces are very much an American problem. Destroying Iran’s nuclear capability is merely an added benefit. Given the Saudi intervention in Lebanese politics, this scenario now requires a radical change in Iraq, one in which a government would be quickly formed and Iranian influence quickly curtailed. Interestingly, we have heard recent comments by administration officials asserting that Iranian influence has, in fact, been dramatically reduced. At present, such a reduction is not obvious to us, but the first step of shifting perceptions tends to be propaganda. If such a reduction became real, then the two lesser Iranian counter moves would be blocked and the U.S. offensive option would become more viable.

Internal Tension in Tehran

At this point, we would expect to see the Iranians recalculating their position, with some of the clerical leadership using the shifting sands of Lebanon against Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Indeed, there have been many indications of internal stress, not between the mythical democratic masses and the elite, but within the elite itself. This past weekend the Iranian speaker of the house attacked Ahmadinejad’s handling of special emissaries. For what purpose we don’t yet know, but the internal tension is growing.The Iranians are not concerned about the sanctions. The destruction of their nuclear capacity would, from their point of view, be a pity. But the destruction of large amounts of their conventional forces would threaten not only their goals in the wider Islamic world but also their stability at home. That would be unacceptable and would require a shift in their general strategy. From the Iranian point of view — and from ours — Washington’s intentions are opaque. But when we consider the Obama administration’s stated need to withdraw from Iraq, Saudi pressure on the United States not to withdraw while Iran remains a threat, Saudi moves against Hezbollah to split Syria from Iran and Israeli pressure on the United States to deal with nuclear weapons, the pieces for a new American strategy are emerging from the mist. Certainly the Iranians appear to be nervous. And the threat of a new strategy might just be enough to move the Iranians off dead center. If they don’t, logic would dictate the consideration of a broader treatment of the military problem posed by Iran.

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28. August 2010 by admin.

GEOPOLITICS OF USA - ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP

 In geopolitics, we are frequently confornted with what appears to be a great deal of movement. Sometimes it is current geopolitical reality breaking apart and a new one emerging. Sometimes it is simply meaningless motion in a fixed geographical reality - nothing more than illusion of maneuver generated for political reasons as players maneuver within a fixed framework for minor advantage or internal political reasons. In other words, we need to distinguish between geopolitics and politics.

Nowhere it is more important than in the Middle East, which has come to be defined in terms of Arab-Israeli equations for reasons I fully don’t understand. Leaving that aside, in recent months we have seen a lot of endless happenings and rumours of happenings. The current impasse between US and Israel, Flotilla Crisis, Iran’s outbursts against Israel, Turkey is no longer a trusted ally, etc. Israel has always been invoked as an ally of US against “War on Terror” (though this term is no longer used) - or even the very reason why US is in the war in first place. Some will say that Israel maneuvered the US into Iraq to serve its own purpose. Some will say it orchestrated 9/11 for its own ends. Others will say that , had US supported Israel more resolutely, there would have been no 9/11.

There is probably no relationship on which people have more diverging views than on that between US and Israel. This seems to be an opportune time to consider the geopolitics of US-Israeli relationship.

Let us begin with some obvious political points. There is relatively small Jewish community in the United States, though its political influence is magnified by its strategic location in critical states like New York and the fact that it is more actively involved in politics than some other ethnic groups.

The Jewish community, as tends to be the case with groups, is deeply divided on many issues. It tends to be united on one issue - Israel - but not with the same intensity as in the past, nor with even semblance of agreement on the specifics. The American Jewish community is as divided as the Israeli Jewish community, with a large segment of people who don’t care much. At the same time, this community donates a huge amount of money to American and Israeli organizations, including groups that lobby on behalf of Israeli issues in Washington. These lobbying entities lean toward the right wing of Israel’s political spectrum, in large part because the Israeli right has tended to govern in the past generation and these groups tend to follow the dominant Israeli strand. It is also because American Jews who contribute to Israel lobby organizations lean right in both Israeli and American politics.

The Israel lobby, which has a great deal of money and experience, is extremely influential in Washington. For decades now, it has done a good job of ensuring that Israeli interests are attended to in Washington, and certainly on some issues it has skewed US policy on the Middle East.

There are however two important questions. The first is whether this is in any way unique. Is a strong Israel lobby an unprecedented intrusion into foreign policy? The key question though, is whether Israeli interests diverge from US interests to the extent that the Israel lobby is taking US foreign policy in directions it wouldn’t go otherwise, in directions that counter the US national interest.

Begin with the first question. Prior to both world wars there was extensive debate on whether the US should intervene in the war. In both cases, the British government lobbied extensively for US intervention on behalf of UK. The British made two arguments. The first was that US shared a heritage with England - code for the idea that white Anglo-Saxon Protestants should stand with white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The second was that there was a fundamental political affinity between British and US democracy from German authoritarianism.

Many Americans, including President Franklin Roosevelt, believed both the arguments. The British lobby was quite powerful. There was German lobby as well, but it lacked the numbers, the money and the traditions to draw on.

But from geopolitical viewpoint, both the arguments were very weak. The US and UK not only were separate countries, they had fought some bitter wars over the question. As for political institutions, geopolitics as a method, is fairly insensitive to the moral claims of regimes. It works on the basis of interest. On that basis, an intervention on behalf of UK in both wars made sense because it provided a relatively low cost way of preventing Germany from dominating Europe and challenging American sea power. In the end, it wasn’t the lobbying interest, massive though it was, but geopolitical necessity that drove US intervention.

The second question, then is: Has the Israel lobby caused the US to act in ways that contravene US interests? For example, by getting the US to support Israel, did it turn Arab world against the Americans? Did it support Israel against Palestinians, thereby generate an Islamist radicalism that led to 9/11? Did it manipulate US policy on Iraq so that US invaded Iraq on behalf of Israel? These allegations have all been made. If true, they are very serious charges.

It is important to remember that US-Israeli ties were not extraordinarily close prior to 1967. President Harry Truman recognized Israel, but the US had not provided major military aid and support. Israel, always in need of an outside supply of weapons, first depended on the Soviet Union, which shipped via Czechoslovakia. When the Soviets realized that Israeli socialists were anti-Soviet as well, they dropped Israel.

Israel’s next patron was France. France was fighting to hold on to Algeria and maintain its influence in Lebanon and Syria, both former French protectorates. The French saw Israel as a natural ally. It was France that really created the Israeli air force and provided the first technology for Israeli nuclear weapons.

The US was actively hostile to Israel during this period. In 1956, following Gamal Abdul Nasser’s seizure of power in Egypt, Cairo nationalized the Suez Canal. Without the canal, the British Empire was finished, and ultimately the French were as well. UK and France worked secretly with Israel, and Israel invaded the Sinai. Then, in order to protect the Suez Canal from and Israeli-Egyptian war, a Franco-British force parachuted in to seize the canal. President Dwight Eisenhower forced the British and French to withdraw - as well as the Israelis. US Israeli relations remained chilly for quite some time.

The break point with France came in 1967. The Israelis, under pressure from Egypt, decided to invade Egypt, Jordan and Syria - ignoring French President Charles de Gaulle’s demand that they do not do so. As a result, France broke its alignment with Israel.

This was a critical moment in US-Israeli relationship. Israel needed a source of weaponry as its national security needs vastly outstripped its industrial base. It was at this point that the Israeli lobby in the United States became critical. Israel wanted a relationship with the US and Israeli lobby brought tremendous pressure to bear, picturing Israel as a heroic, embattled democracy, surrounded by bloodthirsty neighbours, badly needing US help. President Lyndon B. Johnson, bogged down in Vietnam and wanting to shore up his base, saw a popular cause in Israel and tilted toward it.

But there were critical strategic issues as well. Syria and Iraq had both shifted into pro-Soviet group, as had Egypt. Some have argued that, had US not supported Israel, this would not have happened. This, however, runs in face of history. It was US that forced the Israeli out of Sinai in 1956, but the Egyptians moved into the Soviet camp anyway. The argument that it was uncritical support for Israel that caused anti-Americanism in the Arab world doesn’t hold ground either. The Egyptians became anti-American in spite of an essentially anti-Israeli position in 1956. By 1957 Egypt was a Soviet ally.

The Americans ultimately tilted toward Israel because of this reason, not the other way round. Egypt was not only providing the Soviets with naval and air bases, it also was running covert operations in the Arabian Peninsula to bring down the conservative sheikdoms there, including Saudi’s. The Soviets were seen as using Egypt as base of operations against US. Syria was seen as another dangerous radical power, along with Iraq. The defense of the Arabian Peninsula from radical, pro-Soviet Arab movements, as well as the defense of Jordan, became a central interest of US.

Israel was seen as contribution by threatening the security of both Egypt and Syria. The Saudi fear of PLO was palpable. Riyadh saw the Soviet inspired liberation movements as threatening to Saudi’s survival. Israel was engaged in a covert war against PLO and related groups, and that was exactly what the Saudis wanted from late 1960s until early 1980s. Israel’s covert capability against PLO, coupled with its overt military power against Egypt and Syria, was very much in the American interest and that of its Arab allies. It was a low cost solution to some very difficult strategic problems at a time when US was either in Vietnam or recovering from the war.

The occupation of the Sinai, the West Bank and Golan Heights in 1967 was not in US interest. The US wanted Israel to carry out its mission against Soviet backed paramitlitaries and tie down Egypt and Syria, but the occupation was not seen as part of the mission. The Israelis intially expected to convert their occupation of the territories into peace treaty, but that only happend much later, with Egypt. At Khartoum summit in 1967, the Arabs delivered the famous 3 NOes: NO NEGOTIATIONS, NO RECOGNITION & NO PEACE. Israel became an occupying power.

The claim has been made that if US had forced Israelis out of Gaza and West Bank, then it would receive credit and peace would follow. There are 3 problems with that theory:

1. Israelis did not occupy these areas prior to 1967 and there was no peace then,
2. groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have said that a withdrawal would not end the state of war with Israel, and therefore,
3. the withdrawal would create friction with Israel without any clear payoff from the Arabs.

It must be remembered that Egypt and Jordan have both signed peace treaties with Israel and does not seem to care about the Palestinians. The Saudis have never risked a thing for the Palestinians, nor have Iranians. The Syrians have, but they are far more interested in investing in Beirut hotels than in invading Israel. No Arab state is interested in the Palestinians, except for those that are actively hostile. There is Arab and Islamic public opinion and non state organizations, but none would be satisfied with an Israeli withdrawal. They want Israel destroyed. Even if US withdrew all support for Israel, however, Israel would not be destroyed. The radical Arabs do not want withdrawal; they want destruction. And the moderate Arabs don’t care about the Palestinians beyond rhetoric.

Noe getting to the heart of the matter. If US broke all ties with Israel, would the US geopolitical situation be improved? In other words, if it broke with Israel, would Iran or al Qaeda come to view US in a different way? Critics of the Israel lobby argue that,except for the Israeli lobby’s influence, the US would be much secure.

Al Qaeda does not perceive Israel by itself as its central problem. Its goal is the resurrection of the caliphate - and it sees US support for muslim regimes as the central problem. If US abandoned Israel, al Qaeda would still confront US support for countries such as Egypt, Saudi and Pakistan. For al Qaeda, Israel is an important issue, but for US to soothe al Qaeda, it would have to abandon not only Israel but also its allies in Middle East. As for Iran, the Iranian rhetoric has never matched its action. During Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian military purchased weapons and parts from the Israelis. It was more delighted than anyone when Israel destroyed the Iraqi  nuclear reactor in 1981. Iran’s problem with US is its presence in Iraq, its naval presence in Persian Gulf and its support for the Kurds. If Israel disappeared from the world map, Iran’s problems would still remain the same.

It has been said that Israelis inspired the US invasion of Iraq. There is no doubt that Israel was pleased when, after 9/11, US saw itself as an anti-Islamist power. Let me clarify that, benefitting from something does not mean you caused it. However, it has never been clear that Israelis were all that enthusiastic about invading Iraq. Neoconservative Jews like Paul Wolfowitz were enthusiastic, as were non Jews like Dick Cheney. But the Israeli view of a US invasion of Iraq was at the most mixed, and to some extent dubious. The Israelis liked the Iran-Iraq balance of power and were close allies of Turkey, which certainly opposed the invasion. The claim that Israel supported the invasion comes from those who mistake neoconservatives, many of whom are Jews who support Israel, with Israeli foreign policy, which was much more nuanced that the neoconservatives. The Israelis were not at all clear about what the Americans were doing in Iraq, but they were in no position to complain.

Israeli-US relations have gone through three phases. From 1948 to 1967, the US supported the Israel’s right to exist but was not its patron. In the 1967-1991 period, the Israelis were a key American asset in the Cold War. From 1991- the present, the relationship has remained close and little bumpy lately but it is not pivotal to either country. Whether it will remain in the 3rd phase or the relationship will enter into a new phase, only time can say. The fact is US cannot help Israel with Hezbollah or Hamas. The Israelis cannot help US in Iraq or Afghanistan. If the relationship were severed, it would have remarkably little impact on either country - though keeping the relationship is more valuable than severing it.

To sum up:

There is a powerful Jewish, pro Israel lobby in Washington, though it was not very successful in first 20 years or so of Israel’s history. When US policy toward Israel swung in 1967 it has far more to do with geopolitical interests than with lobbying. The US needed help with Egypt and Syria and Israel could provide it. Lobbying appeared to be the key, but it wasn’t; geopolitical necessity was. Egypt was anti-American even when US was anti-Israeli. Al Qaeda would be anti-American even if the US were anti-Israel. Rhetoric aside, Iran has never taken direct action against Israel and nor does it seem to be a real possibility.(existential threat notwithstanding- I will cover that part in my next note).

Portraying the Israeli lobby as super powerful behooves 2 groups: Critics of US Middle Eastern policy and the Israel lobby itself. Critics get to say the US relationship with Israel is the result of manipulation and corruption. Thus, they get to avoid discussing the actual history of Israel, US and Middle East.

The lobby benefits by projecting robust power because one of its jobs is to raise funds - and the image of a killer lobby opens a lot more pockets than does the idea that both Israel and US are simply pursuing their geopolitical interests and that things would go on pretty much the same even without slick lobbying.

The great irony is that the critics of US policy and the Israeli lobby both want to believe in the same myth - that great powers can be manipulated to harm themselves by crafty politicians.

The British did not get US into the World Wars, it was not anti-Nazism that led US to war, similarly the Israelis aren’t maneuvering the Americans into being pro-Israel. Beyond its ability to exert itself on small things, Israeli lobby is powerful in influencing Washington to do what it is going to do anyway.

What happens next in Afghanistan or Iraq  is not up to the Israeli lobby - though Israeli lobby and Saudi Embassy have a different story for it.

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19. June 2010 by admin.

The Geopolitics of Dope Over recent months, the level of violence along the U.S.-Mexican border has begun to rise substantially, with some of it spilling into the United States. Last week, the Mexican government began military operations on its side of the border against Mexican gangs engaged in smuggling drugs into the United States. The action apparently pushed some of the gang members north into the United States in a bid for sanctuary. Low-level violence is endemic to the border region. But while not without precedent, movement of organized, armed cadres into the United States on this scale goes beyond what has become accepted practice. The dynamics in the borderland are shifting and must be understood in a broader, geopolitical context. A low-friction border, one that easily could be traversed at low cost — without extended waits — was important to both sides. In 2006, the United States imported $198 billion in goods from Mexico and exported $134 billion to Mexico. This makes Mexico the third-largest trading partner of the United States and also makes it one of the more balanced major trade relationships the United States has. Loss of Mexican markets would hurt the U.S. economy substantially. The U.S. advantage in selling to Mexico is low-cost transport. Lose that through time delays at the border and the Mexican market becomes competitive for other countries. About 13 percent of all U.S. exports are bought by Mexico.There always have been uncontrolled economic transactions and movements along the border. Both sides understood that the cost of controlling and monitoring these transactions outstripped the benefit. Long before NAFTA came into existence, social and economic movement in both directions — but particularly from Mexico to the United States — were fairly uncontrolled. Borderland transactions in particular, local transactions in proximity to the border region (retail shopping, agricultural transfers and so on), were uncontrolled. So was smuggling. Trade in stolen U.S. cars and parts shipped into Mexico, labor from Mexico shipped into the United States, etc., were seen as tolerable costs for an open border.The U.S. border with Mexico has been intermittently turbulent since the U.S. occupation of northern Mexico. The annexation of Texas following its anti-Mexican revolution and the Mexican-American War created a borderland, an area in which the political border is clearly delineated but the cultural and economic borders are less clear and more dynamic. This is the case with many borders, including the U.S.-Canadian one, but the Mexican border has gone through periods of turbulence in the past and is going through one right now. Not disrupting this trade and not raising its cost has been a fundamental principle of U.S.-Mexican relations, one long predating NAFTA. Leaving aside the contentious issue of whether illegal immigration hurts or helps the United States, the steps required to control that immigration would impede bilateral trade. The United States therefore has been loath to impose effective measures, since any measures that would be effective against population movement also would impose friction on trade. The United States has been willing to tolerate levels of criminality along the border. The only time when the United States shifted its position was when organized groups in Mexico both established themselves north of the political border and engaged in significant violence. Thus, in 1916, when the Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa began operations north of the border, the U.S. Army moved into Mexico to try to destroy his base of operations. This has been the line that, when crossed, motivated the United States to take action, regardless of the economic cost. The current upsurge in violence is now pushing that line. The United States has built-in demand for a range of illegal drugs, including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamines and marijuana. Regardless of decades of efforts, the United States has not been able to eradicate or even qualitatively reduce this demand. As an advanced industrial country, the United States has a great deal of money available to satisfy the demand for illegal drugs. This makes the supply of narcotics to a large market attractive. In fact, it almost doesn’t matter how large demand is. Regardless of how it varies, the economics are such that even a fraction of the current market will attract sellers. Even after processing, the cost of the product is quite low. What makes it an attractive product is the differential between the cost of production and the price it commands. In less-developed countries, supplying the American narcotics market creates huge income differentials. From the standpoint of a poor peasant, the differential between growing a product illegal in the United States compared with a legal product is enormous. From the standpoint of the processor, shippers and distributors, every step in the value chain creates tremendous incentives to engage in this activity over others. There are several factors governing price. The addictive nature of the product creates an inelastic demand curve in a market with high discretionary income. People will buy at whatever the price and somehow will find the money for the purchase. Illegality suppresses competition and drives cartelization. Processing, smuggling and distributing the drugs requires a complex supply chain. Businesses not prepared to engage in high-risk illegal activities are frozen out of the market. The cost of market entry is high, since the end-to-end system (from the fields to the users) both is a relationship business (strangers are not welcome) and requires substantial expertise, particularly in covert logistics. Finally, there is a built-in cost for protecting the supply chain once created. Because they are involved in an illegal business, drug dealers cannot take recourse to the courts or police to protect their assets. Protecting the supply chain and excluding competition are opposite sides of the same coin. Protecting assets is major cost of running a drug ring. It suppresses competition, both by killing it and by raising the cost of entry into the market. The illegality of the business requires that it be large enough to manage the supply chain and absorb the cost of protecting it. It gives high incentives to eliminate potential competitors and new entrants into the market. In the end, it creates a monopoly or small oligopoly in the business, where the comparative advantage ultimately devolves into the effectiveness of the supply chain and the efficiency of the private police force protecting it. That means that drug organizations evolve in several predictable ways. They have huge amounts of money flowing in from the U.S. market by selling relatively low-cost products at monopolistic prices into markets with inelastic demand curves. Second, they have unique expertise in covert logistics, expertise that can be transferred to the movement of other goods. Third, they develop substantial security capabilities, which can grow over time into full-blown paramilitary forces to protect the supply chain. Fourth, they are huge capital pools, investing in the domestic economy and manipulating the political system. Cartels can challenge — and supplant — governments. Between huge amounts of money available to bribe officials, and covert armies better equipped, trained and motivated than national police and military forces, the cartels can become the government — if in fact they didn’t originate in the government. Getting the government to deploy armed forces against the cartel can become a contradiction in terms. In their most extreme form, cartels are the government. Drug cartels have two weaknesses. First, they can be shattered in conflicts with challengers within the oligopoly or by splits within the cartels. Second, their supply chains can be broken from the outside. U.S. policy has historically been to attack the supply chains from the fields to the street distributors. Drug cartels have proven extremely robust and resilient in modifying the supply chains under pressure. When conflict occurs within and among cartels and systematic attacks against the supply chain take place, however, specific cartels can be broken — although the long-term result is the emergence of a new cartel system. In the 1980s, the United States manipulated various Colombian cartels into internal conflict. More important, the United States attacked the Colombian supply chain in the Caribbean as it moved from Colombia through Panama along various air and sea routes to the United States. The weakness of the Colombian cartel was its exposed supply chain from South America to the United States. U.S. military operations raised the cost so high that the route became uneconomic. The main route to American markets shifted from the Caribbean to the U.S.-Mexican border. It began as an alliance between sophisticated Colombian cartels and still-primitive Mexican gangs, but the balance of power inevitably shifted over time. Owning the supply link into the United States, the Mexicans increased their wealth and power until they absorbed more and more of the entire supply chain. Eventually, the Colombians were minimized and the Mexicans became the decisive power. The Americans fought the battle against the Colombians primarily in the Caribbean and southern Florida. The battle against the Mexican drug lords must be fought in the U.S.-Mexican borderland. And while the fight against the Colombians did not involve major disruptions to other economic patterns, the fight against the Mexican cartels involves potentially huge disruptions. In addition, the battle is going to be fought in a region that is already tense because of the immigration issue, and at least partly on U.S. soil. The cartel’s supply chain is embedded in the huge legal bilateral trade between the United States and Mexico. Remember that Mexico exports $198 billion to the United States and — according to the Mexican Economy Ministry — $1.6 billion to Japan and $1.7 billion to China, its next biggest markets. Mexico is just behind Canada as a U.S. trading partner and is a huge market running both ways. Disrupting the drug trade cannot be done without disrupting this other trade. With that much trade going on, you are not going to find the drugs. It isn’t going to happen. Police action, or action within each country’s legal procedures and protections, will not succeed. The cartels’ ability to evade, corrupt and absorb the losses is simply too great. Another solution is to allow easy access to the drug market for other producers, flooding the market, reducing the cost and eliminating the economic incentive and technical advantage of the cartel. That would mean legalizing drugs. That is simply not going to happen in the United States. It is a political impossibility. This leaves the option of treating the issue as a military rather than police action. That would mean attacking the cartels as if they were a military force rather than a criminal group. It would mean that procedural rules would not be in place, and that the cartels would be treated as an enemy army. Leaving aside the complexities of U.S.-Mexican relations, cartels flourish by being hard to distinguish from the general population. This strategy not only would turn the cartels into a guerrilla force, it would treat northern Mexico as hostile occupied territory. Don’t even think of that possibility, absent a draft under which college-age Americans from upper-middle-class families would be sent to patrol Mexico — and be killed and wounded. The United States does not need a Gaza Strip on its southern border, so this won’t happen. The current efforts by the Mexican government might impede the various gangs, but they won’t break the cartel system. The supply chain along the border is simply too diffuse and too plastic. It shifts too easily under pressure. The border can’t be sealed, and the level of economic activity shields smuggling too well. Farmers in Mexico can’t be persuaded to stop growing illegal drugs for the same reason that Bolivians and Afghans can’t. Market demand is too high and alternatives too bleak. The Mexican supply chain is too robust — and too profitable — to break easily. The likely course is a multigenerational pattern of instability along the border. More important, there will be a substantial transfer of wealth from the United States to Mexico in return for an intrinsically low-cost consumable product — drugs. This will be one of the sources of capital that will build the Mexican economy, which today is 14th largest in the world. The accumulation of drug money is and will continue finding its way into the Mexican economy, creating a pool of investment capital. The children and grandchildren of the Zetas will be running banks, running for president, building art museums and telling amusing anecdotes about how grandpa made his money running blow into Nuevo Laredo. It will also destabilize the U.S. Southwest while grandpa makes his pile. As is frequently the case, it is a problem for which there are no good solutions, or for which the solution is one without real support.

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