13. March 2010 by admin.

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13. March 2010 by admin.

  Israel  Defence Forces Chief Of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi arrived in Washington on Monday for a visit in which he will meet with a series of U.S. officials, including White House National Security Advisor James Jones and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen. The topic of sanctions on Iran will inevitably come up, just as the White House has downgraded the once “crippling sanctions” package it has tried to compile. The downgrade follows months of failed attempts to bring on board all members of the P-5+1, most notably Russia and China.   The Americans have reportedly moved on to a more watered-down, weaker version of sanctions that target not Iran’s gasoline imports, but rather the country’s shipping, banking and insurance sectors after appearing to have resigned themselves to the fact that Russia and China were not going to come on board with the initial, more severe proposal. The latest deadline being considered by those drafting the new package is reportedly May, though with the way deadlines have been treated throughout the affair (remember the February deadline?), even that seems like a stretch.   The United States thus finds itself in a geopolitical bind, stuck with no good options and the still formidable task of convincing Russia and China to come on board with the rest of the P-5+1 in agreeing to a way to pressure Tehran into giving up its nuclear ambitions while avoiding a war in the Persian Gulf. But even with watered-down sanctions, Russia still has an interest in seeing the United States remain mired in this imbroglio. Every day of American distraction in the Middle East means another day of Russian resurgence in its former Soviet domain carried out with minimal interference from Washington. And China, which depends on Iran for a significant portion of the oil essential to greasing the wheels of its ever-expanding economy, is happy to push for more talks as long as it is not the only U.N. Security Council member that refuses to bow to Washington’s desires.   With U.S. President Barack Obama’s hopes for a change in the Russian and Chinese positions hinging on how Moscow and Beijing respond to the new draft, the world’s superpower finds itself in uncomfortable terrain. Washington knows that this latest version of sanctions –- labeled as “smart” sanctions due to the fact that they are not intended to target the Iranian people, but rather the country’s elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps –- is only as good as its ability to appease the Israelis, who would want to be able to draw the United States into a fight with Tehran and utilize the strength of the American military as a way of setting back the Iranian nuclear program.
One of the United States’ main strategic imperatives is to prevent the formation of a dominant power on the Eurasian landmass. One of the tactics Washington has been known to employ to achieve this imperative is to wait as long as possible to join a fight as long as there are others present that can do the brunt of the dirty work. For example, the United States stood on the sidelines until 1917 before entering the Great War, and waited until 1944 to land on the beaches of Normandy, giving its Western European allies (as well as its Soviet friends on the Eastern Front) plenty of time to absorb casualties and weaken the Nazi war machine before putting any of its own soldiers into the line of fire.   “One of the United States’ main strategic imperatives is to prevent the formation of a dominant power on the Eurasian landmass.”
Another tried and true tactic, however, has been to utilize a third force –- whether that be a state actor or a non-state actor –- to do Washington’s bidding. Unleashing Islamist insurgents against the Soviets during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan (with financial support from Saudi Arabia and logistical assistance from Pakistan) is a well-known example, as is the use of Awakening Councils in Iraq’s Sunni provinces during the 2007 surge, which helped turn the tide of what then looked like an interminable war. And with the recent focus on the empowerment of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police eerily mirroring the obsession with “Vietnamization” in the 1970’s, the last 100 years of American foreign policy show a country that operates according to the notion that it is easier to allow others to do something for you than it is to do it yourself.   When the United States surveys the current landscape in the Middle East, it does not see any good candidates for helping it to contain Iran. The historic counterweight to a strong Persia, Iraq finds itself weak and fractured, possibly even at the risk of becoming an Iranian satellite as a result of the 2003 American invasion, which toppled the government of Saddam Hussein. The Russian comeback in central Asia and the Caucasus has largely bottled up any possibility of taking that route to destabilize Tehran, short of enlisting the support of Moscow itself. The Persian Gulf states recognize that geography is king, and while the United States buys these countries’ oil, the Iranians are a permanent presence in the region that will not go away over time. Then there are the Saudis, who, despite the sophistication of its equipment, have a military with a very limited capability of operating beyond its borders. Turkey –- a strong country in the region that theoretically could pose a big help to the United States — is focused on other foreign policy agendas that likely outrank helping the Americans at the moment. Afghanistan has problems of its own — namely the fact that it has never existed as a coherent nation state — while Pakistan is currently battling a jihadist insurgency at home. Hopes for a revolution in Iran, through the much-publicized Green Movement, failed to materialize, while the few anti-regime domestic militant groups whose interests could possibly intersect with those of Washington -– Mujahideen-e-Khalq and Jundallah -– do not come close to having what it takes to take on Tehran.   There is, of course, the possibility of negotiations. But all sorts of Faustian bargains arise from this route as well, meaning that when it comes to Iran, the United States is left with no good options.

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13. March 2010 by admin.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited India to talk about the two countries’ shared interest in Afghanistan. Moscow and New Delhi have a history of aligned interests in the country, which will move the two closer together as the United States prepares for an eventual withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited New Delhi on March 11 to discuss, among other things, Afghanistan. During his visit, he is working with the Indians to formulate a common strategy for dealing with that country. Ahead of Putin’s visit, Russian Ambassador to India Alexander Kadakin said it was time for NATO forces to withdraw from Afghanistan. He added that though Russia understands that may not happen immediately, both Russia and India are preparing to cooperate with one another to lay the groundwork for their policies in Afghanistan in anticipation of an eventual U.S. withdrawal.

With the United States turning its attention away from Iraq, Afghanistan is fast becoming — for the moment — a focal point of international attention. Washington is in the process of committing a total of nearly 100,000 troops to the campaign there for the next 12 to 18 months, and it remains the single most important focus of the NATO alliance. But while the U.S. focus has been in the process of shifting to Afghanistan for two years now, other countries such as India, Russia and Iran are beginning to focus their attention to the war-torn country for reasons of their own.

The nature of this focus is twofold. First there are international players, such as Iran, that benefit from the fact that U.S. attention — particularly its ground combat capability — is being absorbed by Afghanistan. Keeping the U.S. bogged down there creates room for maneuver on other issues. Second, there are a number of countries that have an interest in the future of Afghanistan and that will need to position themselves to take advantage of the duration of the expected U.S. commitment, a pivotal time for Afghanistan in terms of shaping the long-term realities of the country.

Enter the Russo-Indian alignment on Afghanistan. Much like Iran, Russia sees benefits in having the U.S. bogged down in Afghanistan. Russia’s current drive to consolidate control over its periphery benefits greatly from the American distraction in the Middle East and South Asia. Logistical challenges for the United States in Afghanistan have created new levers for Moscow as Washington has sought supply routes through the former Soviet Union.

But Russia also must consider the long-term perspective on Afghanistan, a tumultuous country that borders its near abroad. To ensure it does not face challenges in a post-withdrawal period, Russia will need to be prepared to deal with an American-Pakistani-Saudi-Turkish understanding and immense influence in the country.

As Russia is seeking to counterbalance the United States in Afghanistan, India is seeking to counterbalance Pakistan. India has no border with Afghanistan, and it does not have many tools with which to challenge Pakistan’s influence there head-on, so it — like Russia — has less influence in the country than it would prefer. A government in Kabul friendly to Islamabad emboldens Pakistan by giving it a secure border, allowing it to focus all its free attention to its east, whereas an Afghan government friendly to New Delhi weakens Pakistan.

Alliances between countries have a way of recurring throughout history because of the fundamental geopolitical and geographic factors that define a region. Russo-Indian cooperation on Afghanistan is no exception. New Delhi supported the Marxist governments of Kabul that existed during the 1980s at a time when a U.S.-Pakistani-Saudi alliance was supporting Islamist insurgents in bleeding the Red Army.

When the Taliban rose to power in the midst of the intra-Islamist civil war that erupted following the fall of the Marxist regime in 1992, both India and Russia, along with Iran supported the anti-Taliban forces — largely made up of Tajiks, Hazara and Uzbeks — that formed the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. The three countries’ common interest in opposing the rise of a Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul led them to support the same groups: The enemy of their common enemy became their common proxy. And just as Russia, Iran and India found themselves seeking a common strategy in the 1990s in the wake of Afghanistan’s descent into civil war, so, too, will these countries seek to set themselves up as partners in their current attempts to influence the situation in Afghanistan.

Even together, Russia, Iran and India face a more powerful bloc with more influence than they could hope to achieve. But they are not without influence — not only among the ethnic minorities but also among the Pashtuns who were formerly affiliated with the Marxist regimes and through aid monies. (India is the largest regional donor to Afghanistan.) The U.S.-Pakistani-Saudi-Turkish alignment also is leaning heavily on Pakistan to use its immense influence to move forward with their plans for Afghanistan. Because this entails a deeper Islamist influence, both Russia and India will look to cooperate over doing what they can to limit that accommodation, which puts them on a potential collision course with American efforts there.

At the heart of the issue is transnational Islamist militancy, which is the central thread of the common Russian, Iranian and Indian self-interest in Afghanistan. Pakistan has long cultivated militancy in the Pashtun regions on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Islamabad keeps these groups on hand as leverage against New Delhi — it was from these groups that the 2008 Mumbai attacks originated.

Similarly, Moscow’s painful — and recent — memories of Chechen militancy have given rise to deep-seated fears about militancy along its periphery (not to mention that it was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that was the only “government” to recognize Chechen “independence”). More important though, the Russians are worried about the spillover of Islamist militancy from Afghanistan in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan – a more immediate threat given the shared borders. Now the U.S.-Pakistani-Saudi-Turkish axis is seeking, to one degree or another, to facilitate the political accommodation of Taliban and other Islamist groups into the regime in Kabul — the very groups over which Russia, Iran and India harbor the deepest concern.

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