21. February 2010 by admin.

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The German bakery destroyed in a bombing in Pune, India

Summary

An improvised explosive device exploded at a German bakery in Pune, India, at about 7:30 p.m. local time Feb. 13. While no militant group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack, it bears a remarkable similarity to attacks that were commonplace throughout India before the more spectacular commando-style attack that targeted Mumbai in November 2008. Though conflicting reports have emerged on the sequence of events before the bomb detonated, the bakery, known to be frequented by foreigners, likely presented an appealing soft target for whatever individual or group wanted it hit.

Analysis

At approximately 7:30 p.m. local time on Feb. 13, an improvised explosive device detonated at a German bakery in Pune, India. Conflicting reports have emerged on the sequence of events, and while no militant group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it is similar to the type that occurred with frequency before the commando-style Mumbai attack, and the bakery may have been targeted because it was known to be frequented by foreigners.According to reports citing an employee of the bakery, a woman driving an auto-rickshaw handed the employee a backpack believed to contain the explosives responsible for the blast. However, an earlier story said that a customer placed a bag in the restaurant, and that the backpack was left unclaimed and detonated when a waiter opened it. The explosive material was reportedly RDX, a military-grade explosive, mixed with ammonium nitrate. Both materials are relatively easy to acquire and are commonly used in attacks in India. The fact that some reports indicate the device detonated as the backpack was opened suggests the bag was rigged to detonate upon being opened. However, due to conflicting information emerging about the incident, a timed device cannot be ruled out.The bakery, located just east of central Pune (approximately 100 miles southeast of Mumbai) in a neighborhood called Koregaon Park, was adjacent to Osho Ashram, a Hindu spiritual meditation center that draws in many foreign tourists. The bakery was also near many hotels that housed visitors to Osho Ashram. Other sites known to attract foreign visitors are also nearby, including a Chabad House, or Jewish cultural center, which was across the street from the bakery. (A Chabad House in Mumbai was targeted in the November 2008 militant attacks in that city.)The bakery was popular with foreign tourists, and the timing of the attack (Saturday evening) corresponded with peak business hours, when the restaurant would be bustling with people. This would make it less likely for suspicious activity to be noticed, and also provide a target-rich environment ; the restaurant was only some 344 square feet in size and was packed with nearly 70 people at the time of the blast.The latest reports indicate that nine people were killed in the incident, including the waiter who reportedly opened the bag, and as many as 60 were wounded. Contrary to earlier reports saying that most of those killed were foreigners, it appears that most of the casualties were Indians, with possibly only two foreigners (an Iranian biology student and an Italian woman) killed in the attack and 12 other foreigners injured. It is unclear how many foreigners were in the restaurant at the time, but since the restaurant was known to be a gathering place for foreigners (also as a place to buy drugs, according to one report), whoever was behind the attack could have been targeting foreigners. Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram said that David Headley, a U.S. citizen who was arrested in 2009 for his alleged links to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, had surveilled targets around the bakery during his trip prior to the 2008 attacks and during a March 2009 trip to Pune.Leading up to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, several Indian cities, including New Delhi, Bangalore and Ahmedabad, were the targets of serial bombings. The attacks involved multiple explosive devices detonating in short sequence in various locations around the cities, with crowded marketplaces and religious sites being very popular targets. These attacks occurred frequently across India, but quickly tapered off after the very different commando-style attack in Mumbai. Yesterday’s attack was the first significant bombing in India since Mumbai, but it was a fairly simple operation and involved only a single explosive device.Indigenous Islamic groups such as the Indian Mujihadeen claimed responsibility for the attacks leading up to Mumbai, for which the Pakistani-based Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba is believed to be responsible. No group has yet claimed responsible for the Pune attack, but indigenous Islamist groups certainly cannot be ruled out.Indian authorities, which have been at an elevated state of alert since the 2008 attacks, recently have issued warnings of possible attacks against religious sites around India. Chidambaram indicated that security had been stepped up at the nearby Chabad House and the Koregaon Park neighborhood of Pune in October 2009. With heightened security, it is more difficult to successfully carry out complex, multi-target attacks such as those of the recent past. However, an attack like the one against the German bakery in Pune, involving fewer people and fewer targets, would require less preparation time and communications and likely attract less attention from Indian authorities, and thus have a far higher chance of succeeding.

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21. February 2010 by admin.

KREMLIN WARS: PART 1

Searching for the Minister of Organized Crime

Summary

STRATFOR sources have indicated that there is a concerted effort under way to oust longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. The Kremlin’s two powerful political clans — currently at war with each other — are scrambling to fill the vacancy with one of their own. While the mayoralty of Moscow is an important position, part of its prestige comes from Luzhkov’s alleged ties to the Moscow Mob, Russia’s largest organized crime group. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reportedly wants to make oversight of the Moscow Mob part of the duties of the mayor of Moscow, making that position even more powerful and adding to the potential for another frenzied battle between the Kremlin’s clans.

Analysis

The Kremlin Wars — a power struggle between Russia’s two main political clans, led by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov — have spread to new battlefronts. The newest is the Moscow mayoralty, a position that could be left vacant within the year by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s forced retirement. More important, Luzhkov’s alleged “shadow portfolio” of running the Moscow Mob, the powerful Russian organized crime (OC) syndicate, will also be up for grabs when he steps down.

  Luzhkov himself is an institution in Moscow. He has served as mayor since 1992. He and his wife Elena Baturina — who runs Russia’s largest construction group and is the country’s only notable female oligarch — are politically and economically one of the most powerful couples in Russia. Now in his fifth term in office, the 73-year-old Luzhkov thus far has been seen as indispensable to the Kremlin because of his alleged ability to oversee the political aspects of the Moscow Mob’s operations. At the same time, Luzhkov has been difficult to deal with politically because of the independence he has as mayor of Moscow, and has therefore often run afoul of Russia’s chief decision-maker, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.   Putin is expected to make sure that whoever replaces Luzhkov as Moscow’s mayor also receives the alleged OC “portfolio,” in order to maintain government oversight on the most powerful OC group in Russia (and arguably one of the most powerful in the world). This will immediately make Luzhkov’s replacement a powerful figure — and the opposing Kremlin clans will fight wildly to get one of their own into that position.   Russian OC is an integral lever of state power in Russia. Russia’s size traditionally has made government control over the entire territory tenuous during periods when the state’s authority is weak. During those periods, OC has provided employment opportunities and power for Russia’s entrepreneurial minds. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance, many members of Russia’s intelligence services easily integrated themselves into the OC groups that emerged from the shadows in the early 1990s to replace the crumbling state in the economic, political and even judicial spheres.  

When the state is strong — as it has been with Putin as president and then prime minister — it can either expend extraordinary energy on countering OC or include it under the umbrella of the state, essentially regulating it. The latter is almost always the preferred option, since so many connections between former and current intelligence operatives and OC already exist. Currently, the Russian state is looking to increase its influence over domestic OC groups for three main reasons:

• Money: The Russian shadow economy — essentially the production of banned products and services, tax evasion and criminal activity (especially racketeering) — is a significant part of the overall economy. According to data from Russia’s statistical service released in January, the shadow economy is equal to approximately 20 percent of gross domestic product and is set to expand as the labor market deteriorates due to the economic crisis. OC controls this economy and its manifestations outside the country, through trafficking weapons, drugs and people. The government essentially taxes this economy by having political oversight on — or direct kickbacks from — OC activities at various regional levels. This means that regional political bosses are crucial to controlling the flow of money from the shadow economy to government coffers.
• Influence abroad and at home: Russian OC, through its own networks and those of former and current Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) personnel in its midst, has a large overseas presence. Main hubs for OC operations are London, Tokyo, Dubai, Istanbul, Paris, Rome, Amsterdam, Prague, New York and Miami. Thus the Russian government can use OC elements for intelligence, sabotage and even diplomatic service abroad. This also gives the Kremlin plausible deniability, since OC’s actions are always extrajudicial and are assumed, but rarely proven, to be directly linked to the state. Central Europe, where Russian OC often “negotiates” deals with local politicians on Moscow’s behalf, is full of examples of this. Russian OC’s influence also extends domestically by allowing the Kremlin to use OC to pressure regional politicians, businessmen or journalists without using government organs.
• Control of criminal activity: Ultimately, the Kremlin wants Russia to run with minimal internal discord, which means making sure that OC activities are contained. OC gives the government a way to evict businesses not approved by the state while maintaining a veneer of impartiality. Conversely, foreign investors in Russia understand that racketeers will impose a political/security protection fee — called a krysha — on their profits, but the government can use its control of OC to make sure the fee is predictable and not exorbitant, and that OC acts in a way that allows government-approved businesses to operate in Russia.

The crime syndicates’ day-to-day operations are managed by the bosses of the various mobs. For the Kremlin to synchronize those activities with the interests of the state, political oversight is needed. Luzhkov allegedly provided exactly that sort of political oversight during his time as mayor. His purported ability to control Russia’s largest OC syndicate, the Moscow Mob, has been uncanny and is in large part why he is one of the few Yeltsin-era politicians still very much active in Russia’s political scene. This is not to say Luzhkov is directly involved with the operations of the Moscow Mob himself; rather, he is widely perceived to be the group’s political handler — a very powerful position.
However, STRATFOR sources in the Kremlin say Putin feels the Russian state has grown significantly stronger since the 1990s and that the time is ripe to institutionalize political oversight of the Moscow Mob as part of the Moscow mayoralty, thus separating it from Luzhkov as an individual. Putin is expected to add Luzhkov’s alleged role in the Moscow Mob to the next mayor’s portfolio, making it a tool of the state.

  However, this presents three immediate problems. First, Luzhkov must agree to (or be persuaded to accept) the arrangement. While he might accept being forced to resign as Moscow’s mayor, it is unclear that he would agree with Putin in terms of his alleged OC portfolio. Second, the Moscow Mob will have to find Luzhkov’s replacement acceptable. This immediately leads to the third problem: the obvious question of who will be able to replace Luzhkov. His replacement will need to have sufficient clout with both Russia’s security services — the FSB in particular — and the Moscow Mob, but be “clean” enough to be the face of Moscow to the rest of the world in dealing with matters like investment, Russia’s bid for the World Cup in 2018, a potential 2020 Olympic bid and other such events.   The uncertainty over Luzhkov’s replacement leaves room for competition between the two Kremlin clans. Sechin’s clan, made up of the siloviki (members of the Russian intelligence community with positions of power in government and, in some cases, OC), would seem to have the upper hand. The FSB is the backbone of Sechin’s clan, and because that organization has so many links to Russian OC, it would only make sense for the Moscow mayoralty to fall within the Sechin clan’s purview.  

But Surkov, who heads the other powerful political clan, has other ideas. He sees the upcoming vacancy in Moscow as a way to counteract the FSB’s oversight of Russian OC and therefore outmaneuver his nemesis, Sechin.

  The battle for the control of crime syndicates would be highly explosive in any circumstance or in any country. But when it is combined with the ongoing Kremlin Wars — and when it involves OC organizations with reach, clout and capacity as great as Russian OC’s — the conflict will be exponentially greater.   http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100129_kremlin_wars_special_coverage_searching_minister_organized_crime

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21. February 2010 by admin.

Summary
India’s insurgent-ridden northeastern region has long given foreign powers a gamut of exploitable secessionist movements to use to prevent India from emerging as a major global player. Though India has grown accustomed to the ongoing volatility in its northeastern corridor, growing Islamization in the region — spurred by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency and instability in neighboring Bangladesh — will give New Delhi a good reason to pay closer attention to its porous northeastern border.

Analysis
Northeastern India is a region wracked by secessionist violence, where wide networks of drug smuggling, extortion and arms trafficking run rampant. India has traditionally dealt with the myriad secessionist movements through force, fearing that any concessions made to one group would only exacerbate the others’ secessionist tendencies and further undermine the country’s territorial integrity.

The balkanization of the region and the constant drain on Indian resources required to deal with these rebel movements was all part of the United Kingdom’s blueprint for the Indian subcontinent to prevent its former colony from developing a strong national identity and emerging as a major Asiatic power. Up until the partition in 1947, the British played a major role in encouraging tribal, ethnic, religious and linguistic identities, and in isolating various tribal groups from the mainland and the plains areas in Assam for the British East India Co. to secure its commercial enterprise.
Pakistan did not hesitate to jump in where the British left off in the post-partition period, and has since used its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to fund, train and arm these rebel groups in order to keep India’s hands tied. The largest and most powerful of the northeast secessionist movements is the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Once a student movement with populist aims to redistribute the state’s oil wealth, ULFA has gradually changed into what appears to be a moneymaking machine with a strong willingness to do the ISI’s bidding. ULFA runs an impressive extortion racket in the northeast, where Assam’s tea plantation owners and corporate leaders are regularly targeted.

The group maintains that its armed campaign will not let up until the Indian government engages it in unconditional peace talks. Yet, when New Delhi makes such an offer, ULFA usually responds with a bombing, as was the case in the April 9 bomb attack near Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s motorcade in the Assamese capital of Guwahati. ULFA’s leadership understands that New Delhi is not about to reward the armed movement with political concessions, and does not wish to disturb the financial networks it has running throughout the region. Moreover, to preserve their militant proxy, the group’s handlers in both Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s intelligence services have told ULFA not to hold peace talks with the Indian government.

Pakistan’s ISI, in cooperation with Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), appears to be investing a considerable amount of resources in solidifying India’s militant corridor. There are growing indications that these two agencies are working clandestinely in Bangladesh to bring all the northeast-based insurgent outfits and jihadist elements under one umbrella. The ISI has facilitated cooperation between ULFA and other northeastern militant outfits with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, Islamist militant groups in Kashmir, Islamist groups in Bangladesh and a growing number of al Qaeda-linked jihadist groups operating in the region.

Religion, ethnicity and ideology lose relevance within this militant network, as each group has a common interest in furthering their militant and financial capabilities by working together. For example, Tigers cadres organize training camps in the northeast and use their maritime contacts to assist ULFA in transporting arms and narcotics up to Cambodia in ULFA-owned shrimp trawlers that operate out of Bangladesh’s Chittagong port. The Tigers have also been known to train Maoist rebels in Nepal and India at camps in the jungles of India’s eastern state of Bihar.

ULFA’s growing links with Bangladeshi Islamists and jihadist elements in the area are increasingly coming to light. The April 9 attack timed with Singh’s visit to Assam marked the group’s, a tactic that was pioneered by the Tigers (a non-Islamist, majority Hindu group) and has been frequently employed by Islamist militants. Prior to the attack, ULFA chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa warned that New Delhi’s offer for unconditional peace talks was not acceptable, and that that ULFA cadres “have reached such a stage they would strap bombs on their chest and attack.” ULFA’s adoption of suicide bombing looks to be the result of the group’s increased Islamization caused by collusion with Islamist outfits in the region. The bomber in the April 9 suicide attack was Ainul Ali, a Muslim. Indian security sources revealed that ULFA did not have many Muslim cadres in its fold in the past, but the increasing flow of Bangladeshi refugees across the border has given the group more — and more capable — members willing to sacrifice their lives for the group’s cause with nudging from the ISI.

Collaboration between ULFA and the Islamist militants will expand further, as political conditions in Bangladesh appear to be indirectly contributing to the empowerment of Islamists there. Using the Pakistani military regime as an example, Bangladeshi army chief Lt. Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed is reasserting the army in Bangladeshi politics — which have long suffered from a bitter political feud between the family dynasties represented by the Awami League, led by Sheikh Hasina, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by Begum Khaleda Zia. With both party leaders driven into exile, a political vacuum has started to take root in the country, and Bangladesh’s Islamist parties are anxiously waiting to fill it.

India will be taking note of these political developments in Dhaka, though there is not much New Delhi can or wants to do to intervene. As a result, New Delhi is facing a bleak situation in which the ISI’s maneuvers and Bangladesh’s political troubles are sure to further constrain India’s ability to dig itself out of the militant trap Pakistan has set.

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