6. November 2009 by admin.

By B.Raman

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers32/paper3186.html US policy-makers had hoped that the taking-over of Gen. David Petraeus as the commander of the US Central Command, and Gen. Stanley McChrystal as the US Commander in Afghanistan working under Gen.Petraeus would bring about a more proactive strategy to weaken the Taliban and create a divide between it and the Afghan people. The two had earned a reputation in Iraq for reversing the fortunes of Al Qaeda and the former Baathist soldiers of Saddam Hussein, creating a divide between the two and enlisting the support of different tribal leaders and through them their followers for the US military operations. The improvement in the ground situation in Iraq—-though not yet irreversible— was largely due to their thinking, planning and execution. 2. Hopes in Washington that the two Generals would bring about similar results in Afghanistan have been belied so far.The Af-Pak troika of the administration of Barack Obama—- Richard Holbrooke, Obama’s special representative for the Af-Pak region, who handles the political and diplomatic angles, and the two Generals— has not been able to come to grips with the problem almost six months after the new Af-Pak policy of the Obama adminstration was launched in March last. The present ground situation favours the Pakistan-based Neo Taliban. Since the two Generals took over, the Neo Taliban has been able to increase and strengthen its presence in the north too. The situation is still one of a bleeding stalemate, but the prospects of the US-led forces breaking the stalemate and prevailing over the Neo Taliban are not any the brighter since the two Generals took over. 3. The dilemma posed by the worrisome ground situation is reflected in the growing impression that Obama’s Af-Pak strategy has failed to take off and is unlikely to take off and that the time has come to think of a new strategy in which the key to success would be in Pakistan and not in Afghanistan.Vice-President Joe Biden seems to favour a change of focus from a Neo Taliban-centric strategy in Afghanistan to an Al Qaeda-centric one in Pakistan. 4.Presently, the political pressure is on Pakistan to act against the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements operating from sanctuaries in its territory and on the Hamid Karzai Government in Kabul to improve governance, reduce corruption and pay better attention to the problems of the people in the areas controlled by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the US-led Western forces. 5. Neither of these pressures has worked. Nor have the never-ending incentives offered by the US to Pakistan—the latest of which is the expected passage by both Houses of the US Congress of the Kerry-Lugar Bill making a long term commitment of US$ 7.5 billion to Pakistan in the form of non-military aid over a period of five years. The military aid, which too continues to increase, will be in addition. Original expectations when Obama assumed office in January last that strict benchmarks would be laid down for the periodic disbursements of this aid in order to ensure that Pakistan does act sincerely and firmly against the terrorists have been belied.The more Pakistan is pampered, the less it acts against the terrorists. That has been the lesson since 9/11 and this lesson has not been learnt by the officials of the Obama administration.This is evident even from the grim Assessment dated August 30,2009, prepared by Gen.McChrystal, on the basis of which he is reported to be planning to ask for another surge of 21000 US troops— a request over which Obama is reportedly not enthusiastic. 6. The pressures on Karzai to improve governance have not worked either. This is partly due to the difficult ground situation, which would pose a dilemma to any ruler—however democratic and however competent. Moreover, instead of strengthening the position of Karzai, US officials have done everything to weaken his credibility in the eyes of his own people as well as the international community through allegations—some true, many unwisely inspired— regarding his inability or unwillingness to act against corruption and narcotics production and rigging in the Presidential elections. Even if he wins the elections in the first round itself—-as he is expected to— the importance of that victory has already been diluted by these allegations. US officials take a lot of care not to say or do anything, which might weaken the position of the Pakistani leadership, but they do not take similar care in respect of Karzai. 7.In the existing gloomy scenario, there are only two positive factors, which provide some cheer. Firstly, the improvement in the flow of human intelligence to the US intelligence community from sources in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, which has led to some significant sucesses in the form of eradication of some middle-level leaders of Al Qaeda and even senior leaders of the Pakistan Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by US drone strikes. After having eliminated Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP, the Drone strikes are now focussed on eliminating the Haqqani network consisting of the old Soviet era mujahideen warrior Jalaluddin Haqqani and his sons. If the US succeeds in eliminating the Haqqani network— I hope it will— the pressure on the US forces in Afghan territory could lessen— at least in the short term. As against this, the impact of the elimination of Baitullah on the ground situation in Afghanistan would be minimal. His elimination was more a boon to the Pakistani security forces grappling with terrorists of their own creation in their territory than to the US-led Western forces in Afghanistan. 8.The second positive factor is the role of India as a force for stability in Afghanistan. Any objective analyst has to concede that the various road construction, democracy-promotion and people-oriented programmes undertaken by India in the areas controlled by the Government of Afghanistan have benefitted not only the people of Afghanistan immensely, but also the long-term Western objective of a democratic, modern Afghanistan. 9. One would have expected the US policy-makers not only to recognise the importance of retaining the role of India as a force for stability, but also encouraging India to expand further its people-oriented role in Afghanistan. In his assessment, McChrystal recognises — though somewhat grudgingly– the beneficial role of India and the support for that role from the Karzai Government, but one is surprised to find that he shows understanding for the Pakistani concerns over India’s role and hints that these concerns have to be taken into consideration while formulating any revised strategy. He himself says that no strategy will work unless it is people-oriented, but at the same time wants something to be done to address Pakistani concerns over India’s people-oriented role. 10.The Afghan people—whether Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbecks or others— distrust and hate the Pakistanis after seeing the role played by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the creation and fattening of the Taliban since 1994. One saw the extent of the hatred for the Pakistanis when the American and Northern Alliance troops entered Kabul in 2001 under Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistanis assisting the Taliban Government in Kabul were hunted, killed and their dead bodies thrown into the gutters of Kabul. 11. Gen.McChrystal’s ideas, if implemented, would provide an environment for the re-assertion of the hated Pakistani role by paying attention to Pakistani concerns over India’s positive role.This shows how short-sighted US policy-makers and military-officers can be.The General’s assessment is disappointing because it fails to put its finger on the crux of the dilemma being faced by the US-led Western forces, similar to the dilemma which the Soviet troops faced in Afghanistan in the 1980s before they decided to quit in 1988.This dilemma arose in the case of the Soviet troops and has now arisen in the case of the US-led Western troops from the absence of a counter-sanctuaries component to the counter-insurgency strategy. 12.The reluctance of the Soviet troops to take their fighting to the sanctuaries of the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistani territory led to a situation where the Soviet troops kept bleeding till battle fatigue and public disenchantment with the war set in. Similarly, the absence of an effective counter-sanctuaries component is leading to a situation where the US and other Western forces as well as the ANA are bleeding more and more. There are already the incipient signs of a battle fatigue as cound be seen even from the General’s assessment and the beginning of a public disenchantment with the involvement in Afghanistan. This disenchantment is already pronounced in West Europe and Canada and one could see the beginning of it even in the US. Instead of allowing the Neo Taliban to infiltrate in increasing numbers from its sanctuaries and recruiting grounds in the FATA and the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan and then fighting or countering their ambushes in Afghan territory, the US should take its counter-insurgency operations to the camps of the Neo Taliban in adjoining Pakistani territory—-whether in the FATA or in Balochistan. 13. The US already has an air-mounted counter-sanctuaries strategy in the FATA with the help of the Drones, which provide a deniable way of hitting at the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and the Neo Taliban. This strategy has had its successes, but, despite them, has proved inadequate. Initially, these strikes were concentrated on the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and its allies in North Waziristan. Earlier this year, when there was a danger of the TTP expanding its presence to the non-tribal areas and posing a danger to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the focus of the Drone strikes shifted to South Waziristan against the sanctuaries of the TTP.During the last six months or so, the objective of these strikes became not protecting the NATO forces and the ANA in Afghanistan from attacks mounted from the Pakistani territory, but assisting the Pakistan Army in reversing the advance of the TTP into the non-tribal areas. After killing Baitullah in the first week of August, the US has again changed the direction and is now focussing on the Haqqani network, whose threat is more in Afghan territory than in the FATA. The US has not been able to mount a full-scale operation against Al Qaeda sanctuaries in North Waziristan due to the dispersal of its resources to South Waziristan for use against the TTP. 14. Even this limited success has not been there against the staging grounds of the Neo Taliban in Balochistan.The US continues to depend on the Pakistan Army for action against the sanctuaries of the Neo Taliban. The ISI-sponsored Neo Taliban is the only asset left with the Pakistan Army for regaining its primacy in Afghanistan if and when the US and other Western troops leave Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to regain this primacy without the direct deployment of its own army as it did in the 1990s. If the US is waiting for the Pakistan Army to act against the Neo Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistani territory, this is not going to happen. The US has only two alternatives—either itself act against the sanctuaries in Balochistan and destroy the Neo Taliban leadership in order to restore the damaged image of the US forces in Afghanistan, thereby paving the way for an honourable exit or keep its operations confined to Afghan territory, thereby continuing to bleed and face the prospect of an exit forced on the US by the Neo Taliban under humiliating conditions. 15.The role of the Drones—even if extended to Balochistan– may not be as effective as their role in the FATA. The places in the FATA where the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda,the TTP and the Haqqani network are located are far from inhabited areas. The dangers of civilian fatalities are not large. In the Quetta and adjoining areas of Balochistan, the sanctuaries of the Neo Taliban are located in inhabited areas. It would be very difficult—almost impossible—to avoid large civilian fatalities. Deniable ground operations would, therefore, be necessary to eliminate the sanctuaries of the Neo Taliban. The US has the capability for such ground operations, but does not have the political will to use it lest it add to the already high anti-US feelings in Pakistan and affect even the limited co-operration which it has presently been getting from Pakistan in the FATA. 16. This danger of adverse reaction in Pakistan has to be faced if the US wants to bring about better ground conditions, which would enable it to contemplate withdrawing from Afghanistan with honour and with some confidence that Afghanistan will not revert to its pre-9/11 position of being the rear base for Al Qaeda. Before contemplating withdrawal, the US has to destroy Al Qaeda sanctuaries, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, in the FATA, the Haqqani network and the Neo Taliban sanctuaries in Balochistan. It has to come to terms with the hard reality that this is something which the US has to do without depending on Pakistan.Pakistan and Al Qaeda are biding their time hoping that after the US withdrawal, they can move into Afghanistan once again. This should not be allowed to happen. 17. Instead of discussing the various options available in this regard,McChrystal’s report skirts the crux of the dilemma and discusses other issues having little relevance to a counter-sanctuaries strategy. His assessment reads more like one prepared by a senior officer attending a joint staff course than a recommendation for action prepared by an officer in charge of command and control. It is possible there is a classified part of the Assessment in which McChrystal discusses a counter-sanctuaries strategy. If not, his thinking doesn’t bode well for the ultimate success of the US operations in the Af-Pak region. 18. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier paper of May 13,2009, titled “The Af-Pak Situation–An Update”, at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers32/paper3186.html (27-9-09) (The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

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6. November 2009 by admin.

http://watching-history.blogspot.com/2009/10/future-of-pakistan.html

Recent history in Pakistan seems to bear a similarity to events in Iran during the rule of the Shah. The recent leadership of Pakistan has been similar in several ways to that of the Shah. In both countries the leaders were strongly backed by the United States. Both were involved in repressing or attacking their own people. In Iran, this led the revolution of 1979 which created an Islamic Republic. Could something similar happen in Pakistan? In 1953, the democratically elected leader of Iran, Mohammed Mosaddeq, was replaced by the Shah in a US and British led coup. The US and their CIA provided funding and support to the Shah during his resign, and helped to establish the dreaded SAVAK secret police force. SAVAK tortured and executed thousands during the Shah’s rule, and imprisoned many more. 1n Pakistan, the democratically elected leader, Nawaz Sharif was deposed in a military coup in 1999 by General Musharraf. While the US was not involved in this coup, the Bush administration strongly supported Musharraf after 9/11 and provided him with significant funding. Musharraf was pressured to resign in 2008 and Pakistan did elect a new leader, Asif Ali Zardari, though he has maintained close ties to the US and has continued similar policies. Under the Obama administration, the US has remained a strong backer of Zardari and is continuing to provide aid to his government. After 9/11 Musharraf was threatened by the US to side with them against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Under pressure from the US, and worried about closer ties between India and the US, Musharraf agreed and provided the US with the use of three airbases, as well as other support. In the following years, the Pakistan army took an active role in the war, with forces operating at the Afghan border and well as pursuing domestic al-qaeda and Taliban militants. In recent years, Pakistan has supported and permitted (though sometimes reluctantly) the United States use of unmanned drones to bomb suspected militant sites within Pakistani territory. This bombing has escalated considerably in the past couple years. For nationalistic reasons, and concern over civilian casualties, the Pakistani public has been very critical of these attacks and many consider them attacks on Pakistani sovereignty or even acts of terror. In a recent visit to Pakistan, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was sharply questioned over these attacks. Earlier this year, the Pakistani military began a major escalation in their fight against the Taliban with an assault on the Swat Valley region. This resulted in the displacement of over 2 million people, and many casualties among militants, army and civilians. More recently, there is an offensive underway in South Waziristan, which has triggered large bombings and civilian casualties. All schools across the nation have been closed for an indefinite period of time. A recent poll by Gallup Pakistan was undertaken to gauge public sentiment. The results should not be too surprising given the above. Only 9 percent of Pakistanis support the drone attacks, while 67 percent oppose. More people support dialogue with the Taliban than military action (43 percent to 41). President Zardari has the support of only 11 percent of the population (with his party having only 20 percent support). Perhaps more telling, only 11 percent consider the Taliban the greatest threat to Pakistan, while 59 percent consider the United States the largest threat. Clearly, the US is deeply unpopular in Pakistan, and the vast majority of people do not support their government’s alliance with the US. Another issue is that of US aid. The US congress has passed an aid package for Pakistan, which imposes several conditions, including one which critics suggest results in US oversight of the Pakistani military. Pakistanis have responded with street protests and claim this is a violation of Pakistani sovereignty. It is possible the US will modify the bill to improve the language, but the damage is already done. Pakistanis are distrustful of any aid from the US. Another large complaint is that US contractors are operating with impunity within Pakistan, and that they are carrying weapons illegally. There are many differences between Iran and Pakistan, of course, and one situation can never parallel another completely. Also, even when there are similar situations, the outcome can sometimes be different. Still, there are lessons to be learned from history. A government supported by a foreign power most citizens do not like or identify with, that represses and kills its own people, is not in a stable situation. There are many examples in history of such situations others than Iran, and many of them have had similar outcomes. Pakistan’s alignment with the US and US interests appears to be the largest factor causing instability within that country. The majority of Pakistanis do not support this role nor any domestic government that follows it. I will predict that unless there is an election in Pakistan of a government that follows the will of its people more closely, the likelihood of a revolution, coup, or breakup will increase over time. Eventually the situation will become untenable, and one of these outcomes will come to pass.

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6. November 2009 by admin.

by Rupert Cornwell

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090929/edit.htm#6 Six months after proclaiming a new commitment to the war in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama is under growing pressure to make what would amount to a U-turn in US policy and scale back America’s commitment to a conflict that many experts – and a majority of the public – now fear may be unwinnable.
The debate, which divides Mr Obama’s most senior advisers, was thrown into stark relief by the leaked report of General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of US and allied forces in Afghanistan, warning that the war might be lost within a year without a further boost in troop strength and a major change in strategy to combat the spreading Taliban insurgency.
General McChrystal’s bleak assessment coupled with Washington’s frustration with the Afghan leader Hamid Karzai and the fraud-ridden election over which he presided, has reignited a rift between Vice-President Joseph Biden and Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, over how the war should be waged. It has also left Mr Obama facing a fateful choice: whether to go along with his generals and send yet more troops, or stand current policy on its head.
Spoken or unspoken, behind the debate lurks the shade of Vietnam. It emerged that The Washington Post, the first to report General McChrystal’s devastating 66-page memorandum, agreed to delay publication by 24 hours, omitting elements relating to future tactics that the Pentagon and White House said might endanger American troops on the front lines in Afghanistan.
Bob Woodward, the paper’s investigative reporter, who broke the story, compares the document to the secret history of the Vietnam war that caused a sensation when it was obtained in 1971 by The New York Times. The so-called Pentagon Papers “came out eight years too late,” Mr Woodward says.
The stakes are now huge – so huge that the President barely mentioned Afghanistan in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. If Washington is perceived as opposing a further troop build-up, or leaning towards a reduction, then other countries in the coalition, where the eight-year-long war is even more unpopular than here, will rush for the exits.
Hitherto, the issue of the war in Afghanistan has seemed straightforward. In contrast to Iraq, Afghanistan has been the “good war” – a war of necessity, fought to make sure that a repeat of the 9/11 attacks, directed from Afghanistan by an al-Qa’ida sheltered by the Taliban, would never occur again.
Underlining this reinvigorated commitment, Mr Obama authorised an increase in US strength in Afghanistan to 68,000 by the end of the year, and named General McChrystal, previously in charge of US special forces, as his new commander on the ground. But the latter’s recommendation of a boost of 30,000 to 40,000 confronts this president with a dilemma akin to that facing his predecessor over Iraq three years ago: to surge or not to surge? And views within the administration differ sharply.
Essentially the choice, in strategic jargon, is between counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. The latter, implying a broad war against the Taliban to prevent it returning to power, seems to be what General McChrystal has in mind, and has long been backed by Mrs Clinton. Only this week, she had scathing words for those who argued that al-Qa’ida was no longer a factor in Afghanistan. “If Afghanistan is taken over again by the Taliban, I can’t tell you how fast al-Qa’ida would be back.”
The Vice-President, on the other hand, wants a narrower focus on al-Qa’ida itself, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where security forces have scored some important recent successes against the terrorist organisation and its Taliban allies. Under this approach, the US would require fewer forces in the field.
Instead of trying to protect the general population from the Taliban and operating a “hearts and minds” policy to win over civilian support, it would concentrate on targeted strikes on al-Qa’ida operatives, relying on umnanned drones, missile attacks and the special forces where General McChrystal is an expert. Simultaneously the training of Afghan government forces would be speeded up.
A third faction advocates a compromise, either scaling back the requested troop increase, or even starting to reverse it, while at the same time ensuring that the country does not collapse into chaos.
The White House and Pentagon are now studying the report, and it will be “weeks” before a decision is made, administration officials say.
But Mr Obama, once so trenchant on the subject, is now hedging his bets. All options are on the table, he indicated during his blitz of the Sunday talk shows last weekend. “The first question is, are we doing the right thing?” he told CNN.
As it is, public support for the conflict is dropping sharply, too. According to a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll yesterday, 59 per cent of those surveyed were now “less confident” that the US could achieve a successful end to the war. More than half opposed an increase in American forces, while a third wanted an immediate pullout.
This growing pessimism is visible on Capitol Hill, too. Earlier this month, Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, warned that neither Capitol Hill nor ordinary voters are in the mood for sending more soldiers to a war that has already taken almost 900 American lives – and 51 in August alone. Then Michigan’s Carl Levin, chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, declared that the US should send no more troops before a “surge” in Afghan security forces. But as even Pentagon officials concede, training Afghan forces up to the required standard of competence – not to mention loyalty – will be even more difficult than it was in Iraq.
Complicating matters further, Congressional leadersare now demanding a personal accounting from General McChrystal on how the war is going. For the moment Robert Gates, the Defense Secretary, has resisted the pressure, insisting the commander will only appear on Capitol Hill when a new policy has been decided. But if US casualties continue to grow, he may have little choice in the matter. In the meantime, Mr Obama is increasingly in a corner.
As Republicans constantly remind him, for the US to wind down its commitment would send a message of weakness and inconsistency to friends and foes alike. But to press on with a long, inconclusive war in a distant corner of Asia carries well-known and equal perils.
Once again, events are bearing out the famous aphorism of Mark Twain, that “while history doesn’t repeat itself, it rhymes”.
— By arrangement with The Independent

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