12. March 2010 by admin.

Protesters in Istanbul burn a Chinese flag during a demonstration after a Friday prayer.

Summary

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a July 10 televised address, labeled the Chinese crackdown against Uighurs in the northwestern Chinese province of Xinjiang a “genocide.” Erdogan’s statement is the latest in a stream of bold moves by Ankara to internationalize Beijing’s struggle with its minority Uighur population. Turkey’s interest in the violence between ethnic Han Chinese and Muslim Uighurs is motivated in part by domestic politics, but is also a manifestation of the ruling Justice and Development Party’s contentious desire to push a pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic agenda.

Analysis

In a televised address July 10, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan commented on the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang province, stating: “The incidents in China are, simply put, a genocide. There’s no point in interpreting this otherwise.”

Given the mass killings of Armenians by Turks during the Ottoman Empire, “genocide” is a loaded term for the Turks, and not one they throw around freely. Erdogan’s comment is the latest in a stream of provocative statements aiming to draw international attention to Beijing’s attempts to contain ethnic unrest in Xinjiang. China, highly vexed by Turkey’s actions, has already dismissed Turkey’s attempt to take the Xinjiang riots to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC); Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang issued a statement asserting that the Chinese government had taken decisive measures according to the law, and that the unrest is a purely internal Chinese affair. Qin emphasized that the issue was not one that demanded the attention of the UNSC, despite Turkey’s claims.

Ethnic riots between dominant Han Chinese and Muslim Uighur minorities in Urumqi in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region have so far killed 156 people and left more 1,000 injured, according to Chinese reports. The international response to date has been relatively mixed and muted. Russia has come out strongly in defense of China’s territorial integrity and the state’s forceful crackdown, while Europea and the United States have cautiously called on China to respect human rights in putting down the unrest. Turkey, however, has gone above and beyond any other country in internationalizing the issue and in condemning Beijing, raising questions over what is truly driving Ankara’s agenda.

Turkey has not always been this vocal about its support for the Uighurs, an ethnically Turkic group that speaks a dialect similar to Turkish and a fraction of which considers itself part of a greater Eastern Turkestan region of Central Asia. Though Beijing’s repressive policies toward the Uighurs have long been a sticking point in Chinese-Turkish relations, the Turkish government typically has restrained itself and acted indifferent when China carried out periodic crackdowns in Xinjiang, in the interest of maintaining a healthy relationship with Beijing.

Just five days before the riots in Urumqi broke out, Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited the Xinjiang region after visiting Beijing in the first trip to China a Turkish president has made in 14 years. While there, Gul said that China’s Uighurs represented the “friendship bridge” between China and Turkey and would allow the two countries to further their relations.

It only took a few days for that friendship bridge to collapse. When the riots erupted, the Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned a senior Chinese diplomat and issued a relatively calm response July 7 with a statement that read: “It is our expectation that the persons who are responsible for these incidents will be found as soon as possible and brought to justice. We believe that the necessary measures will be taken to prevent this kind of incident in the future in China, a country on the way to becoming more stable and prosperous. We extend our condolences to the people of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in particular and to the people of China in general, to the families of those who lost their lives and wish speedy recovery to those who were injured.”

Domestic politics then began to take over, as several Turkish nongovernmental organizations, human rights groups, pro-government business unions and nationalist opposition parties began calling for boycotts of Chinese goods and criticized the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for keeping quiet while Turkic Uighurs were getting killed by Chinese security forces. Erdogan on July 8 then denounced Beijing, calling the Uighurs Turkic brethren of Turkey and saying he would take the issue to the UNSC, using Turkey’s position as a non-permanent member of the council and as president of the council for the month of July. A day later, Erdogan announced that his government would grant a visa to Rebiya Kadeer, a wealthy and prominent Uighur political activist, if she chose to travel to Turkey. Kadeer had said in a July 8 interview that her visa applications to Turkey in 2006 and 2007 had been denied. Apparently, the Turkish government no longer feels as compelled to respect Beijing’s wishes in keeping the Uighur issue out of the political limelight and is even ready to give the stage to a well-known activist like Kadeer. Finally, on July 10, Erdogan brought the issue to a new level when he called the Chinese crackdown a “genocide” — a term that even the most radical Uighur separatists would not use lightly.

Turkey’s bold criticism of Beijing brings to light a number of contradictions. The Turks’ ethnic ties to China’s Uighur population may justify, in Ankara’s mind, a defense of Turkic Uighurs against the Chinese state. However, the Turkish government’s concerns are just as large as Beijing’s when it comes to maintaining territorial integrity and containing separatist movements, whether Eastern Turkestani or Kurdish.

The AKP also has a strong economic interest in China, which is what primarily drove Gul to visit China recently with a large business delegation to encourage more Chinese investment into Turkey. Turkey has a large trade deficit with China that works in Beijing’s favor; according to Chinese customs statistics, bilateral trade between the two countries, which mostly consists of raw materials, totaled $12.57 billion in 2008, with Chinese exports to Turkey reaching $10.59 billion and Turkish exports to China only reaching $1.98 billion. Turkish exports have already taken a major hit over the past year as Turkey’s main trading partners in Europe have struggled to cope with the global recession and sustain demand for Turkish exports, making it all the more imperative for Turkey to seek out new markets in places like China. However, in this case, the Uighurs were paramount to Turkish economic interests in China. Even Turkish Trade and Industry Minister Nihat Ergun implied on July 9 that Turkish consumers should boycott Chinese goods over the Xinjiang riots, stating that Turks should reconsider their values if the country that they buy goods from does not respect human rights.

Domestic politics has certainly played a role in the AKP’s increasingly hard-line attitude toward Beijing, but the Turkish response to the Xinjiang riots is also a reflection of the AKP’s broader pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic agenda to expand Turkish clout in its traditional spheres of influence, a policy embodied by Erdogan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu.

Turkey’s unusually bold criticism of Israel during the Israeli military offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in early 2008 was the Islamist-rooted AKP’s way of broadening its appeal in the Arab and wider Islamic world. By taking a harsh stand against its traditional ally in the region, Turkey sent a message that it would be a defender of Muslims across the region, allowing Ankara to gain esteem from its Arab neighbors who had only just started to pick up on Turkey’s regional resurgence.

While the Islamic image has worked well for Turkey in its Arab backyard, the Turks have been struggling to garner the same level of support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where Turkic-speaking populations are spread throughout Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In these regions, Turkey has relied more heavily on its Turkic identity to connect with the Turkic populations and establish a stronger foothold in its near abroad. However, the AKP has also overestimated the extent to which others identify themselves as cousins of Turkey, particularly in the post-Soviet space where the AKP’s Islamic branding and pan-Turkic movement tend to alienate post-Communist regimes that do not identify as strongly with Islam and fear a Turkish imperial agenda. This is mostly due to the issue of time. Turkey — as the Ottoman Empire — ruled much of the Middle East up until the end of World War I. But the Turkic groups of Central Asia have not been united with their “brothers” in Turkey for the better part of a millennium, and even then not under the rubric of what could be considered a single government.

In China, the Turkic Uighurs, while grateful for a foreign backer, were already suspect of Turkey’s intentions when Gul visited Xinjiang province. Turkey has had little influence amongst the Eastern Turkestan movement and, until now, has been more inclined to remain indifferent to the Uighurs’ plight. Even now, Turkish support for the Uighurs does not stretch beyond rhetoric. Taking the case to the UNSC may draw international attention to the issue, much to Beijing’s discontent, but any action in the UNSC is highly unlikely with Russia and China carrying veto power.

Nonetheless, Turkey seems prepared to risk a serious breach in relations and economic links with a major power like China for the sake of promoting its pan-Turkic/Islamic brand. The AKP may well believe this is the path toward regional expansion, but once the Turks go beyond the Arab world in pushing this brand, they are only more likely to encounter greater resistance.

“This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR“

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12. March 2010 by admin.

Last week a small crisis with potentially serious implications blew up between Israel and Turkey. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon summoned Turkish Ambassador to Israel Ahmet Oguz Celikkol to a meeting Jan. 11 to protest a Turkish soap opera that depicted Israeli agents kidnapping Palestinian children. When the ambassador arrived, he received a lower seat than Ayalon — and was photographed in that position, making it appear that Ayalon was speaking to an inferior. Ayalon wouldn’t shake hands with him during the televised parts of the meeting, and had an Israeli flag visible on the table. Topping it all off, Ayalon told an Israeli cameraman in Hebrew that the important thing was that people see Celikkol sitting down low “while we’re up high.”Turks saw the images as a deliberate Israeli insult, though Ayalon argued that the episode was not meant as an insult but as a reminder that Israel does not take criticism lightly. While it is difficult to see the relative height of seats as an international incident, Ayalon clearly intended to send a significant statement to Turkey. The Turks took that statement to heart, so symbolism clearly matters. Israel’s intent is not so clear, however.

Turkey and Israeli National Security

Over the past year, Turkey has become increasingly critical of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. Turkey has tried to mediate, for example, between Syria and Israel. Now, Turkey has made it known that it holds Israel responsible for these failures. Even so, Turkey remains Israel’s major ally, albeit informally, in the Muslim world. Turkey is also a growing power. Uniquely in the region, it provides Israel with a dynamic economy to collaborate with. Turkey also has the most substantial and capable military force in the region. Should Turkey shift its stance to a pro-Arab, anti-Israel position, the consequences for Israel’s long-term national security would not be trivial.

Also last week, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman introduced a new concept to Israeli diplomacy, and Israel’s treatment of the Turkish ambassador must be understood in this light. According to Lieberman, Israel will expel ambassadors from countries that it feels have criticized Israel unfairly. The presence of ambassadors does not mean as much today as it did in the 18th century, but the image of Israel responding to criticism — which, fair or not, is widespread — by reducing relations seems self-defeating. For many governments, having Israel reduce diplomatic status causes no harm, and might even be a political plus domestically. Obviously, Lieberman’s statement was meant to generate support among the Israeli public, and it well might. But consider the strategic consequences to Israel.

Turkey has been shifting its position on its role in the Islamic world in recent years under the Islamist-rooted government of President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While increasingly critical of Israel, the Turkish government also has tried to bridge the gap between the Arabs and Israelis, albeit to promote Turkey’s position in the Muslim world. Thus, Turkey is far from being confrontational with Israel. Moreover, tensions in Turkey between secularists in the military and the civilian Islamist-rooted government are substantial. Turkish internal politics are complicated, and therefore politics between Turkey and Israel are complicated.

Israeli Strategy

Ever since its peace treaty with Egypt, Israel’s grand strategy has been to divide Muslim nations in the region, finding common interests with some to make certain no common front against Israel arises. To this end, Israel has formal treaties with Jordan and Egypt both based on common enemies. The Jordanian government — Hashemites ruling a country with a substantial Palestinian population — fears the Palestinians at least as much as Israel. Egypt, which suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, opposes Hamas, which is an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel accordingly uses mutual hostility toward the Palestinians to create a balance of power on its border.

Still, both Egypt and Jordan have said — and will continue to say — many critical things about Israel. They need to speak to their respective domestic audiences, and Israel understands that what is said to satisfy that audience is not necessarily connected to their foreign and security policies. Some Israelis condemn both Egypt and Jordan for such criticisms. But from a larger perspective, if Egypt were to repudiate its peace treaty with Israel and begin refurbishing its military, and Jordan were to shift to an anti-Israeli policy and allow third parties to use its territory and the long and difficult-to-defend Jordan River as a base of operations, Israel would face a fundamental strategic threat.

So Israel has adopted a very simple policy: Egypt and Jordan may say what they want so long as Egypt does not abandon its neutrality and beef up its military and Jordan does not let a foreign force into the Jordan Valley. And given that the Israelis want to ensure that the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes survive, the Israelis tolerate periodic outbursts against Israel. Rhetoric is rhetoric and geopolitics is geopolitics, and the Israelis understand the distinction.

That they understand this difference makes Ayalon’s behavior, let alone Lieberman’s as-yet-unimplemented policy, difficult to follow. It is difficult to know whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sanctioned Ayalon’s move. As has been the case in Israel for years, Netanyahu’s coalition is weak and fragmented, enabling smaller parties to pursue their own policies. There is no question that embarrassing the Turkish ambassador pleased many Israelis, particularly those who already belong to Netanyahu’s coalition. If the event was staged with an Israeli audience in mind, the episode might have made sense. But Ayalon also spoke to the Turkish public, and at the moment, the Turkish voters may well be more important to Israel than Israeli voters. Turkey is just too powerful a country for Israel to have as an enemy.

On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak made an official visit to Turkey, and both sides went out of their way to put the Ayalon incident behind them. Clearly, there are members of the Turkish and Israeli cabinets who do not want a crisis between the two countries. And they probably will be able to contain the current situation.

Either way, Israel certainly knew how the seating episode would play in Turkey. Perhaps the Israelis felt that by showcasing their displeasure they might incite Turkish secularists against the Islamists. If so, this is a dangerous game, as insulting Turkey is apt to mobilize the secularists against Israel as much as the Islamists, leading to a Turkish consensus on the Israeli issue not in Israel’s best interests.

The Turkish Re-Emergence

When we step back and look at the broader strategic picture, we see a Turkey slowly but systematically re-emerging as a regional power prepared to use its influence. Washington has observed this, too, and so regards Turkey as a key part of its strategy to draw down the U.S. presence in Iraq. Turkey does not want to see massive instability in Iraq any more than the Americans do. Similarly, in any confrontation with Iran, Turkey is both a communications channel and a potential ally. Further afield, Turkey is contributing to the Western war effort in Afghanistan, and has substantial influence in the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia. The United States has no desire to move into confrontation with Turkey. Indeed, it sees Turkey not so much as a U.S. surrogate, which Turkey is not, but as the most significant regional power with interests aligned with the United States.

Israel is also an ally of the United States, but it cannot achieve the things Turkey might in Syria, Iraq and the rest of the region. The U.S. interest at present lies in stabilizing these countries and moving them away from Iran. The Turks could help this process. The Israelis can’t. That means that in any breakdown of relations between Turkey and Israel, the United States will be hard-pressed to side with Israel. The United States shares fundamental interests with Turkey, so in breaking with Turkey, the Israelis are risking a breach with the United States.

U.S. relations aside, Israel needs its relationship with Turkey as well. The region as a whole has two major powers and one potential power. Turkey and Israel are the major powers, Egypt is the potential one. The ongoing Turkish economic surge of the past few years will generate economic activity throughout the region, particularly in Egypt, where wages are low and where the (albeit small) middle class can buy Turkish products. A Turkish-Egyptian economic relationship follows from the Turkish surge. Maintaining Egyptian neutrality is a foundation of Israeli national security, but souring Israeli-Turkish relations during a Turkish-sponsored economic revival in Egypt could threaten this. And Israel does not want to be caught between a hostile Egypt and Turkey.

Elsewhere in the region, Turkey is increasing its influence in Syria. It currently shares Israel’s interests in curbing Hezbollah in Lebanon and redirecting Syrian relations away from Iran toward Turkey. Obviously, Israel wants to see this process continue, but Turkey could expand its influence in Syria without dealing with Hezbollah.

Israeli Limitations

Turkey is a developing power with options, while Israel is a power that has developed to its limits. The Turkish re-emergence could well transform the region, and Turkey has a number of ways it could play this. By contrast, geopolitically and economically, Israel is committed in a certain direction. This is a moment during which Turkey has options, and more options than Israel.

Israel has relatively few tools available to shape Turkey’s choices, though it does have several ways to close off some Turkish choices. One of Turkey’s choices is to maintain its relationship with Israel. If the Turks choose not to maintain this relationship, Israel’s strategic position will suffer a severe blow. Logic would therefore have it that Israel would try to avoid sparking a political process in Turkey that makes breaking with Israel the easier choice.

By deliberately embarrassing the Turks, Lieberman and Ayalon are unlikely to make the Turks want to improve their relationship with Israel. And Lieberman and Ayalon seem to underestimate the degree to which Israel needs this relationship. Turkey can afford to criticize Israel because an Israeli rupture with Turkey actually solves diplomatic problems for Turkey without harming the Turkish strategic position. If Turkey breaks with Israel, Israel now has a very powerful regional adversary quite capable of arming regional Arab powers. It is also a country able to challenge the primacy of the Israeli relationship in American regional thinking. We therefore see avoiding a crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations as mattering more to Israel in the long run than to Turkey.

“This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR“

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12. March 2010 by admin.

The Lebanese army command believes major military operations in the forthcoming war between Israel and Hezbollah will begin in the western Bekaa Valley. The army command believes the Israelis will pursue Hezbollah as far as Hirmil at the northern end of the valley. The Lebanese army also reportedly is aware that Iranian missiles continue to reach Hezbollah from Syria. Iranian planes unload missiles at the airport in Aleppo, Syria, after which they are shipped to the Bekaa.

A team of missile experts from Iran’s elite military unit, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, led by an Iranian colonel reportedly arrived in Lebanon about three weeks ago. The team examined Hezbollah missile sites in the western Bekaa Valley and supervised the installation of additional missile silos and concrete bunkers. Iran also reportedly will begin a new cycle of guerrilla warfare training in al-Shara near the Lebanese-Syrian border.

Meanwhile, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a pro-Syrian left-wing faction opposed to the mainstream ruling Palestinian Fatah movement, is said to have mobilized 4,000 highly trained fighters outside the large PFLP-GC military base in Qusaya, Lebanon. At present, the troops at are stationed on the Syrian side of the border, but they could enter Qusaya’s perimeter in a matter of minutes. The Lebanese army reportedly is aware of the arrival of eight additional tanks to Qusaya.

  It has been reported that Hezbollah and the PFLP-GC are coordinating their military plans. Moreover, at Damascus’ insistence, the Iranians allegedly have instructed Hezbollah to treat the PFLP-GC as its equal.

 The Syrians hope the PFLP-GC will be able to prevent the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway. An IDF advance into the Bekaa would put Damascus within just a few hours of Israeli forces. As the Syrians do not want to become embroiled in Israel’s next war with Hezbollah, they are therefore preparing the PFLP-GC to fight a proxy war on Syria’s behalf.

  Courtsey:http://www.stratfor.com/node/156688/analysis/20100311_lebanon_syria_preparations_future_conflict_israel

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