9. November 2010 by admin.

Why Obama’s India Trip Matters? President Barack Obama is on a high-profile diplomatic trip to India this week, furthering Obama’s goal of deepening U.S.-India ties and addressing a number of related issues. Since entering office, Obama has continued President George W. Bush’s emphasis on building a special relationship between the two countries, making Indian Prime Minister Manmohan K. Singh the guest of honor at Obama’s first official state dinner. Here’s what’s happening on the visit, why it matters, and what it could mean for the two countries and beyond.

• Why the U.S. and India Want to Be Best Friends  The New York Times’ Jim Yardley writes, “Both countries are eager to build on their improved ties and set up a unique, special relationship, given that together they represent the world’s richest and largest democracies. Faced with a rising authoritarian China, and an economically wounded Europe, a weakened United States is casting about for global partners. India would seem a nice fit.”

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6. November 2010 by admin.

U.S. President Barack Obama begins a four-day visit to India today (on Nov. 6), heading a 375-member entourage of security personnel, policymakers, business leaders and journalists to demonstrate to the world that the U.S.-Indian relationship is serious and growing.Obama will begin his visit in the financial hub of Mumbai, where he will make a symbolic show of solidarity with India on the counterterrorism front by staying at the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, which came under attack in 2008, and highlight corporate compatibility between the two countries. Obama will spend the rest of the trip in New Delhi, where he will address a joint session of Parliament, a reciprocal gesture following Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s address to Congress in November 2009.Most Indians and Americans think and hope that Indo-US relations could be much better and closer than what it is now. However, regardless of what one may want the relations to be like, the geopolitical needs of both the countries are different and there are and will be numerous issues on which India and America will have to agree to disagree on. How did the biggest and largest democracies of the world drifted apart and failed to build close and deep relationship is a matter of historical and geopolitical analysis and beyond the scope of current article. But in spite of that, there is little doubt that the United States and India are sounding a much deeper and strategic relationship, as illustrated by their bilateral civilian nuclear agreement, growing business links, arms deals and a host of military exercises taking place over the next several months. Still, very real and unavoidable constraints on ties remain in place, constraints that will hamper this already uneasy partnership from developing into a robust alliance. The immediate hindrance lies in the U.S. strategic need to bolster Pakistan to shape a U.S. exit strategy from Afghanistan and try to shore up the balance of power on the subcontinent. In the longer term, however, India could use the threat of Chinese expansion in Beijing’s perceived sphere of influence to enhance its relationship with Washington.Strategic MotivationsIndia does not make friends easily (or has failed to recognize and make friends easily), particularly friends with militaries capable of reaching the subcontinent. India grew closer to the Soviets during the Cold War out of fear of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan, but only because Moscow’s military reach into the subcontinent was limited. After the Soviet Union collapsed, India was left without a meaningful ally, all the while becoming deeply resentful of the blind eye Washington turned toward the rise of Pakistan’s Islamist proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan.The 9/11 attacks finally created an opportunity for a U.S.-Indian relationship to materialize. Both countries had common cause to cooperate with each other against Pakistan, neutralize the jihadist threat and embark on a real, strategic partnership. For the United States, this was the time to play catch-up in balance-of-power politics in South Asia. The U.S. interest at any given point on the subcontinent is to prevent any one power from becoming strong to the point that it could challenge the United States, while at the same time protecting vital sea lanes running from East Asia to the Persian Gulf via the Indian Ocean basin. The United States has the naval assets to guard these maritime routes directly, but as it extends itself more and more worldwide, its need for regional proxies grows. Though India’s capabilities remain quite limited given its domestic challenge, it is an aspiring naval power with a deep fear of Chinese encroachment and Islamist militancy.India also has a massive consumer market of 1.2 billion people and has the United States at the top of its list of trading partners. A roughly balanced and diversified relationship exists between the two economies, even as protectionist tendencies run heavily on both sides of the trade divide. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the United States exported $16.4 billion worth of goods and services to India, mostly aircraft, fertilizers, computer hardware, scrap metal and medical equipment, while India exported $21 billion worth of goods and services to the United States, mostly information technology services, pharmaceuticals, textiles, machinery, gems and diamonds, iron and steel products, and food products. India thus makes a strong candidate for a regional U.S. proxy.But this is where a fundamental U.S.-Indian disconnect arises. India is far from interested in molding itself into a proxy of the global hegemon. India’s self-enclosed geography and internal strengths permit it to remain fiercely independent in its foreign policy calculations, unlike much weaker Pakistan, which needs an external patron to feel secure.The United States has been caught off guard every time New Delhi takes a stance that runs counter to U.S. interests, something that has happened despite the U.S. charm offensive toward India that revved up in 2005 with a civilian nuclear deal. India has refused to comply with U.S. sanctions on Iran, still has reservations about allowing U.S. firms into the Indian nuclear market after the bilateral nuclear deal, and protests what New Delhi perceives as U.S. interference in the Kashmir dispute. As a former Indian national security adviser put it, India is happy to have its partnership with the United States, but Washington is going to have to get used to hearing “no” from India on numerous issues.The Pakistan ProblemThe much more urgent misalignment of interests hindering the U.S.-India relationship concerns Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan. In 2001, when al Qaeda struck the United States and Pakistan-backed militants attacked the Indian parliament soon after, India sensed an opportunity. The Cold War shackles on ties were broken as the urgency of a broader Islamist militant threat drove New Delhi and Washington together. India hoped the bond would sustain itself, keeping Pakistan isolated over the long term, but it was only a matter of time before U.S. efforts to balance India against Pakistan disappointed New Delhi.The United States has now reached a saturation point in its war in Afghanistan. While short-term military victories have provided Washington useful political cover as they do in all unpopular wars, they obscure the core disadvantage occupiers face against the insurgents when it comes to on-the-ground intelligence, corruption, population control, and the insurgent luxury of choosing the time and place of battle. Washington is thus shaping an exit strategy from Afghanistan. This necessarily will involve some sort of accommodation with the Taliban that only one power in the region has the relationship to orchestrate: Pakistan.Pakistan has every interest in having the United States as its patron and keeping it involved in the region, but not to the extent that U.S. military activity in the Pakistani-Afghan borderland risks severely destabilizing the Pakistani state. For its part, the United States does not want India to become the unchallenged hegemon of the subcontinent at the expense of a much weaker Pakistan. This means that in return for Pakistani cooperation in tying up loose ends in the jihadist war, Pakistan will expect the United States to facilitate a restoration of Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. This would extend Pakistan’s strategic depth, stifling any Indian attempt to develop a foothold in the region that could see Pakistan wind up in a pincer grip.This naturally upsets New Delhi, which maintains that Islamabad will continue to compensate for its military weakness by backing militant proxies to target the Indian state, something Washington is ignoring to achieve its goals in Afghanistan. India sees a Taliban political comeback in Afghanistan as setting the stage for Pakistan-backed militants to regroup. More worryingly for New Delhi, a number of these militants have been drawn into a much more unpredictable, lethal jihadist network that makes it harder for New Delhi to blame Pakistan for terrorist acts in India.India’s strategic interest calls for taking advantage of Islamabad’s sour relationship with the current Afghan government to build a foothold in Afghanistan with which to create an additional lever against Islamabad along Pakistan’s northwestern rim. India has done so primarily through a number of development projects. Besides being one of the top five bilateral donors to the war-torn country, India has thousands of laborers in Afghanistan building schools, hospitals, roads and power plants. One of the most notable projects India has been involved in is the funding and construction of a 218-kilometer (about 135 miles) highway from Zaranj in Afghanistan’s southwestern Nimroz province to Delaram in Farah province.Since Afghanistan forms a land bridge between South Asia and Central Asia, where vast amounts of energy and mineral resources are concentrated, India has a deeper interest in developing the necessary transit links to access the Central Asian energy market, which the Chinese already have tapped into extensively. India cannot rely on its Pakistani rival to allow Indian goods to flow overland. Under a current arrangement, Afghan goods to India must pass through Pakistan. But Pakistan does not allow Indian goods to transit Pakistan overland to Afghan markets. Instead, India relies on its favorable trading terms with Iran to transport Indian goods via the Iranian port of Chabahar to Afghanistan and on to Central Asia. In creating transit infrastructure in Afghanistan, like the Zaranj-Delaram highway, and between Afghanistan and Iran, India is developing alternative trade routes in the region that will allow it to bypass Pakistan.The Question of Indian Troops for AfghanistanWhether India should elevate its support for Afghanistan, to include deploying Indian forces to the country, has been the subject of quiet debate among Indian defense circles. The public rationale given for such a plan is that insurgents have targeted Indian laborers involved in reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, and that the small contingent of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in Afghanistan has proven insufficient to protect the laborers. In addition to regular attacks on Indian construction crews, the 2008 and 2009 bombings on the Indian Embassy in Kabul highlighted the threat that Pakistan could use its militant connections in Afghanistan to try and drive India out of the country.Those arguing for an Indian military deployment to Afghanistan believe that placing Indian troops in the country would sufficiently alarm Pakistan to divert forces from its east, where Pakistani forces are concentrated in Punjab along the Indo-Pakistani border, to its northwestern border with Afghanistan. This (they hope) would shift some of the focus of Pakistani-Indian conflict away from Kashmir and the Indian homeland. Those calling for Indian troops are making a dangerous assumption, however, that the United States will remain in Afghanistan for the long haul and will be there to contain attempts by Pakistan to act against Indian military overland expansion in the region.There are a number of reasons why this troop scenario is unlikely to play out. The most obvious constraint is the enormous logistical difficulty India would have in supplying troops in Afghanistan. If India cannot convince Pakistan to allow overland trade to Afghanistan, it can certainly rule out Pakistan agreeing to an Indian military supply line to Afghanistan. India is also extremely risk-averse when it comes to military deployments beyond its borders. It already is struggling with a counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir and in Naxalite territory along the country’s eastern belt and remembers the deadly fiasco that followed the Indian deployment of forces to Sri Lanka to counter the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the late 1980s. And Indian troops in Afghanistan would make prime targets for hardened jihadists receiving support from Pakistan.At the same time, India is unwilling to bow to Pakistani pressure by downgrading its presence in Afghanistan. An inevitable U.S. drawdown from the region and a Pakistani return to Afghanistan translates into a bigger security threat for India. The more India can dig its heels in Afghanistan, primarily through reconstruction projects, the better the chances it will develop some say in Afghan affairs with which to check Pakistan’s regional ambitions. For its part, Pakistan will continue to demand that the United States use its leverage with New Delhi to minimize the Indian presence in Afghanistan and hand over the task of shaping the future Afghan government to Islamabad.Though little of this discussion will hit the headlines, the disconnect in U.S.-Indian strategic interests — in which India wants the United States to sustain pressure on Islamabad and serve as a check on Pakistan-backed militancy while Washington needs to bolster Pakistan to withdraw from Afghanistan and maintain some balance in the region between the two nuclear rivals — will put a cloud over Obama’s high-profile visit. India might even have to share the spotlight during Obama’s tour, as rumors are circulating that the U.S. president may make a surprise visit to Afghanistan to show his dedication to the war effort. The U.S. administration has debated whether the president could make such a trip without stopping over in Pakistan to reduce the fallout that could emerge from having Air Force One bypass Pakistan in an Afghan-India trip. The delicate nature of these issues illustrates just how high-maintenance the region is for the United States, and how urgent Washington’s need is to keep relations with Pakistan on steady footing.Leveraging a Mutual Concern Over ChinaWhile Pakistan and Afghanistan are pulling India and the United States apart, China could keep the emerging U.S.-India partnership from derailing. China’s insatiable appetite for resources, heavy reliance on export trade and overarching need to protect those vital commercial supply lines has driven Chinese naval expansion into the Indian Ocean Basin, namely through ports in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan and overland linkages through Pakistan and Myanmar on India’s flanks. Indian fears of Chinese encirclement have prompted New Delhi to modernize and expand the Indian navy. Just as the United States is interested in bolstering Japan’s naval defenses, Washington (along with Japan) views Indian military expansion in the Indian Ocean as a useful hedge against China.India has watched with concern as China has become more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir and has broached the suspect of more robust military assistance to Pakistan during its present time of need. Moreover, while India’s Nepal policy has largely been on autopilot, China has quietly built up its clout in the small Himalayan kingdom, threatening to undermine New Delhi’s influence in a key buffer state. China also has attempted to create a closer relationship with the junta and ethnic factions in Myanmar, where Beijing seeks oil and natural gas pipelines that will give some of its energy imports an overland route that will allow it to replace the Strait of Malacca.Meanwhile, the United States is engaged in a standoff with China as it tries to end Beijing’s currency manipulation policies while Beijing is unwilling to comply due to the social and political costs of rapidly reforming its financial system. As bilateral trade tensions continue to simmer, China has sought to take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation with wars in the Islamic world to assert itself in areas of strategic interest, including the South China Sea and East China Sea and in territories it disputes with India. China’s sovereignty claims and military capability in the South China Sea are of particular concern to the United States. This level of assertiveness can be expected to grow as the People’s Liberation Army Navy continues to increase its clout in political affairs, though Beijing knows it must avoid provoking an outright confrontation with the United States.Though U.S. attention is currently absorbed in trying to work out an understanding with Pakistan on Afghanistan (an understanding that will severely undermine the U.S.-Indian relationship in the near term,) it is only a matter of time before U.S. attention turns back toward countries like China whose interests potentially are on a collision course with U.S. interests. As U.S. attention on China increases, India can highlight its own fears of Chinese expansion in South Asia to bolster the Indian relationship with Washington, especially if China is able to maintain its internal stability long enough to sustain a bold foreign policy. The China factor could prove particularly useful for New Delhi to voice its concerns over more pressing threats, like Pakistan, as India and the United States attempt to work out the kinks of their bilateral relationship. Ultimately, India and the United States will have to agree to disagree on a number of issues, relying on high-profile state visits to keep up appearances. But a mutual concern over China may help reduce some of the current tensions between New Delhi and Washington over Pakistan in the future.

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27. October 2010 by admin.

We are a week away from the 2010 U.S. midterm elections. The outcome is already locked in. Whether the Republicans take the House or the Senate is close to immaterial. It is almost certain that the dynamics of American domestic politics will change. The Democrats will lose their ability to impose cloture in the Senate and thereby shut off debate. Whether they lose the House or not, the Democrats will lose the ability to pass legislation at the will of the House Democratic leadership. The large majority held by the Democrats will be gone, and party discipline will not be strong enough (it never is) to prevent some defections. Should the Republicans win an overwhelming victory in both houses next week, they will still not have the votes to override presidential vetoes. Therefore they will not be able to legislate unilaterally, and if any legislation is to be passed it will have to be the result of negotiations between the president and the Republican Congressional leadership. Thus, whether the Democrats do better than expected or the Republicans win a massive victory, the practical result will be the same. When we consider the difficulties President Barack Obama had passing his health care legislation, even with powerful majorities in both houses, it is clear that he will not be able to push through any significant legislation without Republican agreement. The result will either be gridlock or a very different legislative agenda than we have seen in the first two years. These are not unique circumstances. Reversals in the first midterm election after a presidential election happened to Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. It does not mean that Obama is guaranteed to lose a re-election bid, although it does mean that, in order to win that election, he will have to operate in a very different way. It also means that the 2012 presidential campaign will begin next Wednesday on Nov. 3. Given his low approval ratings, Obama appears vulnerable and the Republican nomination has become extremely valuable. For his part, Obama does not have much time to lose in reshaping his presidency. With the Iowa caucuses about 15 months away and the Republicans holding momentum, the president will have to begin his campaign. Obama now has two options in terms of domestic strategy. The first is to continue to press his agenda, knowing that it will be voted down. If the domestic situation improves, he takes credit for it. If it doesn’t, he runs against Republican partisanship. The second option is to abandon his agenda, cooperate with the Republicans and re-establish his image as a centrist. Both have political advantages and disadvantages and present an important strategic decision for Obama to make.

The Foreign Policy Option

Obama also has a third option, which is to shift his focus from domestic policy to foreign policy. The founders created a system in which the president is inherently weak in domestic policy and able to take action only when his position in Congress is extremely strong. This was how the founders sought to avoid the tyranny of narrow majorities. At the same time, they made the president quite powerful in foreign policy regardless of Congress, and the evolution of the presidency over the centuries has further strengthened this power. Historically, when the president has been weak domestically, one option he has had is to appear powerful by focusing on foreign policy.For presidents like Clinton, this was not a particularly viable option in 1994-1996. The international system was quiet, and it was difficult to act meaningfully and decisively. It was easier for Reagan in 1982-1984. The Soviet Union was strong and threatening, and an aggressive anti-Soviet stance was popular and flowed from his 1980 campaign. Deploying the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile in Western Europe alienated his opponents, strengthened his position with his political base and allowed him to take the center (and ultimately pressured the Soviets into agreeing to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). By 1984, with the recession over, Reagan’s anti-Soviet stance helped him defeat Walter Mondale.Obama does not have Clinton’s problem. The international environment allows him to take a much more assertive stance than he has over the past two years. The war in Afghanistan is reaching a delicate negotiating state as reports of ongoing talks circulate. The Iraq war is far from stable, with 50,000 U.S. troops still there, and the Iranian issue is wide open. Israeli-Palestinian talks are also faltering, and there are a host of other foreign issues, ranging from China’s increasing assertiveness to Russia’s resurgent power to the ongoing decline in military power of America’s European allies. There are a range of issues that need to be addressed at the presidential level, many of which would resonate with at least some voters and allow Obama to be presidential in spite of weak political support.There are two problems with Obama becoming a foreign policy president. The first is that the country is focused on the economy and on domestic issues. If he focuses on foreign policy and the U.S. economy does not improve by 2012, it will cost him the election. His hope will be foreign policy successes, or at least the perception of being strong on national security, coupled with economic recovery or a plausible reason to blame the Republicans. This is a tricky maneuver, but his presidency no longer offers simple solutions. The second problem is that his presidency and campaign have been based on the general principle of accommodation rather than confrontation in foreign affairs, with the sole exception of Afghanistan, where he chose to be substantially more aggressive than his predecessor had been. The place where he was assertive is unlikely to yield a major foreign policy success, unless that success is a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. A negotiated settlement will be portrayed by the Republicans as capitulation rather than triumph. If he continues on the current course in Afghanistan, he will seem to be plodding down an old path and not pioneering a new one. Interestingly, if Obama’s goal is to appear strong on national security while regaining the center, Afghanistan offers the least attractive venue. His choices are negotiation, which would reinforce his image as an accommodationist in foreign policy, or continued war, which is not particularly new territory. He could deploy even more forces into Afghanistan, but then would risk looking like Lyndon Johnson in 1967, hurling troops at the enemy without a clear plan. He could, of course, create a massive crisis with Pakistan, but it would be extremely unlikely that such an effort would end well, given the situation in Afghanistan. Foreign policy presidents need to be successful.There is little to be done in Iraq at the moment except delay the withdrawal of forces, which adds little to his political position. Moreover, the core problem in Iraq at the moment is Iran and its support of disruptive forces. Obama could attempt to force an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, but that would require Hamas to change its position, which is unlikely, or that Israel make massive concessions, which it doesn’t think it has to do. The problem with Israel and the Palestinians is that peace talks, such as those under Clinton at Camp David, have a nasty tendency to end in chaos. The European, Russian and Chinese situations are of great importance, but they are not conducive to dramatic acts. The United States is not going to blockade China over the yuan or hold a stunning set of meetings with the Europeans to get them to increase their defense budgets and commit to more support for U.S. wars. And the situation regarding North Korea does not have the pressing urgency to justify U.S. action. There are many actions that would satisfy Obama’s accomodationist inclinations, but those would not serve well in portraying him as decisive in foreign policy.

The Iranian Option

This leaves the obvious choice: Iran. Iran is the one issue on which the president could galvanize public opinion. The Republicans have portrayed Obama as weak on combating militant Islamism. Many of the Democrats see Iran as a repressive violator of human rights, particularly after the crackdown on the Green Movement. The Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia, is afraid of Iran and wants the United States to do something more than provide $60 billion-worth of weapons over the next 10 years. The Israelis, obviously, are hostile. The Europeans are hostile to Iran but want to avoid escalation, unless it ends quickly and successfully and without a disruption of oil supplies. The Russians like the Iranians are a thorn in the American side, as are the Chinese, but neither would have much choice should the United States deal with Iran quickly and effectively. Moreover, the situation in Iraq would improve if Iran were to be neutralized, and the psychology in Afghanistan could also shift.If Obama were to use foreign policy to enhance his political standing through decisive action, and achieve some positive results in relations with foreign governments, the one place he could do it would be Iran. The issue is what he might have to do and what the risks would be. Nothing could, after all, hurt him more than an aggressive stance against Iran that failed to achieve its goals or turned into a military disaster for the United States. So far, Obama’s policy toward Iran has been to incrementally increase sanctions by building a weak coalition and allow the sanctions to create shifts in Iran’s domestic political situation. The idea is to weaken President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and strengthen his enemies, who are assumed to be more moderate and less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons. Obama has avoided overt military action against Iran, so a confrontation with Iran would require a deliberate shift in the U.S. stance, which would require a justification. The most obvious justification would be to claim that Iran is about to construct a nuclear device. Whether or not this is true would be immaterial. First, no one would be in a position to challenge the claim, and, second, Obama’s credibility in making the assertion would be much greater than George W. Bush’s, given that Obama does not have the 2003 weapons of mass destruction debacle to deal with and has the advantage of not having made such a claim before. Coming from Obama, the claim would confirm the views of the Republicans, while the Democrats would be hard-pressed to challenge him. In the face of this assertion, Obama would be forced to take action. He could appear reluctant to his base, decisive to the rest. The Republicans could not easily attack him. Nor would the claim be a lie. Defining what it means to almost possess nuclear weapons is nearly a metaphysical discussion. It requires merely a shift in definitions and assumptions. This is cynical scenario, but it can be aligned with reasonable concerns. Destroying Iran’s nuclear capability does not involve a one-day raid, nor is Iran without the ability to retaliate. Its nuclear facilities are in a number of places and Iran has had years to harden those facilities. Destroying the facilities might take an extended air campaign and might even require the use of special operations units to verify battle damage and complete the mission. In addition, military action against Iran’s naval forces would be needed to protect the oil routes through the Persian Gulf from small boat swarms and mines, anti-ship missile launchers would have to be attacked and Iranian air force and air defenses taken out. This would not solve the problem of the rest of Iran’s conventional forces, which would represent a threat to the region, so these forces would have to be attacked and reduced as well. An attack on Iran would not be an invasion, nor would it be a short war. Like Yugoslavia in 1999, it would be an extended air war lasting an unknown number of months. There would be American POWs from aircraft that were shot down or suffered mechanical failure over Iranian territory. There would be many civilian casualties, which the international media would focus on. It would not be an antiseptic campaign, but it would likely (though it is important to reiterate not certainly) destroy Iran’s nuclear capability and profoundly weaken its conventional forces. It would be a war based on American strengths in aerial warfare and technology, not on American weaknesses in counter insurgency. It would strengthen the Iranian regime (as aerial bombing usually does) by rallying the Iranian public to its side against the aggression. If the campaign were successful, the Iranian regime would be stronger politically, at least for a while, but eviscerated militarily. A successful campaign would ease the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, calm the Saudis and demonstrate to the Europeans American capability and will. It would also cause the Russians and Chinese to become very thoughtful. A campaign against Iran would have its risks. Iran could launch a terrorist campaign and attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, sending the global economy into a deep recession on soaring oil prices. It could also create a civil war in Iraq. U.S. intelligence could have missed the fact that the Iranians already have a deliverable nuclear weapon. All of these are possible risks, and, according to STRATFOR’s thinking, the risks outweigh the rewards. After all, the best laid military plan can end in a fiasco.We have argued that a negotiation with Iran in the order of President Richard Nixon’s reversal on China would be a lower-risk solution to the nuclear problem than the military option. But for Obama, this is politically difficult to do. Had Bush done this, he would have had the ideological credentials to deal with Iran, as Nixon had the ideological credentials to deal with China. But Obama does not. Negotiating an agreement with Iran in the wake of an electoral rout would open the floodgates to condemnation of Obama as an appeaser. In losing power, he loses the option for negotiation unless he is content to be a one-term president. I am arguing the following. First, Obama will be paralyzed on domestic policies by this election. He can craft a re-election campaign blaming the Republicans for gridlock. This has its advantages and disadvantages; the Republicans, charging that he refused to adjust to the electorate’s wishes, can blame him for the gridlock. It can go either way. The other option for Obama is to look for triumph in foreign policy where he has a weak hand. The only obvious way to achieve success that would have a positive effect on the U.S. strategic position is to attack Iran. Such an attack would have substantial advantages and very real dangers. It could change the dynamics of the Middle East and it could be a military failure. I am not claiming that Obama will decide to do this based on politics, although no U.S. president has ever engaged in foreign involvement without political considerations, nor should he. I am saying that, at this moment in history, given the domestic gridlock that appears to be in the offing, a shift to a foreign policy emphasis makes sense, Obama needs to be seen as an effective commander in chief and Iran is the logical target. This is not a prediction. Obama does not share his thoughts with me. It is merely speculation on the options Obama will have after the midterm elections, not what he will choose to do.

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18. August 2010 by admin.

Obama: Muslim missionary? Part 1 

Posted: August 16, 2010

By Chuck Norris

Unlike any other time in U.S. history, our First Amendment freedoms of speech and religion are in jeopardy. As if recently passed “hate-crime” laws and a politically correct culture weren’t bad enough, now our president is using internationalpressure and possibly law to establish a prohibition against insulting Islam or Muslims.

Let me remind us how we got here.

Speaking for most founders in his day, John Jay, America’s first chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, appointed by George Washington himself, said, “Providence has given to our people the choice of their rulers, and it is the duty, as well as the privilege and interest of our Christian nation to select and prefer Christians for their rulers.”

Two hundred years later, President Obama has already denied America’s rich Judeo-Christian heritage before the eyes and ears of other countries, as he publicly declared in Turkey on April 6, 2009, for the whole world to hear: “We do not consider ourselves a Christian nation.”

Then there was Cairo in June 2009, when President Obama vowed to establish “a new beginning between the United Statesand Muslims around the world … I also know civilization’s debt to Islam. … I also know that Islam has always been a part of America’s story. … And since our founding, American Muslims have enriched the United States. … So I have known Islam on three continents before coming to the region where it was first revealed.”

He goes on to say, “That experience guides my conviction that partnership between America and Islam must be based on what Islam is, not what it isn’t. And I consider it part of my responsibility as president of the United States to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear.”

That last line is really one of the most unique U.S. presidential religious passions and missions stated to date: “And I consider it part of my responsibility as president of the United States to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear.”

Another big question is: What did the president mean when he said, “That experience guides my conviction that partnership between America and Islam must be based on what Islam is, not what it isn’t”? It makes no sense at all to refer to a partnership between a country and religion – America and Islam. Why not say partnership between America and Muslim nations or a partnership between Americans and Muslims or even a partnership between Christianity and Islam? That comment is very strange to me and has a much deeper meaning.

Roughly six months later, in February 2010, Obama appointed Rashad Hussain to serve as his special envoy to theOrganization of the Islamic Conference, or OIC, an inter-governmental body of 56 Muslim countries that also forms an official body represented in the United Nations. (Where is the same treatment from this White House for countries that uphold Judeo-Christian values to unite and have the same treatment that allows them to form an official body represented in the U.N.? Or any religion, for that matter? There’s something rotten in the state of Denmark!)

Obama rejoiced, “I’m proud to announce today that I am appointing my special envoy to the OIC – Rashad Hussain. As an accomplished lawyer and a close and trusted member of my White House staff, Rashad has played a key role in developing the partnerships I called for in Cairo. And as a hafiz of the Quran, he is a respected member of the American Muslim community, and I thank him for carrying forward this important work.”

In 2007, then President George W. Bush explained the initial purpose for a OIC representative: “Our special envoy will listen to and learn from representatives from Muslim states, and will share with them America’s views and values. This is an opportunity for Americans to demonstrate to Muslim communities our interest in respectful dialogue and continued friendship.”

But Obama has considerably upped the OIC ante. Today, the White House purports from its website that special envoy, Muslim and hafiz of the Quran, Rashad Hussain, “will deepen and expand the partnerships that the United States has pursued with Muslims around the world since President Obama’s speech in Cairo last June.”

Again, notice the differences between the Bush and Obama plans with the special OIC envoy: from Bush’s mission to “listen and learn from representatives” to Obama’s mission to “deepen and expand the partnerships.”

The OIC members (including U.S. Special Envoy Rashad Hussain) pledge to its charter mission to rid the world of “the defamation of religion.” But the “defamation of religion” translates to mean “defamation of Islam.” An article on the OIC website explains, “Western foreign policy is considered to be the single most significant factor determining the attitudes of many Muslims toward the West. … Unfortunately, Islam often conjures in the Western minds images of authoritarian government, subjugation of women, cruel punishments of Shariah law and violence in the popular Western mind.”

“Unfortunately”?!

The world also just learned recently from the assistant secretary for public affairs in the State Department, P.J. Crowley, that theWhite House has repeatedly sent out as an American ambassador of peace the Islamic fundamentalist and executive director of the Ground Zero mosque, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, who is being sponsored by the U.S. State Department for repeated trips to the Middle East, where he is teaching on Muslim life in America and promoting religious tolerance.

But doesn’t one who called the U.S. an “accessory” to Sept. 11 just a few weeks after the tragic event and one who still refuses to call Hamas a foreign terrorist organization seem a strange choice for a U.S. ambassador of peace who promotes religious tolerance?

It is absolutely no surprise, therefore, though gravely unfortunate and disappointing for our commander in chief to blurt out last Friday night, while celebrating the holy month of Ramadan at a White House dinner, that he is in favor of building the mosque near Ground Zero!

The president explained the next day, “I was not commenting and I will not comment on the wisdom of making the decision to put a mosque there. I was commenting very specifically on the right people have that dates back to our founding. That’s what our country is about.”

White House spokesman Bill Burton reiterated the next day about Obama’s stance on constructing the mosque: “Just to be clear, the president is not backing off in any way from the comments he made last night. It is not his role as president to pass judgment on every local project. But it is his responsibility to stand up for the constitutional principle of religious freedom and equal treatment for all Americans. What he said last night, and reaffirmed today, is that if a church, a synagogue or a Hindu temple can be built on a site, you simply cannot deny that right to those who want to build a mosque.”

But I could not agree more with Sally Regenhard, whose firefighter son was killed at the World Trade Center on Sept. 11: “As an Obama supporter, I really feel that he’s lost sight of the germane issue, which is not about freedom of religion. It’s about a gross lack of sensitivity to the 9/11 families and to the people who were lost.”

And Debra Burlingame, a spokeswoman for some Sept. 11 families and the sister of one of the pilots killed in the attacks, summed it up perfectly: “Barack Obama has abandoned America at the place where America’s heart was broken nine years ago, and where her true values were on display for all to see.”

Obama is not just rebooting America’s image in the Muslim world. He’s deepening and expanding Islamic belief, practice, culture around the world, like a Muslim missionary.

(Next week in Part 2, I will discuss how the Obama administration has changed course in just this past year regarding passing anti-First Amendment defamation of religion resolutions, as well as demonstrate how Obama has been prejudice in his treatment of Islam versus Christianity).

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25. April 2010 by admin.

 The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 4: The View from Kabul

April 20, 2010

Amid a surge of Western troops into Afghanistan, a raging Taliban insurgency and Pakistan’s attempts to consolidate its influence in the country, Kabul is being pulled in many directions. The government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, now at the beginning of its second five-year term, is trying to secure its own future as well as balance the ambitions of other key players, all while preventing the already war-torn country from becoming a proxy battleground.

A growing Taliban insurgency and a surge of U.S. and allied forces into the country are shaking things up in Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital. There, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, now in his second five-year term, has been formally in power since 2002 and in elected office since 2004. After several years of being portrayed as an American lackey, perceived more as the mayor of Kabul than the president of Afghanistan, Karzai has tried to break out of this mold and secure his own political survival. This at a time when the Taliban have emerged as a major force and the United States has made it clear that its commitment to Afghanistan is limited.Karzai’s problems have only escalated since the Obama administration took office. Relations began to sour in the run-up to last year’s Afghan presidential election, when elements in Washington began searching for alternatives to Karzai, who was being criticized for corruption. But with years of experience in managing his country’s many regional warlords, Karzai was able to quickly align with all major ethnic groups and ensure his victory in the election, despite the entire process being marred by charges of fraud.Tensions with Washington throughout the election helped Karzai create his own political space within the country, space that he sought to expand even as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry behind the scenes expressed doubts about Karzai’s viability as an effective American partner. In recent weeks, Karzai took his efforts to a different level by accusing the United States of engaging in fraud during the Afghan election, triggering a strong response from Washington. His move paid off. After a couple of weeks of high tensions, senior U.S. officials, including President Barack Obama, moved to ease the strain, calling the Afghan president an ally and partner. With almost all of a second five-year term still ahead of him, Karzai is as much a political reality in the country as the Taliban. 

Objectives and Problems

 The main objective of the current Karzai regime is to maintain as much of the existing political structure as possible and to maximize its position within that structure. This is a system that has been crafted and staffed in large part by Karzai and his inner circle, and thus it bolsters their position disproportionately. But because the Taliban are also a political reality, Kabul must work to achieve meaningful political accommodations that will serve to stabilize the security situation in the countryside.To maximize its leverage, Kabul must do this rapidly. The surge of U.S. forces into the country and the money, aid and advice that the Karzai regime receives will never be more abundant than it is right now, so with his power at its height, Karzai must reach these political accommodations as soon as possible.Meanwhile, Kabul has two main problems. The first is that it has limited means to compel the Taliban to negotiate on the requisite timetable while the Taliban have every incentive to hold out on any meaningful talks. The Karzai government is working with interlocutors (mostly former Taliban officials who still retain influence) to negotiate with the jihadist movement, but the question is the pace at which real progress can be made. At the heart of these negotiations is the question of who speaks for the Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s single largest demographic segment, accounting for more than 40 percent of the country’s population.Nor will political accommodation come cheaply. The Taliban will not be won over with a few Cabinet positions. The current discussions include the need for constitutional change that will allow more room for Islamic law and perhaps an extra-executive religious entity that controls the judiciary. Just how much of a stake the Taliban would have in the government and what shape that stake would take remains to be seen. In any case, it will likely require substantial concessions in Kabul.  

 The second problem is that Kabul’s efforts to negotiate with the Taliban are being pulled and manipulated from all sides. This is the real challenge for the current regime — balancing all the outside players who are trying to shape the negotiations. Kabul needs to prevent the already fractious and war-torn country from becoming a proxy battleground for the United States and Iran or Pakistan and India (among other countries). The difficulty of maintaining this balancing act — while also maintaining local support — is increasing by the day.Kabul’s closest allies are the United States and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Although Washington and Kabul do not always see eye to eye, and Karzai is trying to distance himself from the United States in order to downplay the puppet image, the United States and other coalition countries provide the foundational support for his government as well as security in the countryside. And while the United States likely views Karzai as a convenient scapegoat as well as an interchangeable political part, it is trying to demonstrate some confidence in the Afghan president. At a major tribal meeting in Kandahar on April 4, U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, head of the ISAF, was notably silent, allowing Karzai to speak and lead the discussion.Aside from the United States, Pakistan is the next biggest player in Afghanistan, and because of its own links to the Taliban, it has far more practical leverage than the United States does in shaping the negotiations (of which it has every intention of being at the center). Pakistan’s arrest of senior Taliban figure Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is now believed to have been carried out to disrupt direct negotiations between the Taliban and Kabul in which Baradar is thought to have been engaged. A strong Pakistani hand in Afghanistan is a longstanding reality for Kabul, but Islamabad is maneuvering to consolidate its influence as a planned American drawdown in 2011 approaches.But Pakistan’s resurging role in Afghanistan places Karzai in a difficult place between his eastern neighbor and its regional rival India. New Delhi has invested a great deal in development and reconstruction work in Afghanistan since 2002, and Kabul will need to balance this aid with the need for Pakistani assistance with the Taliban. And complicating all this, of course, is India’s alignment with Russia on the Afghanistan issue.Perhaps more critical than the Indo-Pakistani struggle over Afghanistan is the U.S.-Iranian contest. Although Iraq is the main arena for Washington’s struggle with Tehran, the focus of the contest is shifting to Afghanistan, along with the U.S. military effort. Iran also has considerable influence to its east, with deep historical, ethno-linguistic and cultural ties that it has adroitly established and cultivated not only among its natural allies — ethno-political minorities opposed to the Taliban — but also among some elements of the Taliban themselves. Though this influence is not decisive (the Taliban have their own interests, and many groups opposed to the Taliban are close to Karzai and the West), Tehran has the ability to influence events on the ground in Afghanistan, and an eventual settlement of the war cannot happen without Iranian involvement. From Karzai’s point of view, he has to balance his alignment with the United States with the fact that Iran is always going to be Afghanistan’s western neighbor, long after U.S. and NATO forces have left his country.This is really the ultimate problem. On its best day, Afghanistan is poor, lacks basic infrastructure and is economically hobbled. With weak domestic security forces and little to offer the outside world, Kabul can only hope to continue to entice more international aid while playing all the various countries with vested interests in Afghanistan against each other. Incorporating the Taliban into the political framework will be especially important over the next few years, but when and if that happens, the balancing act will continue to be played by any central government in Kabul.

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25. April 2010 by admin.

The Afghanistan Campaign Part 2: The Taliban Strategy

The Afghan Taliban is a group of insurgents who ultimately seek to secure power over Afghanistan, but first they must merely survive as a cohesive entity during the current International Security Assistance Force offensive. Nevertheless, the Taliban is a diffuse entity being pulled in many directions by multiple actors, and the precise definition of “securing power” and the appropriate strategy to regain that power are still being debated.

It was thus clear to the Taliban long before U.S. President Barack Obama’s long-anticipated announcement that some 30,000 additional troops would be sent to Afghanistan in 2010 that there would be more of a fight before the United States and its allies would be willing to abandon the country — a surge that is an attempt, in part, to reshape Taliban perceptions of the timeline of the conflict by redoubling the American commitment before the drawdown might begin.

And though it took the Taliban a while to regroup, a considerable vacuum began to grow in which the Taliban began to re-emerge, particularly amid poor, corrupt and ineffectual central governance. As early as 2006, it was clear that the Afghan jihadist movement had assumed the form of a growing and powerful insurgency that was progressively gaining steam; the situation was beginning to approach the point at which it could no longer be ignored. As the surge in Iraq began to show signs of success, the United States began to shift its attention back to Afghanistan.

While the U.S.-led coalition never stopped pursuing the Taliban, Washington’s attention quickly shifted to Iraq. In Afghanistan, the mission quickly evolved from toppling a government in Kabul to combating a nascent insurgency in the south and east. U.S. officials, led by the American ambassador to Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, first began the process of talking to the Taliban on the eve of the invasion of Iraq. All this took place while Washington continued to press Islamabad to do more against the Taliban.The Taliban were never defeated in 2001, when the United States moved to topple their government in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. They largely declined combat in the face of overwhelmingly superior military force. Though they were not, at that moment, an insurgent force, their moves were classic guerrilla behavior, and their quick transition from the seat of power back to such tactics is a reminder of how well — and how painfully — schooled Afghans have been in the insurgent arts over the last several decades.

Overall, the Taliban ideally aspire to return to the height of their power in the late 1990s but realize that this is not realistic. That ascent to power, which followed the toppling of the Marxist regime left in place after the Soviet withdrawal and the 1992-1996 intra-Islamist civil war, was somewhat anomalous in that the circumstances were fairly unique to post-Soviet invasion Afghanistan. Today, the Taliban’s opponents are much stronger and far better equipped to challenge the Taliban than in the mid-1990s; this opposing force is as much a reality as the Taliban and has a vested interest in preserving the current regime. The old mujahideen of the 1980s, whom the younger Taliban displaced in the 1990s, have grown steadily wealthier since the collapse of the Taliban regime and are now well-settled and prosperous in Kabul and their respective regions, benefiting greatly from the Western presence and Western money. This is true of many urban areas of Afghanistan that have been altered significantly in the eight years since the U.S. invasion and have little desire to return the Taliban’s severe austerity. In many ways, this fight for dominance is between not only the Taliban and the United States and its allies; it is also between the Taliban and the old Islamist elite, the former mujahideen leaders who did their time on the battlefield in the 1980s.

So, in addition to fighting the current military battle, there is a great deal of factional fighting and political maneuvering with other Afghan centers of power. At a bare minimum, the Taliban intend to ensure that they remain the single strongest power in the country, with not only the largest share of the pie in Kabul (the ability to dominate) but also a significant degree of power and autonomy within their core areas in the south and east of the country. But within the movement (which is a very diffuse and complex set of entities), there is a great deal of debate about what objectives are reasonably achievable. Like the Shia in Iraq, who originally aspired to total dominance in the early days following the fall of the Baathist regime and have since moderated their goals, the Taliban have recognized that some degree of power sharing is necessary. The ultimate objective of the Taliban — resumption of power at the national level — is somewhat dependent on how events play out in the coming years. The objective of attaining the apex of power is not in dispute, but the best avenue — be it reconciliation or fighting it out until the United States begins to draw down — and how exactly that apex might be defined is still being debated.

But there is an important caveat to the Taliban’s ambitions. Having held power in Kabul, they are wary of returning there in a way that would ultimately render them an international pariah state, as they were in the 1990s. When the Taliban first came to power, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized the regime, and the group’s leadership became intimately familiar with the challenges of attempting to govern a country without wider international recognition. It was under this isolation that the Taliban allied with al Qaeda, which provided them with men, money and equipment. Now it is using al Qaeda again, this time not just as a force multiplier but, even more important, as a potential bargaining chip at the negotiating table. Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s central leader, wants to get off the international terrorist watch list, and there have been signals from various elements of the Taliban that the group is willing to abandon al Qaeda for the right price. This countervailing consideration also contributes to the Taliban’s objective — and particularly the means to achieving that objective — remaining in flux.

To understand the Taliban and their current strategy, it helps to begin with the basics. The Taliban are insurgents, and their first order of business is simply survival. A domestic guerrilla group almost always has more staying power than an occupier, which is projecting force over a greater distance and has the added burden of a domestic population less directly committed to a war in a foreign — and often far-off — land. If the Taliban can only survive as a cohesive and coherent entity until the United States and its allies leave Afghanistan, they will have a far less militarily capable opponent (Kabul) with whom to compete for dominance.

Currently facing an opponent (the United States) that has already stipulated a timetable for withdrawal, the Taliban are in an enviable position. The United States has given itself an extremely aggressive and ambitious set of goals to be achieved in a very short period of time. If the Taliban can both survive and disrupt American efforts to lay the foundations for a U.S./NATO withdrawal, their prospects for ultimately achieving their aims increase dramatically.

And here the strategy to achieve their imperfectly defined objective begins to take shape. The Taliban have no intention of completely evaporating into the countryside, and they have every intention of continuing to harass International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, inflicting casualties and raising the cost of continued occupation. In so doing, the Taliban not only retain their relevance but may also be able to hasten the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Judging from the initial phase of Operation Moshtarak in Marjah and what can likely be expected in similar offensives in other areas, the Taliban strategy toward the surge is: 1) largely decline combat but leave behind a force significant enough to render the securing phase as difficult as is possible for U.S.-led coalition forces by using hit-and-run tactics and planting improvised explosive devices; 2) once the coalition force becomes overwhelming, fall back and allow the coalition to set up shop and wage guerrilla and suicide attacks (though Mullah Omar has issued guidance that these attacks should be initiated only after approval at the highest levels in order to minimize civilian casualties). In all likelihood, this phase of the Taliban campaign would include attempts at intimidation and subversion against Afghan security forces.

Being a diffuse guerrilla movement, the Taliban will likely attempt to replicate this strategy as broadly as possible, forcing ISAF forces to expend more energy than they would prefer on holding ground while impeding the building and reconstruction phase, which will become increasingly difficult as coalition forces target more and more areas. The idea is that the locals who are already wary about relying on Kabul and its Western allies will then become even more disenchanted with the ability of the coalition to weaken the Taliban. However, the ISAF attempting to take control of key bases of support on which the Taliban have long relied, and the impact of these efforts on the Taliban will warrant considerable scrutiny.

For now, the Taliban appear to have lost interest in larger-scale attacks involving several hundred fighters being committed to a single objective. Though such attacks certainly garnered headlines, they were extremely costly in terms of manpower and materiel with little practical gain. And with old strongholds like Helmand province feeling the squeeze, there are certainly some indications that ISAF offensives are taking an appreciable bite out of the operational capabilities of at least the local Taliban commanders.

Conserving forces and minimizing risk to their core operational capability are parallel and interrelated considerations for the Taliban in terms of survival. If the recent assault on Marjah is any indication, the Taliban are adhering to these principles. While some fighters did dig in and fight and while resistance has stiffened — especially within the last week — the Taliban declined to make it a bloody compound-to-compound fight despite the favorable defensive terrain.

Similarly, the U.S. surge intends to make it hard for the Taliban to sustain — much less replace — manpower and materiel. Taliban tactics must be tailored to maximize damage to the enemy while minimizing costs, which drives the Taliban directly to hit-and-run tactics and the widespread use of improvised explosive devices.

There is little doubt that the Taliban will continue to inflict casualties in the coming year. But there is also considerable resolve behind the surge, which will not even be up to full strength until the summer and will be maintained until at least July 2011. Indeed, it is not clear if the Taliban can inflict enough casualties to alter the American timetable in its favor any further.

There is also the underlying issue of sustaining the resistance. Manpower and logistics are inescapable parts of warfare. Though the United States and its allies bear the heavier burden, the Taliban cannot ignore that it is losing key population centers and opium-growing areas central to recruitment, financing and sanctuary. The parallel crackdowns by the ISAF on the Afghan side of the border and the Pakistani crackdowns on the opposite side, where the Taliban has long enjoyed sanctuary, represent a significant challenge to the Taliban if the efforts can be sustained. Signs of a potential increase in cooperation and coordination between Washington and Islamabad could also be significant.

In other words, despite all its flaws, there is a coherency to what the United States is attempting to achieve. Success is anything but certain, but the United States does seek to make very real inroads against the core strength of the Taliban. One of those methods is to reduce the Taliban’s operational capability to the point where it will no longer have the capability to overwhelm Afghan security forces after the United States begins to draw down. There is no shortage of issues surrounding the U.S. objectives to train up the Afghan National Army and National Police, and it is not at all clear that even if those objectives are met that indigenous forces will be able to manage the Taliban.

But the Taliban must also deal with the logistical strain being imposed on it and strive to maintain its numbers and indigenous support. Central to this effort is the Taliban’s information operations (IO), conveying their message to the Afghan people. Thus far, the ISAF has been far behind the Taliban in such IO efforts, but as the coalition ratchets up the pressure, it remains to be seen whether the more abstract IO will be sufficient for sustaining hard logistical support, especially with pressure being applied on both sides of the border.

Similarly, there is the issue of internal coherency. Any insurgent movement must deal with not only the occupier but also other competing guerrillas and insurgents, whether their central focus is military power or ideological. The Taliban’s main competition is entrenched in the regime of President Hamid Karzai and among those in opposition to Karzai but part of the state; at issue are the Taliban’s sometimes loose affiliations with other Taliban elements and al Qaeda. The United States, the Karzai regime, Pakistan and al Qaeda are all seeking and applying leverage anywhere they can to hive off reconcilable elements of the Taliban.

The United States seeks to divide the pragmatic elements of the Taliban from the more ideological ones. The Karzai regime may be willing to deal with them in a more coherent fashion, but at the heart of all its considerations is the partially incompatible retention of its own power. Al Qaeda, with its own survival on the line, is seeking to draw the Taliban toward its transnational agenda. Meanwhile, Pakistan wants to bring the Taliban to heel, primarily so it can own the negotiating process and consolidate its position as the dominant power in Afghanistan, much as Iran seeks to do in Iraq. Each player has different motivations, objectives and timetables.

Amidst all these tensions, the Taliban must expend intelligence efforts and resources to maintain cohesion, despite being an inherently local and decentralized phenomenon. As Mullah Omar’s code of conduct released in July 2009 demonstrates, “command” of the Taliban as an insurgent group is not as firm as it is in more rigid organizational hierarchies. The reconciliation efforts will certainly test the Taliban’s coherency.

If history is any judge, in the long run the Taliban will retain the upper hand. In Afghanistan, the United States is attempting to do something that has never been tried before — much less achieved — i.e., constitute a viable central government from scratch in the midst of a guerrilla war. But the Taliban must be concerned about the possibility that some aspects of the U.S. strategy may succeed. Central to the American effort will be Pakistan — and Islamabad is showing significant signs of wanting to work closer with Washington.

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25. April 2010 by admin.

The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 1: The U.S. Strategy

The United States is in the process of sending some 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, and once they have all arrived the American contingent will total nearly 100,000. This will be in addition to some 40,000 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel. The counterinsurgency to which these troops are committed involves three principal players: the United States, the Taliban and Pakistan. 

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States entered Afghanistan to conduct a limited war with a limited objective: defeat al Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from ever again serving as a sanctuary for any transnational terrorist group bent on attacking the United States. STRATFOR has long held that the former goal has been achieved, in effect, and what remains of al Qaeda prime — the group’s core leadership — is not in Afghanistan but across the border in Pakistan. While pressure must be kept on that leadership to prevent the group from regaining its former operational capability, this is an objective very different from the one the United States and ISAF are currently pursuing.

The current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is to use military force, as the United States did in Iraq, to reshape the political landscape. Everyone from President Barack Obama to Gen. Stanley McChrystal has made it clear that the United States has no interest in making the investment of American treasure necessary to carry out a decade-long (or longer) counterinsurgency and nation-building campaign. Instead, the United States has found itself in a place in which it has found itself many times before: involved in a conflict for which its original intention for entering no longer holds and without a clear strategy for extricating itself from that conflict.

  This is not about “winning” or “losing.” The primary strategic goal of the United States in Afghanistan has little to do with the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. That may be an important means but it is not a strategic end. With a resurgent Russia, a perpetually defiant Iran and an ongoing global financial crisis — not to mention profound domestic pressures at home — the grand strategic objective of the United States in Afghanistan must ultimately be withdrawal. This does not mean total withdrawal. Advisers and counterterrorism forces are indeed likely to remain in Afghanistan for some time. But the European commitment to the war is waning fast, and the United States has felt the strain of having its ground combat forces almost completely absorbed far too long.

To facilitate that withdrawal, the United States is trying to establish sustainable conditions — to the extent possible — that are conducive to longer-term U.S. interests in the region. Still paramount among these interests is sanctuary denial, and the United States has no intention of leaving Afghanistan only to watch it again become a haven for transnational terrorists. Hence, it is working now to shape conditions on the ground before leaving.

  Immediate and total withdrawal would surrender the country to the Taliban at a time when the Taliban’s power is already on the rise. Not only would this give the movement that was driven from power in Kabul in 2001 an opportunity to wage a civil war and attempt to regain power (the Taliban realizes that returning to its status in the 1990s is unlikely), it would also leave a government in Kabul with little real control over much of the country, relieving the pressure on al Qaeda in the Afghan-Pakistani border region and emboldening parallel insurgencies in Pakistan.

  The United States is patently unwilling to commit the forces necessary to impose a military reality on Afghanistan (likely half a million troops or more, though no one really knows how many it would take, since it has never been done). Instead, military force is being applied in order to break cycles of violence, rebalance the security dynamic in key areas, shift perceptions and carve out space in which a political accommodation can take place.

  In terms of military strategy, this means clearing, holding and building (though there is precious little time for building) in key population centers and Taliban strongholds like Helmand province. The idea is to secure the population from Taliban intimidation while denying the Taliban key bases of popular support (from which it draws not only safe haven but also recruits and financial resources). The ultimate goal is to create reasonably secure conditions under which popular support of provincial and district governments can be encouraged without the threat of reprisal and from which effective local security forces can deploy to establish long-term control.

  The key aspect of this strategy is — working in conjunction with and expanding Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces to establish security and increasingly take the lead in day-to-day security operations. (The term was coined in the early 1970s, when U.S. President Richard Nixon drew down the American involvement in Vietnam by transitioning the ground combat role to Vietnamese forces.) In any counterinsurgency, effective indigenous forces are more valuable, in many ways, than foreign troops, which are less sensitive to cultural norms and local nuances and are seen by the population as outsiders.

  But the real objective of the military strategy in Afghanistan is political. Gen. McChrystal has even said explicitly that he believes “that a political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome.” Though the objective of the use of military force almost always comes down to political goals, the kind of campaign being conducted in Afghanistan is particularly challenging. The goal is not the complete destruction of the enemy’s will and ability to resist (as it was, for example, in World War II). In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, the objective is far more subtle than that: It is to use military force to reshape the political landscape. The key challenge in Afghanistan is that the insurgents — the Taliban — are not a small group of discrete individuals like the remnants of al Qaeda prime. The movement is diffuse and varied, itself part of the political landscape that must be reshaped, and the entire movement cannot be removed from the equation.

  At this point in the campaign, there is wide recognition that some manner of accommodation with at least portions of the Taliban is necessary to stabilize the situation. The overall intent would be to degrade popular support for the Taliban and hive off reconcilable elements in order to further break apart the movement and make the ongoing security challenges more manageable. Ultimately, it is hoped, enough Taliban militants will be forced to the negotiating table to reduce the threat to the point where indigenous Afghan forces can keep a lid on the problem with minimal support.Meanwhile, attempts at reaching out to the Taliban are now taking place on multiple tracks. In addition to efforts by the Karzai government, Washington has begun to support Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani efforts. At the moment, however, few Taliban groups seem to be in the mood to talk. At the very least they are playing hard to get, hinting at talks but maintaining the firm stance that full withdrawal of U.S. and ISAF forces is a precondition for negotiations.

  The current U.S./NATO strategy faces several key challenges:For one thing, the Taliban are working on a completely different timeline than the United States, which — even separating itself from many of its anxious-to-withdraw NATO allies — is poised to begin drawing down forces in less than 18 months. While this is less of a fixed timetable than it appears (beginning to draw down from nearly 100,000 U.S. and nearly 40,000 ISAF troops in mid-2011 could still leave more than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan well into 2012), the Taliban are all too aware of Washington’s limited commitment.

  Then there are the intelligence issues:

• One of the inherent problems with the Vietnamization of a conflict is operational security and the reality that it is easy for insurgent groups to penetrate and compromise foreign efforts to build effective indigenous forces. In short, U.S./ ISAF efforts with Afghan forces are relatively easy for the Taliban to compromise, while U.S./ISAF efforts to penetrate the Taliban are exceedingly difficult.
• U.S. Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, the top intelligence officer in Afghanistan who is responsible for both ISAF and separate U.S. efforts, published a damning indictment of intelligence activity in the country last month and has moved to reorganize and refocus those efforts more on understanding the cultural terrain in which the United States and ISAF are operating. But while this shift will improve intelligence operations in the long run, the shake-up is taking place amid a surge of combat troops and ongoing offensive operations. Gen. David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, and Gen. McChrystal have both made it clear that the United States lacks the sophisticated understanding of the various elements of the Taliban necessary to identify the potentially reconcilable elements. This is a key weakness in a strategy that ultimately requires such reconciliation (though it is unlikely to disrupt counterterrorism and the hunting of high-value targets).

 The United States and ISAF are also struggling with information operations (IO), failing to effectively convey messages to and shape the perceptions of the Afghan people. Currently, the Taliban have the upper hand in terms of IO and have relatively little problem disseminating messages about U.S./ISAF activities and its own goals. The implication of this is that, in the contest over the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, the Taliban are winning the battle of perception.   The training of the ANA and ANP is also at issue. Due to attrition, tens of thousands of new recruits are necessary each year simply to maintain minimum numbers, much less add to the force. Goals for the size of the ANA and ANP are aggressive, but how quickly these goals can be achieved and the degree to which problems of infiltration can be managed — as well as the level of infiltration that can be tolerated while retaining reasonable effectiveness — all remain to be seen. In addition, loyalty to a central government has no cultural precedent in Afghanistan. The lack of a coherent national identity means that, while there are good reasons for young Afghan men to join up (a livelihood, tribal loyalty), there is no commitment to a national Afghan campaign. There are concerns that the Afghan security forces, left to their own devices, would simply devolve into militias along ethnic, tribal, political and ideological lines. Thus the sustainability of gains in the size and effectiveness of the ANA and ANP remains questionable.   This strategy also depends a great deal on the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, over which U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry has expressed deep concern. The Karzai government is widely accused of rampant corruption and of having every intention of maintaining a heavy dependency on the United States. Doubts are often expressed about Karzai’s intent and ability to be an effective partner in the military-political efforts now under way in his country.   While the United States has already made significant inroads against the Taliban in Helmand province, insurgents there are declining to fight and disappearing into the population. It is natural for an insurgency to fall back in the face of concentrated force and rise again when that force is removed, and the durability of these American gains could prove illusory. As Maj. Gen. Flynn’s criticism demonstrates, the Pentagon is acutely aware of challenges it faces in Afghanistan. It is fair to say that the United States is pursuing the surge with its eyes open to inherent weaknesses and challenges. The question is: Can those challenges be overcome in a war-torn country with a long and proven history of insurgency?

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8. November 2009 by admin.

“Indisputable evidence now shows CAIR and other “mainstream” Islamic groups are acting as fronts for a well-funded conspiracy of the Muslim Brotherhood – the parent of al-Qaida and Hamas – to infiltrate and destroy the American system.” CAIR is a qualified receiver of charitable dollars or “zakat” through Islamic Charities.
WorldNetDaily
October 14, 2009
By Art Moore
Washington, D.C.
In the wake of the sensational ACORN video sting operation by two young investigators, an even more daring and devastating undercover investigation – this one infiltrating the nation’s most aggressive Muslim “civil rights” organization for six months – has produced stunning revelations about the supposedly “moderate” group, backed up by 12,000 pages of documents obtained during the secret op.
As revealed in a new book detailing the operation and its findings, the Washington, D.C.-based Council on American-Islamic Relations, or CAIR, is not the beneficent Muslim civil-rights group it claims to be. Indisputable evidence now shows CAIR and other “mainstream” Islamic groups are acting as fronts for a well-funded conspiracy of the Muslim Brotherhood – the parent of al-Qaida and Hamas – to infiltrate and destroy the American system.
Until now, CAIR has remained a powerful force in the nation’s capital and across the country, from demanding the Obama administration stop FBI counter-terrorism tactics to compelling a school district to apologize to Muslims.
That influence, many believe, may be coming to an end, as a result of the undercover investigation – which included the son of a veteran counter-terrorism investigator, who grew a beard and converted to Islam, as well as two veiled female interns.
“Muslim Mafia: Inside the Secret Underworld That’s Conspiring to Islamize America,” a WND Books publication by counter-terrorism investigator P. David Gaubatz and “Infiltration” author Paul Sperry, documents CAIR’s ultimate purpose to transform the United States into an Islamic nation under the authority of the Quran.
The book already has prompted action on Capitol Hill.
With evidence from “Muslim Mafia” in hand, U.S. Rep. Sue Myrick, R-N.C., co-founder of the Congressional Anti-Terror Caucus, and other members of Congress – including Reps. John Shadegg, R-Ariz., and Paul Broun, R-Ga. – plan to hold a press conference today in Washington calling for an investigation and an end to political lobbying by front groups such as CAIR.

“Now we have proof – from the secret documents that this investigative team has uncovered, coupled with the ones recently declassified by the FBI – that [radical Islamist] agents living among us have a plan in place, and they are successfully carrying out that subversive plan,” Myrick writes in the foreword to “Muslim Mafia.”
Noting that CAIR has tried to hide its strategy, finances, membership, internal disputes and much more from public view since its founding in 1994, Islam expert Daniel Pipes lauded “Muslim Mafia” for definitively exposing the “tawdry and possibly illegal inner workings of radical Islam’s most aggressive organization in North America.”
“The revelations in this book should both put CAIR out of business and permanently discredit the Islamist cause,” Pipes said.   Undercover
The book begins as a real-life, heart-pounding thriller, with Chris Gaubatz, the son of co-author David Gaubatz, preparing to go underground as an intern for CAIR at its Herndon, Va., office.   Astoundingly, the younger Gaubatz, posing as a bearded Muslim convert, ends up with a position at CAIR’s national office in Washington, just three blocks from the U.S. Capitol building, working alongside top leaders Ibrahim Hooper, Nihad Awad and Corey Saylor.
Along with declassified government documents, the book unveils thousands of e-mails, faxes and internal memos that were never meant for public viewing.   The new evidence shows that CAIR – already designated an unindicted co-conspirator in the largest terror-financing case in U.S. history – is part of an organized crime network in America made up of more than 100 other Muslim front groups that collectively comprise the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood.   “Muslim Mafia” also exposes the inner workings of the mob-like Brotherhood and explains its broader conspiracy of infiltrating the American government and “destroying Western civilization from within.”   “The evidence found in the investigation is incontrovertible,” said co-author Sperry, noting that the book has more than 40 pages of footnotes and an appendix with more than 50 pages of exclusive confidential documents.   The Brotherhood is known within Islamist circles as the “Ikhwan mafia” because of its highly organized structure, centralized control and covert operations. CAIR, reveals “Muslim Mafia,” is one part of the network of front groups, cut-outs and shell companies that shield the Brotherhood’s criminal activities from authorities.   “These guys talk about jihad and murdering Jews like the mob talked about killing – totally casual, like they were ordering pizza,” said one FBI official in Washington quoted in the book.   Some key smoking-gun revelations detailed in “Muslim Mafia” include:

• New evidence that CAIR was launched to support the Hamas terrorist group, and has transferred tens of thousands of dollars to a group recently convicted as Hamas’ top fundraising arm in the U.S. – money that ended up aiding terrorist attacks on Israelis and Americans;
• Internal documents showing CAIR, despite claims of cooperating with law enforcement, actively works behind the scenes to mislead and deceive the FBI on behalf of terrorism suspects – and has even cultivated Muslim moles inside law enforcement who have tipped off FBI terror targets;
• CAIR is more closely tied to al-Qaida than previously reported;
• CAIR claims to represent all Muslim Americans; however, it has victimized some 100 indigent Muslims in a massive fraud and threatened them when they tried to go to the media; and internally, personnel complaints reveal CAIR discriminates against Shiite Muslims and Muslim women within its own headquarters;
• CAIR and its sister fronts are funded by foreign Muslim Brotherhood sources;
• CAIR leaders share the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal to replace the U.S. Constitution with Shariah law:
• The Muslim Brotherhood investment in corporate America will be used to pressure U.S. companies into compliance with Islamic principles.

The book also shows radical Muslims in the U.S. are working to support Palestinian terrorists, destroy Israel, gut U.S. anti-terrorism laws, loosen U.S. Muslim immigration policies and convert Americans to Islam.

The authors explain they targeted CAIR because it helps control the “religious crime syndicate from its power base in Washington, the capitol of the same government it wishes to overthrow.”   While the FBI has cut formal ties to CAIR in the wake of its designation as an unindicted co-conspirator in a plot to fund the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, the group has virtually unfettered access to Capitol Hill and continues to wield influence in the White House.   CAIR, the book reveals, regularly reserves meeting rooms and prays Fridays alongside Muslim Rep. Keith Ellison, D-Minn., and a growing number of Muslim staffers.
The first Muslim elected to Congress and a de facto CAIR board member, Ellison predicted in one CAIR power breakfast he soon would be flanked by 15 other Muslim congressmen, “Muslim Mafia” notes.   Chris Gaubatz, in fact, once found himself praying elbow-to-elbow with Ellison during a Friday prayer gathering attended by CAIR inside the U.S. Capitol.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., the book says, is totally in the dark about the threat, and so is the White House.   In fact, reveals “Muslim Mafia,” in the White House President Obama is hiring Muslims – including an adviser who advocates compliance with Shariah law – based on resumes solicited from Muslim Brotherhood fronts.   Meanwhile, the FBI is in conflict internally about how to deal with the Brotherhood, with some top officials in favor of maintaining outreach, while counter-terror case agents in the field strongly object, pointing to evidence the network is a factory for homegrown terror and is secretly carrying out activities hostile to the U.S.   “They’ve achieved outrageous penetration at senior levels of our government,” veteran FBI special agent John Guandolo warns in the book.   Until recently, the FBI engaged in outreach activities with CAIR, including forcing rookie agents to take cultural field trips to area mosques.   The “Muslim Mafia” authors obtained notes revealing the FBI even has offered to sponsor Muslim youth camps with the Boys Clubs of America.   A shortage of Arab linguists and dozens of discrimination suits by Arab and Muslim employees have prompted the FBI to recruit from Brotherhood-related groups, such as the Islamic Society of North America.   A Muslim agent who drew national attention when he refused to tape-record a fellow Muslim during a terrorism investigation was promoted and now recruits other Muslims to become agents and linguists.   ‘Hit sheets’

The book also presents evidence CAIR has prepared “hit sheets” on its critics in the news media in an effort to intimidate them into silence.   Internal memos show, for example, top officials privately met with CNN executives in Atlanta to press them to cancel Glenn Beck’s program on its Headline News network. Beck now has a highly rated afternoon show on the Fox News Channel.   CAIR’s campaign to boycott leading nationally syndicated radio talk-show host Michael Savage’s advertisers cost more than $160,000, the book reveals. The authors recount how CAIR ran out of money before it could crack Savage’s most loyal sponsors.   The book also includes new revelations about CAIR’s role in the “flying imams” case in 2006 in which six Muslim leaders were removed from an airline flight in Minneapolis after passengers and crew members reported what they believed to be suspicious behavior.
“Muslim Mafia” also exposes CAIR’s secret agenda to criminalize anti-terror profiling by police and private entities.   Gaubatz is a veteran federal investigator and counter-terrorism specialist who served for more than a decade as a special agent in the U.S. Air Force’s elite Office of Special Investigations. He held the U.S. government’s highest security clearances, including Top Secret–SCI (Sensitive Compartmented Information), and was briefed in many so-called black projects.   Gaubatz also is a State Department–trained Arabic linguist with more than two decades of experience in the Middle East, including tours in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq. In 2003, he led a 15-man team to rescue the family members of the Iraqi lawyer credited with saving Army Private First Class Jessica Lynch.   Sperry, a media fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, is former Washington bureau chief for Investor’s Business Daily and former Washington bureau chief of WorldNetDaily.com.   His bestseller “Infiltration: How Muslim Spies and Subversives Have Penetrated Washington” is being used by the U.S. military and top law enforcement departments nationwide. Many of the numerous stories he has broken on national security and counter-terrorism have been cited by the Washington Post, USA Today, UPI and the Associated Press, among others. His columns have appeared in publications such as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, New York Post, Houston Chronicle, American Spectator and Reason.
One FBI official quoted in “Muslim Mafia” says CAIR and the other Muslim Brotherhood front groups differ from al-Qaida in that, while all share the same goals, they use different methods to achieve them.   “The only difference between the guys in the suits and the guys with the AK-47s is timing and tactics,” the official explained.

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6. November 2009 by admin.

by Rupert Cornwell

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090929/edit.htm#6 Six months after proclaiming a new commitment to the war in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama is under growing pressure to make what would amount to a U-turn in US policy and scale back America’s commitment to a conflict that many experts – and a majority of the public – now fear may be unwinnable.
The debate, which divides Mr Obama’s most senior advisers, was thrown into stark relief by the leaked report of General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of US and allied forces in Afghanistan, warning that the war might be lost within a year without a further boost in troop strength and a major change in strategy to combat the spreading Taliban insurgency.
General McChrystal’s bleak assessment coupled with Washington’s frustration with the Afghan leader Hamid Karzai and the fraud-ridden election over which he presided, has reignited a rift between Vice-President Joseph Biden and Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, over how the war should be waged. It has also left Mr Obama facing a fateful choice: whether to go along with his generals and send yet more troops, or stand current policy on its head.
Spoken or unspoken, behind the debate lurks the shade of Vietnam. It emerged that The Washington Post, the first to report General McChrystal’s devastating 66-page memorandum, agreed to delay publication by 24 hours, omitting elements relating to future tactics that the Pentagon and White House said might endanger American troops on the front lines in Afghanistan.
Bob Woodward, the paper’s investigative reporter, who broke the story, compares the document to the secret history of the Vietnam war that caused a sensation when it was obtained in 1971 by The New York Times. The so-called Pentagon Papers “came out eight years too late,” Mr Woodward says.
The stakes are now huge – so huge that the President barely mentioned Afghanistan in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. If Washington is perceived as opposing a further troop build-up, or leaning towards a reduction, then other countries in the coalition, where the eight-year-long war is even more unpopular than here, will rush for the exits.
Hitherto, the issue of the war in Afghanistan has seemed straightforward. In contrast to Iraq, Afghanistan has been the “good war” – a war of necessity, fought to make sure that a repeat of the 9/11 attacks, directed from Afghanistan by an al-Qa’ida sheltered by the Taliban, would never occur again.
Underlining this reinvigorated commitment, Mr Obama authorised an increase in US strength in Afghanistan to 68,000 by the end of the year, and named General McChrystal, previously in charge of US special forces, as his new commander on the ground. But the latter’s recommendation of a boost of 30,000 to 40,000 confronts this president with a dilemma akin to that facing his predecessor over Iraq three years ago: to surge or not to surge? And views within the administration differ sharply.
Essentially the choice, in strategic jargon, is between counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. The latter, implying a broad war against the Taliban to prevent it returning to power, seems to be what General McChrystal has in mind, and has long been backed by Mrs Clinton. Only this week, she had scathing words for those who argued that al-Qa’ida was no longer a factor in Afghanistan. “If Afghanistan is taken over again by the Taliban, I can’t tell you how fast al-Qa’ida would be back.”
The Vice-President, on the other hand, wants a narrower focus on al-Qa’ida itself, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where security forces have scored some important recent successes against the terrorist organisation and its Taliban allies. Under this approach, the US would require fewer forces in the field.
Instead of trying to protect the general population from the Taliban and operating a “hearts and minds” policy to win over civilian support, it would concentrate on targeted strikes on al-Qa’ida operatives, relying on umnanned drones, missile attacks and the special forces where General McChrystal is an expert. Simultaneously the training of Afghan government forces would be speeded up.
A third faction advocates a compromise, either scaling back the requested troop increase, or even starting to reverse it, while at the same time ensuring that the country does not collapse into chaos.
The White House and Pentagon are now studying the report, and it will be “weeks” before a decision is made, administration officials say.
But Mr Obama, once so trenchant on the subject, is now hedging his bets. All options are on the table, he indicated during his blitz of the Sunday talk shows last weekend. “The first question is, are we doing the right thing?” he told CNN.
As it is, public support for the conflict is dropping sharply, too. According to a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll yesterday, 59 per cent of those surveyed were now “less confident” that the US could achieve a successful end to the war. More than half opposed an increase in American forces, while a third wanted an immediate pullout.
This growing pessimism is visible on Capitol Hill, too. Earlier this month, Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, warned that neither Capitol Hill nor ordinary voters are in the mood for sending more soldiers to a war that has already taken almost 900 American lives – and 51 in August alone. Then Michigan’s Carl Levin, chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, declared that the US should send no more troops before a “surge” in Afghan security forces. But as even Pentagon officials concede, training Afghan forces up to the required standard of competence – not to mention loyalty – will be even more difficult than it was in Iraq.
Complicating matters further, Congressional leadersare now demanding a personal accounting from General McChrystal on how the war is going. For the moment Robert Gates, the Defense Secretary, has resisted the pressure, insisting the commander will only appear on Capitol Hill when a new policy has been decided. But if US casualties continue to grow, he may have little choice in the matter. In the meantime, Mr Obama is increasingly in a corner.
As Republicans constantly remind him, for the US to wind down its commitment would send a message of weakness and inconsistency to friends and foes alike. But to press on with a long, inconclusive war in a distant corner of Asia carries well-known and equal perils.
Once again, events are bearing out the famous aphorism of Mark Twain, that “while history doesn’t repeat itself, it rhymes”.
— By arrangement with The Independent

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5. November 2009 by admin.

 Keith Olbermann on Robert F. McDonnell, Republican candidate for governor of Virginia:     “In (McDonnell’s master’s thesis), he described women having jobs as detrimental to the family, called legalized use of contraception illogical, pushed to make divorce more difficult, and insisted government should favor married couples over, quote, ‘cohabitators, homosexuals or fornicators.’ Wow. When did he write this? 1875? No, 1989. Wow, 1989.     “Goodbye, Mr. McDonnell.”

– MSNBC, Sept. 22, 2009, Rachel Maddow also on McDonnell:     “And here’s where the conservative movement and the Republican establishment smash into each other like bumper cars without bumpers. Here’s where Republican electoral chances stop being separate from the wild-eyed excesses of the conservative movement.     “Part of watching Republicans try to return to power is watching … the conservative movement eat the Republican Party, eat their electoral chances over and over and over again.”

On election night, conservatives-eating-Republicans resulted in an 18-point landslide for McDonnell, who beat his Democratic opponent 59 percent to 41 percent — winning two-thirds of all independent voters and ending the Democrats’ eight-year reign in the Virginia governor’s office.     Republicans swept all statewide offices for the first time in 12 years, winning the races for lieutenant governor and attorney general, as well as assembly seats, garbage inspector, dog catcher and anything else Virginians could vote for.    
To paraphrase a pompous blowhard: Goodbye, Mr. Democrat.     And that’s not the most exciting news from election night! Astoundingly, Jon Corzine, the incumbent governor of heavily Democratic New Jersey — a state that Barack Obama won by 16 points just a year ago — lost by 5 points.     At 49 percent for Republican Chris Christie versus 44 percent for Corzine, the election wasn’t even close enough to be stolen by ACORN. (Although Corzine did extremely well among underaged Salvadoran prostitutes living in government housing.)     The biggest winner election night was pollster Scott Rasmussen, who — once again — produced the most accurate poll results. New York Times poll: Corzine 40, Christie 37; Quinnipiac poll: Corzine 43, Christie 38; Rasmussen poll: Christie 46, Corzine 43.     The biggest loser was President Obama, who campaigned tirelessly for Corzine, even giving up golf on several occasions and skipping a quarter-million-dollar “date night” with Michelle to stump for the Democrat.     Just two days before the election, Obama was at a rally in New Jersey assuring voters that Corzine was “one of the best partners I have in the White House. We work together. … Jon Corzine helped get this done.”     Except the problem is that voting for Obama a year ago was a fashion statement, much like it was once a fad to buy Beanie Babies, pet rocks and Cabbage Patch Kids. But instead of ending up with a ridiculous dust-collector at the bottom of your closet, the Obama fad leaves you with higher taxes, a reduced retirement fund, no job and a one-year wait for an MRI.     That is why Corzine’s defeat sounded the death knell for national health care.     The good news: Next time Corzine is in a major car accident after speeding on the New Jersey Turnpike, he’ll be able to see a doctor right away.    
The media will try to rescue health care by talking about nothing but the 23rd district of New York, where the Democrat won Tuesday night. Congratulations, Democrats — you won a congressional seat in New York! Next up: A Catholic elected pope!     Far from an upset, the Democrats’ winning the 23rd district was a long-term plan of the Obama White House. That’s why Obama made John McHugh, the moderate Republican congressman representing the 23rd district, his Secretary of the Army earlier this year. The Democrats thought McHugh’s seat would be easy pickings.     Only in the last week has everyone acted as if a Democratic victory in the 23rd district would be a shocking surprise — an upset victory caused by puritanical Republicans staging inquisitions against “mainstream” Republican candidates like Dede Scozzafava, the designated “Republican” candidate in the special election.    
This is preposterous — there was absolutely nothing Republican about Scozzafava. As a supporter of partial-birth abortion, card-check union schemes and massive government spending programs, she was less Republican than John McCain.     Even Markos Moulitsas of Daily Kos called Scozzafava the most liberal candidate in the race — which may explain why she was the choice of George Soros’ Working Families Party and why she promptly endorsed the Democrat after withdrawing from the race last weekend.

Conservative opposition to Scozzafava hardly suggests that they plan to impose litmus tests on every Republican candidate in the 2010 elections.     Speaking of litmus tests, on MSNBC recently, liberal blogger Jane Hamsher said of the possibility that a blue dog Democrat would oppose national health care: “I dare Blanche Lincoln — I dare Blanche Lincoln to join a filibuster. She’ll draw primary opponents so fast it would make your head spin.”     While I’m sure an out-of-touch liberal blogger from Hollywood knows more about Arkansas than an elected senator from that state, Hamsher’s threat sounds more like an intra-party civil war than conservatives opposing a George Soros-supported Republican candidate in a New York congressional race.     Not only do conservatives not pick insane fights — such as staging a 2006 primary fight against a recent vice presidential candidate because he supported the war in Iraq — but conservatives are more popular than Republicans.     By contrast, liberals are less popular than Democrats. When conservatives take control of the Republican Party, Republicans win. When liberals take control of the Democratic Party, Democrats end up out of power for eight to 12 years.

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