The Geopolitics of Dope

19. June 2010 by admin.

The Geopolitics of Dope Over recent months, the level of violence along the U.S.-Mexican border has begun to rise substantially, with some of it spilling into the United States. Last week, the Mexican government began military operations on its side of the border against Mexican gangs engaged in smuggling drugs into the United States. The action apparently pushed some of the gang members north into the United States in a bid for sanctuary. Low-level violence is endemic to the border region. But while not without precedent, movement of organized, armed cadres into the United States on this scale goes beyond what has become accepted practice. The dynamics in the borderland are shifting and must be understood in a broader, geopolitical context. A low-friction border, one that easily could be traversed at low cost — without extended waits — was important to both sides. In 2006, the United States imported $198 billion in goods from Mexico and exported $134 billion to Mexico. This makes Mexico the third-largest trading partner of the United States and also makes it one of the more balanced major trade relationships the United States has. Loss of Mexican markets would hurt the U.S. economy substantially. The U.S. advantage in selling to Mexico is low-cost transport. Lose that through time delays at the border and the Mexican market becomes competitive for other countries. About 13 percent of all U.S. exports are bought by Mexico.There always have been uncontrolled economic transactions and movements along the border. Both sides understood that the cost of controlling and monitoring these transactions outstripped the benefit. Long before NAFTA came into existence, social and economic movement in both directions — but particularly from Mexico to the United States — were fairly uncontrolled. Borderland transactions in particular, local transactions in proximity to the border region (retail shopping, agricultural transfers and so on), were uncontrolled. So was smuggling. Trade in stolen U.S. cars and parts shipped into Mexico, labor from Mexico shipped into the United States, etc., were seen as tolerable costs for an open border.The U.S. border with Mexico has been intermittently turbulent since the U.S. occupation of northern Mexico. The annexation of Texas following its anti-Mexican revolution and the Mexican-American War created a borderland, an area in which the political border is clearly delineated but the cultural and economic borders are less clear and more dynamic. This is the case with many borders, including the U.S.-Canadian one, but the Mexican border has gone through periods of turbulence in the past and is going through one right now. Not disrupting this trade and not raising its cost has been a fundamental principle of U.S.-Mexican relations, one long predating NAFTA. Leaving aside the contentious issue of whether illegal immigration hurts or helps the United States, the steps required to control that immigration would impede bilateral trade. The United States therefore has been loath to impose effective measures, since any measures that would be effective against population movement also would impose friction on trade. The United States has been willing to tolerate levels of criminality along the border. The only time when the United States shifted its position was when organized groups in Mexico both established themselves north of the political border and engaged in significant violence. Thus, in 1916, when the Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa began operations north of the border, the U.S. Army moved into Mexico to try to destroy his base of operations. This has been the line that, when crossed, motivated the United States to take action, regardless of the economic cost. The current upsurge in violence is now pushing that line. The United States has built-in demand for a range of illegal drugs, including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamines and marijuana. Regardless of decades of efforts, the United States has not been able to eradicate or even qualitatively reduce this demand. As an advanced industrial country, the United States has a great deal of money available to satisfy the demand for illegal drugs. This makes the supply of narcotics to a large market attractive. In fact, it almost doesn’t matter how large demand is. Regardless of how it varies, the economics are such that even a fraction of the current market will attract sellers. Even after processing, the cost of the product is quite low. What makes it an attractive product is the differential between the cost of production and the price it commands. In less-developed countries, supplying the American narcotics market creates huge income differentials. From the standpoint of a poor peasant, the differential between growing a product illegal in the United States compared with a legal product is enormous. From the standpoint of the processor, shippers and distributors, every step in the value chain creates tremendous incentives to engage in this activity over others. There are several factors governing price. The addictive nature of the product creates an inelastic demand curve in a market with high discretionary income. People will buy at whatever the price and somehow will find the money for the purchase. Illegality suppresses competition and drives cartelization. Processing, smuggling and distributing the drugs requires a complex supply chain. Businesses not prepared to engage in high-risk illegal activities are frozen out of the market. The cost of market entry is high, since the end-to-end system (from the fields to the users) both is a relationship business (strangers are not welcome) and requires substantial expertise, particularly in covert logistics. Finally, there is a built-in cost for protecting the supply chain once created. Because they are involved in an illegal business, drug dealers cannot take recourse to the courts or police to protect their assets. Protecting the supply chain and excluding competition are opposite sides of the same coin. Protecting assets is major cost of running a drug ring. It suppresses competition, both by killing it and by raising the cost of entry into the market. The illegality of the business requires that it be large enough to manage the supply chain and absorb the cost of protecting it. It gives high incentives to eliminate potential competitors and new entrants into the market. In the end, it creates a monopoly or small oligopoly in the business, where the comparative advantage ultimately devolves into the effectiveness of the supply chain and the efficiency of the private police force protecting it. That means that drug organizations evolve in several predictable ways. They have huge amounts of money flowing in from the U.S. market by selling relatively low-cost products at monopolistic prices into markets with inelastic demand curves. Second, they have unique expertise in covert logistics, expertise that can be transferred to the movement of other goods. Third, they develop substantial security capabilities, which can grow over time into full-blown paramilitary forces to protect the supply chain. Fourth, they are huge capital pools, investing in the domestic economy and manipulating the political system. Cartels can challenge — and supplant — governments. Between huge amounts of money available to bribe officials, and covert armies better equipped, trained and motivated than national police and military forces, the cartels can become the government — if in fact they didn’t originate in the government. Getting the government to deploy armed forces against the cartel can become a contradiction in terms. In their most extreme form, cartels are the government. Drug cartels have two weaknesses. First, they can be shattered in conflicts with challengers within the oligopoly or by splits within the cartels. Second, their supply chains can be broken from the outside. U.S. policy has historically been to attack the supply chains from the fields to the street distributors. Drug cartels have proven extremely robust and resilient in modifying the supply chains under pressure. When conflict occurs within and among cartels and systematic attacks against the supply chain take place, however, specific cartels can be broken — although the long-term result is the emergence of a new cartel system. In the 1980s, the United States manipulated various Colombian cartels into internal conflict. More important, the United States attacked the Colombian supply chain in the Caribbean as it moved from Colombia through Panama along various air and sea routes to the United States. The weakness of the Colombian cartel was its exposed supply chain from South America to the United States. U.S. military operations raised the cost so high that the route became uneconomic. The main route to American markets shifted from the Caribbean to the U.S.-Mexican border. It began as an alliance between sophisticated Colombian cartels and still-primitive Mexican gangs, but the balance of power inevitably shifted over time. Owning the supply link into the United States, the Mexicans increased their wealth and power until they absorbed more and more of the entire supply chain. Eventually, the Colombians were minimized and the Mexicans became the decisive power. The Americans fought the battle against the Colombians primarily in the Caribbean and southern Florida. The battle against the Mexican drug lords must be fought in the U.S.-Mexican borderland. And while the fight against the Colombians did not involve major disruptions to other economic patterns, the fight against the Mexican cartels involves potentially huge disruptions. In addition, the battle is going to be fought in a region that is already tense because of the immigration issue, and at least partly on U.S. soil. The cartel’s supply chain is embedded in the huge legal bilateral trade between the United States and Mexico. Remember that Mexico exports $198 billion to the United States and — according to the Mexican Economy Ministry — $1.6 billion to Japan and $1.7 billion to China, its next biggest markets. Mexico is just behind Canada as a U.S. trading partner and is a huge market running both ways. Disrupting the drug trade cannot be done without disrupting this other trade. With that much trade going on, you are not going to find the drugs. It isn’t going to happen. Police action, or action within each country’s legal procedures and protections, will not succeed. The cartels’ ability to evade, corrupt and absorb the losses is simply too great. Another solution is to allow easy access to the drug market for other producers, flooding the market, reducing the cost and eliminating the economic incentive and technical advantage of the cartel. That would mean legalizing drugs. That is simply not going to happen in the United States. It is a political impossibility. This leaves the option of treating the issue as a military rather than police action. That would mean attacking the cartels as if they were a military force rather than a criminal group. It would mean that procedural rules would not be in place, and that the cartels would be treated as an enemy army. Leaving aside the complexities of U.S.-Mexican relations, cartels flourish by being hard to distinguish from the general population. This strategy not only would turn the cartels into a guerrilla force, it would treat northern Mexico as hostile occupied territory. Don’t even think of that possibility, absent a draft under which college-age Americans from upper-middle-class families would be sent to patrol Mexico — and be killed and wounded. The United States does not need a Gaza Strip on its southern border, so this won’t happen. The current efforts by the Mexican government might impede the various gangs, but they won’t break the cartel system. The supply chain along the border is simply too diffuse and too plastic. It shifts too easily under pressure. The border can’t be sealed, and the level of economic activity shields smuggling too well. Farmers in Mexico can’t be persuaded to stop growing illegal drugs for the same reason that Bolivians and Afghans can’t. Market demand is too high and alternatives too bleak. The Mexican supply chain is too robust — and too profitable — to break easily. The likely course is a multigenerational pattern of instability along the border. More important, there will be a substantial transfer of wealth from the United States to Mexico in return for an intrinsically low-cost consumable product — drugs. This will be one of the sources of capital that will build the Mexican economy, which today is 14th largest in the world. The accumulation of drug money is and will continue finding its way into the Mexican economy, creating a pool of investment capital. The children and grandchildren of the Zetas will be running banks, running for president, building art museums and telling amusing anecdotes about how grandpa made his money running blow into Nuevo Laredo. It will also destabilize the U.S. Southwest while grandpa makes his pile. As is frequently the case, it is a problem for which there are no good solutions, or for which the solution is one without real support.

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Security and World Cup

18. June 2010 by admin.

Summary

Security is always a concern for organizers of the World Cup, and this year’s upcoming tournament in South Africa — the first World Cup on the continent — is no exception. Envisioning a range of threats from terrorism to petty crime, tournament organizers are trying to beef up security in nine cities that will serve as venues for the games. Less than a month before the tournament begins, STRATFOR thought it time to look at how real those threats are and how security preparations are shaping up.

Analysis

In June and July, South Africa will host the first World Cup tournament ever held in Africa. The first game of the tournament will be June 11 in Johannesburg, where the finals are scheduled to be held July 11. The World Cup draws hordes of spectators, sponsors and dignitaries, including this year, perhaps, U.S. President Barack Obama, who has expressed an interest in attending should the U.S. team proceed to the finals.

Security is always a concern for World Cup organizers, and this year’s tournament — the largest sporting event ever hosted on African soil — raises concerns about South Africa’s ability to provide a secure environment for the month-long event. While terrorism is high on the list of organizers’ concerns, the security issue that will affect the most people will likely be violent crime, which has grown endemic in South Africa over the past two decades.

 

The South Africa World Cup Organizing Committee has designated nine cities to host the soccer matches: Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Bloemfontein (Mangaung in the local language), Pretoria (Tshwane), Rustenburg, Port Elizabeth, Polokwane and Nelspruit. Semi-final matches will be played in Cape Town and Durban, the third place match will be played in Port Elizabeth and the finals will be played in Johannesburg.

In the run-up to the event, STRATFOR thought it appropriate to take a look at the security environment in South Africa, evaluate specific threats and offer guidance on how to avoid danger during the tournament.

 

Crime

 Unlike terrorism, which tends to be driven by ideology, criminal activity is driven by opportunity and the desire for quick cash, and both of those factors will be in abundance during the World Cup. To mitigate against any conceivable security threat, an estimated 44,000 members of the South African Police Service (SAPS), the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) and private security personnel will be deployed at tournament venues, hotels where the teams will be staying and anywhere considered a possible launching point for criminal or terrorist acts (more on these deployments below in the section titled “Security Preparations”). Many national teams will also have their own security details. The U.S. team, for example, will be guarded by personnel from the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS).

Foreign governments also have been heavily involved in assisting South African security officials with logistics and communications in preparation for the tournament and will remain involved until it ends. The DSS has extensive experience conducting security for large, high-profile events, and there has been extensive coordination with the German authorities to learn from their experiences hosting the last World Cup, which was held in 2006. These measures will certainly go a long way toward securing the stadiums, hotels and other World Cup venues, most of which are located in city centers. But efforts to secure World Cup activities could displace criminal attacks to more accessible targets outside this ring of security, to urban and rural areas where the police presence will be weaker.

Property crime is widespread in South Africa and found in every city throughout the country. The country’s criminal elements tend to be organized and efficient, with gangs often conducting practice runs and extensive preoperational surveillance before hitting hardened targets such as armored cash transporters and ATMs (sometimes using explosives and automatic weapons). Organized-crime leaders are even known to specify high-demand products for theft, including certain models of cars and cell phones and other electronics. In the pursuit of cash or valuables, criminals are known to use extreme violence against anyone attempting to stop them. While such extreme measures would not likely be employed against unarmed civilians during the World Cup, firearms, knives and other weapons are plentiful in South Africa and are frequently used if a victim resists.

Most crime in South Africa takes place in underdeveloped and poorly policed townships outside of the main city centers. However, criminals certainly do not limit themselves to townships, and in order to pursue wealthier targets they are known to attack in upscale neighborhoods and on downtown streets. In 2007, the wife of prominent businessman and senior African National Congress (ANC) politician Tokyo Sexwale was targeted in a carjacking in an upscale, well-policed Johannesburg neighborhood. Three hijackers in a vehicle cut off Judy Sexwale’s BMW in a parking lot, forced her from the car and sped off in it, all in about 10 seconds. The incident occurred at 11 a.m., with numerous bystanders looking on. Carjackers do not discriminate between white, black, foreigner or local; the trigger is the appearance of wealth — mainly clothes, accoutrements and cars. Carjacking has become so rampant in South Africa that many South Africans do not stop at stop signs if they perceive any potential risk as they approach an intersection.

Suggesting an even greater threat than that posed by local street gangs and criminals, STRATFOR sources say that criminals from Nigeria are planning to travel to South Africa and take advantage of the throngs of tourists attending World Cup events during the month-long tournament. Along with Chinese and Russians, Nigerians are leading organized-crime figures in South Africa, focusing on fraud and black-market activities. Driven by economic desperation, Zimbabweans also present a significant, though less sophisticated, criminal threat in South Africa. It is likely that migratory criminals from other African countries will also prey upon World Cup visitors, contributing to the prevailing threat. This criminal element will include everything from the relatively harmless hawkers of African curios who will be found outside every tournament venue and major hotel to organized gangs that will surveil unsuspecting tourists and rob them when the opportunities arise.

Not all criminal activity in South Africa involves property crime. Among all the world’s countries, South Africa has the highest incidence of reported rapes per capita. While rapists do not specifically target foreigners, gangs often use the same level of speed and precision to identify and attack rape victims as they do in conducting carjackings. Rape is also employed to instill fear in victims, particularly white victims, during home invasions. Because of the high level of police protection in the city centers during the month-long World Cup, tourists should be relatively secure in these areas, but the risk of being targeted by opportunistic rapists and other criminals will increase in outlying areas. Finally, rape carries the associated risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, since South Africa has a high incidence of the disease (in 2008, approximately 11 percent of South Africans had been diagnosed with HIV/AIDS).

When visiting South Africa during the World Cup, foreign travelers are advised to be mindful of their surroundings and maintain situational awareness at all times in public areas. Visitors should never expose valuables, including wallets, jewelry, cell phones and cash, any longer than necessary. And they should avoid traveling at night, especially into townships and areas of South African cities that are outside of the more secure and centralized soccer venues. Outlying areas will have scant police protection, since most of the country’s security apparatus will be focused on the World Cup. No matter where they are, foreign visitors are encouraged to travel in large groups (three or more people), since in South Africa, as elsewhere, there is generally more safety in numbers.

 

The Jihadist Threat

 

Despite thinly veiled threats from regional jihadist groups, none of the major groups (either global or regional) possess the capability or the strategic intent to carry out a spectacular attack against a World Cup venue. The core al Qaeda group — Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and their closest confidants — has not demonstrated an ability to strike outside of South Asia for years. While the jihadist desire remains strong to strike at high-profile international targets, militant groups often come to the conclusion that striking local and regional targets where their capabilities are more established provides a better chance for success. Pulling off an attack in an entirely novel theater (where jihadists do not control the territory) against a lesser known target requires months of planning, training and coordination, along with substantial resources. The devolution of al Qaeda through military and covert operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan has severely hampered if not disabled al Qaeda prime, which is not likely capable of assembling and projecting sufficient force to South Africa this summer to affect the World Cup.

Meanwhile, al Qaeda’s more capable and active regional nodes such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (to which a specific threat against the World Cup was attributed in April that ultimately proved hollow), the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and the Somalia-based jihadist group al Shabaab are focused on their own objectives back home. Of these groups, AQAP is the only one that has demonstrated the ability to strike outside of its region, since it was behind the Christmas Day attempt to bring down Northwest Airlines Flight 253. While the attempt was unsuccessful, its masterminds are believed to be still at large in Yemen. Still, the attempt did alert U.S. counterterrorism authorities to the threat posed by AQAP. The United States has deployed assets to Yemen to disrupt the group’s capability to carry out further attacks, making it more difficult for AQAP to operate without U.S. authorities (who are working closely with South African officials in providing security for the World Cup) knowing about it.

The other three primary al Qaeda franchise groups, AQIM, the ISI and al Shabaab, have demonstrated no ability to strike outside of their regions. AQIM’s current struggle is primarily against the Algerian government, and the group’s target set is limited, for the most part, to Algerian military and police forces. AQIM also has claimed responsibility for minor attacks and abductions in Mauritania, Mali and Niger. While two members of the ISI have recently been arrested in Iraq on suspicions of plotting an attack during the World Cup, those reports have not been substantiated as a serious threat — or even one that involved South Africa. The ISI also has not shown an interest in striking outside of its region and considering that it is currently fighting the U.S.-backed Iraqi government, now is not an opportune time for the group to stage an attack on another continent. South Africa is more than 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) away from northern Africa and the Middle East, putting a substantial distance between these groups and the World Cup.

Similarly, al Shabaab is consumed with a three-front war against the Western-backedTransitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, African Union forces and various Somali militias. The militant group is currently focused on toppling the TFG, not waging transnational jihad by attacking the World Cup. The primary advantage of attacking the tournament would be the publicity it would bring, but this is something al Shabaab does not necessarily want right now. The group is challenged enough as it is by forces on the ground supporting the TFG and does not need to provide another reason for regional and global security forces to intervene on the TFG’s behalf.

 

Lone Wolves and Grassroots Jihadists

 

Threats from grassroots jihadists and lone wolves are much less predictable than threats from the al Qaeda core or its franchises. Whereas jihadist groups are bright blips on the radar of intelligence agencies around the world, lone wolves operate under the radar, often unbeknownst to any security or intelligence agency. They maintain anonymity by operating without the help of others and even without telling others, which means they are far more difficult to detect. They are also not limited to any geographical region. Grassroots terrorists, on the other hand, may work in groups, but these groups are small cells unaffiliated with known and monitored jihadist entities and are virtually invisible. In both cases, however, the lack of support networks typically limits their capability, and thus the damage they can cause. The low profile of lone wolves and grassroots jihadists generally means they lack experienced bombmakers, operatives and strategists, and their attacks typically come across as amateurish. Nevertheless, given the global attention to South Africa during the World Cup, it would not take a large attack to attract worldwide media coverage.

 

Other Terrorist Threats

 

While the actions of lone wolves and grassroots jihadists are difficult to predict and cannot be ruled out, there are no major political conflicts in South Africa at the moment that might induce a terrorist act. Nor is there any recent history of terrorism in South Africa. That, along with the general trend in grassroots attacks, suggests that any ideologically motivated terrorist attack in South Africa during the World Cup would likely — if successful at all — be small and unsophisticated.

Of course, jihadists by no means have a monopoly on the tactic of terrorism. Any individual or group can attempt to affect political change through violence against the public. And the World Cup certainly offers an extremely public forum for a group or individual to air their grievances against the South African government, or any of the other 31 countries represented by the qualifying teams. Reasons for terror attacks can be as provocative as ethnic disputes, as mundane as personal financial problems or as unpredictable as mental illness.

Although terrorism is not common in modern-day South Africa, there has been a trace of such activity in its recent history. During apartheid, the ANC — the current ruling party — was considered a terrorist group by the South African government because it was opposed to white rule and expressed its opposition through violence. On the far right, the white supremacist group Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) committed violent acts against black South Africans and staged protests against the government during the final days of apartheid. The AWB has not carried out violent attacks in decades, but its leader, Eugene Terre Blanche, was murdered by two black farmhands April 3. AWB leaders continue to leave violence as an option, at least rhetorically, but in more than 20 years they have shown no appetite for violent retaliation. While it is highly unlikely that the AWB would sanction an attack, underlying racial sentiments could still provoke a grassroots or lone-wolf attack (the consequences of which we have outlined above). As far as the AWB is concerned, the group is a known entity and would have a difficult time launching an attack without the authorities finding out about it during the planning process.

There are other right-wing extremists in South Africa not affiliated with the AWB, and in April South African police arrested suspects and seized explosives from a residence in south Johannesburg linked to right-wing activities. The arrests served a positive purpose for the government in showing that blacks are not the only ones who commit violent acts in South Africa, and government officials were quick to say that Pretoria does not foresee a significant threat from right-wing groups during the World Cup.

South Africa did spawn one militant Islamist group, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), which detonated almost 200 improvised explosive devices between 1996 and 2000, largely targeting government buildings (such as police stations), gay night clubs and synagogues in the Cape Flats area east of Cape Town. Their largest attack occurred in 1998 against a Planet Hollywood restaurant (one person was killed and the restaurant was closed). PAGAD was not technically a jihadist group, since it did not want to overthrow the South African government. Its intent was to attack targets that it believed oppressed Muslim customs in the country. PAGAD’s leader and several members were sentenced to prison terms in 2002, and there has been very little activity by the group since. While PAGAD still has a small number of supporters in the Cape Flats area of Cape Town and still condones violence, there are no indications that it, or any other grassroots jihadist group in South Africa, is planning to carry out an attack during the World Cup.

A recent incident in Angola during that country’s hosting of the African Cup of Nations soccer tournament raised questions about the possibility of a similar domestic terrorist threat in South Africa. In January, the Togo soccer team participating in the tournament in Angola’s Cabinda province was attacked by members of the rebel group Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). Armed with AK-47s, a small number of FLEC fighters, who are opposed to the Angolan government’s presence in the oil-rich province, shot at the bus carrying the Togo soccer team as it was traveling to a game, injuring several team members and killing two. Angola’s security environment is much less stable than that of South Africa, where no rebel groups on the order of FLEC operate. South Africa also does not have nearly the same level of volatility in its political conflicts as Angola, where disagreements can quickly become violent.

 

Security Preparations

 

For the duration of the World Cup tournament, the South African Police Service and the South African National Defense Force will deploy forces to the streets, air and sea to protect against threats to tournament venues. Most of the measures (such as naval patrols off the coast and overflights of fighter jets) are in light of the jihadist threat, which, while unlikely to materialize in an attack, is still seen as a looming worst-case scenario. Private security firms have been contracted by the tournament organizing committee to provide security around and inside the soccer stadiums.

Participating teams and attending dignitaries (including visiting heads of state) will likely have security escorts that will include protective motorcades so as not to require closing off streets. Teams will have both primary and alternate travel routes, along with designated safe areas in the event of an incident and stationary protective teams at their hotels. Uniformed and plainclothes security officers will likely be stationed along travel routes between team accommodation sites and the playing venues. As a result of these precautions taken by the participating teams, along with the overall security umbrella provided by the South African government, the “window of opportunity” to attack a World Cup team will be very small. As a byproduct of these measures, potential attacks will likely be diverted to more accessible soft targets, which could be unsuspecting tourists or bystanders, especially in areas from which police have been pulled to beef up security at tournament venues.

South African security agencies do have recent experience safeguarding large sporting events like the World Cup. In June 2009, South Africa hosted the Confederation Cup, an international soccer tournament that gathered eight teams in four different stadiums around the country for two weeks without incident. This time around, South African officials are making even more extensive preparations to secure tournament venues, and remaining concerns largely involve the execution of the security plan in the event of an incident.

The federal police and military units to be deployed and the outline of this year’s World Cup security umbrella include the following:

• South African air force (SAAF) Gripen fighter jets (currently South Africa has about six operational out of 12 delivered from an order of 26), which will enforce no-fly zones above World Cup venues. The aircraft will rotate to different air force bases depending on threat levels determined for each game.
• Other SAAF and army aircraft such as smaller Hawk fighter jets, transport planes and helicopters will be mobilized for other duties, including logistics.
• South African navy ships will be deployed, including patrol corvettes that will be stationed as command platforms in the harbors at Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth to provide additional radar and anti-aircraft coverage.
• Naval submarines, minesweepers and other vessels will be deployed to provide supplemental coverage.
• Military and police explosive ordinance disposal teams, including sniffer dogs, will be present at all stadiums.
• The SAPS Special Task Force, the police force’s specialized counterterrorism team, will be on standby for rapid response to any crisis situation in the country from its national base in Pretoria.
• Special weapons and tactics (“SWAT”) teams will be mobilized from city-based police force detachments.
• A national-level joint operations “fusion center” will be maintained in Pretoria, while each province hosting a World Cup venue will have a provincial-level command post.
• There are no designated demonstration areas for protesters, and no protests will be permitted at World Cup venues or fan parks adjacent to the venues.
• For access to VIP sections at the stadiums, there will likely be credential controls in place, including portable fingerprint scanners.
• Game attendees will be inspected by metal detectors and hand wands, and all vehicles arriving at the stadiums will be searched.
• While there are no “official” hotels for the visiting teams, there has been communication between World Cup security officials and management at the high-end hotels likely to accommodate teams and dignitaries.
• Uniformed and plainclothed police officers will be present at high-profile and popular venues such as Nelson Mandela Square in Johannesburg, the Victoria and Alfred (V&A) Waterfront in Cape Town and the Gateway in Durban, all of which are likely to receive large numbers of World Cup visitors.

 

Political Instability

 

The ANC is entrenched as the ruling party of the South African government. In the short term, the ANC does not face any threat to its political hegemony from a rival political party. Whatever instability the government does face stems from within its ruling alliance, which, along with the ANC, consists of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party. COSATU’s approximately 2 million members are capable of mobilizing strikes and protests on a city and national basis, and are usually motivated by pay and cost-of-living concerns. Protests are not usually violent, but if any do occur during the World Cup, foreign visitors are advised to steer clear of them. Some COSATU members, notably the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, have threatened to strike during the tournament, but the ANC government is almost certain to put intense pressure on all labor groups to help ensure a strike- and protest-free World Cup.

 

Miscellaneous Threats

 

Privately operated medical facilities in South Africa are well equipped for all levels of medical care, and foreign visitors should choose private over public (government-operated) health-care facilities in South Africa. Private medical services can also stabilize a patient and facilitate a medical evacuation to another country (such as the United Kingdom or the United States) should the need or preference arise.

Should a catastrophic event occur in a South African city during the World Cup, both private and public medical services would be heavily taxed if not overloaded. Although provisions will be in place for such a contingency, a mass-casualty event would degrade the availability and quality of care on the scene, and conventional means of medical evacuation may not be immediately available. Indeed, South African health officials have publicly expressed their concerns about the medical system’s state of readiness for the enormous influx of World Cup attendees (organizers estimate as many as 300,000), some of whom will need medical attention at some point during their stay.

Even without a catastrophic event, South Africa’s transportation infrastructure will likely be stressed to capacity. There is a robust domestic private-airline sector, private nationwide bus network and many private car-rental companies, and these providers may be stretched to meet the needs of 300,000 foreign visitors.

Hotels in South Africa that host World Cup teams will have extra security personnel assigned to them, though mainly to protect the teams. Hotels in South Africa are otherwise on their own as far as implementing security precautions, and travelers should not assume that hotels in which they find themselves have extensive security plans in place.

South Africa’s airline industry maintains a level of security sufficient for direct flights operating to and from the country to be certified by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, and airport security will certainly be heightened during the tournament. The South African government also purchased body scanners following the attempted bombing by a Nigerian national of a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day in 2009. Despite these safeguards, however, South Africa has not implemented airport security standards as stringent as those used in the United States. That is not to say there is any intentional negligence, but there are weaknesses to be exploited in the system, should an attacker desire to do so.

Finally, “hooliganism,” a security threat endemic to large soccer matches and tournaments anywhere passions run high, will be present in South Africa. Hooliganism is the popular term for the phenomenon in which mobs of soccer fans engage in violent and destructive behavior, often under the influence of alcohol or drugs. However, South Africans themselves are not known for hooliganism, which tends to be more common in Europe. The fact that this year’s World Cup will be so far removed from Europe will reduce the risk of hooliganism considerably, and the large security force on hand will likely prevent any violent activity from getting very far out of hand. South African authorities are also working with European governments to blacklist identified hooligans and ban them from traveling to South Africa for the tournament.

While crime will likely have the most visible affect on the World Cup games, South African authorities are preparing for the worst. Hosting an event like the World Cup is an extraordinary challenge for any country, especially one without a wealth of experience at it. In such cases, it is the unexpected and unintended that usually cause the most disruption. However, South Africa is not alone in preparing for the event. The International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA), Germany, the United States and other countries have provided financial and professional assistance. For the most part, events like the World Cup and the Olympics — despite daunting challenges — typically transpire rather smoothly, and South Africa is certainly hoping that it does not buck the trend.

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Iran’s Next Move

18. June 2010 by admin.

Iran’s Next Move

A senior Iranian official Thursday warned that Tehran would not tolerate the inspection of vessels belonging to the Islamic republic in open seas under the pretext of implementing the latest round of sanctions imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). Kazem Jalali, rapporteur of Parliament’s Foreign Policy and National Security Committee, said one such response would be Iranian countermeasures in the strategic Straits of Hormuz. This statement from the lawmaker is the latest in a series of similar statements from senior Iranian civil and military officials in recent days.

Iran making good on this threat hinges on a number of prerequisites. First, a country must actually move to exercise the option of boarding an Iranian ship. If that were to happen, the question then would be: Will Iran actually go as far as retaliating in the Straits of Hormuz? After all, such an action carries the huge risk of a counter-reaction from the United States, which cannot allow Iran to tamper with the free flow of oil through the straits.

At this point, it is unclear how Tehran will respond to one of its ships being searched. What is certain is that this latest round of sanctions has created a crisis for the Iranian leadership both on the foreign policy front and domestically, where an intra-elite struggle has been publicly playing out for a year. One may recall that prior to the June 9 approval of the sanctions was that the United States was not in a position to impose sanctions with enough teeth to force Iran to change its behavior.

That view still stands because the latest round of sanctions are not strong enough to trigger a capitulation on the part of the Iranians. But they have enough bite to prevent Iran from doing business as usual, especially with the European Union and the United States piling on additional unilateral sanctions. Perhaps the most significant development is the Russian alignment with the United States, which made the fourth round of sanctions possible.

Despite saying earlier this week that his country is ready to negotiate, there is no way Ahmadinejad can come to the negotiating table just as the United States has gained an upper hand in the bargaining process. He cannot be seen as caving in to the pressure of the American-led UNSC sanctions. As it is, the Iranian president has to deal with the domestic uproar that he is leading the Islamic republic to ruin, which makes efforts to regain his position among the warring factions and formulate a response to get the Islamic republic back in the driver’s seat even more difficult.Russia is no longer protecting Iran in the UNSC. Furthermore, imposing sanctions on Iran after it signed a uranium swap deal has been a major loss for Tehran. It has created a very embarrassing situation for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at home, where he has no shortage of opponents — even among his own ultraconservative camp. The U.S. move to allow the May 17 Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian uranium swap agreement to go through, followed quickly by a move toward sanctions suggests that Washington tried to exploit the intra-elite rift to its advantage and undermine the position of relative strength that Tehran had been enjoying up to that point. The U.S. move has not only exacerbated tensions between the warring factions in the Iranian political establishment, it has also forced Iranian foreign policy decision-makers to go back to the drawing board and re-evaluate Iran’s strategy vis-a-vis the United States.

While it has a number of cards to play, (e.g., Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan), precisely how Iran will respond remains as opaque as the infighting within the regime. But the next move has to come from Iran. This new situation has led international observers to engage in their own process of reassessing the situation on the Iranian domestic and foreign policy fronts.

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Turkey: Escalating Tension Over The Flotilla Probe

18. June 2010 by admin.

Turkey: Escalating Tension Over the Flotilla Probe

June 15, 2010 

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses 

the Turkish parliament June 15

A spokesman for the Turkish Foreign Ministry said June 15 that Israel’s decision to pursue an internal investigation on the May 31 raid on the Turkish aid ship bound for Gaza fell short of Turkish and international expectations. The statement follows a June 14 announcement by the United States that it will support Israel’s internal probe, with a U.S. State Department spokesman saying Israel has the institutions and capabilities to conduct a credible, impartial and transparent investigation.

 

By not supporting the Turkish demand for an international inquiry, Washington has put Ankara in a difficult position. Turkey must choose between maintaining its credibility as a growing regional power by taking a hard line against the Israeli raid, or taking a credibility hit for the sake of preserving its long-standing though frayed security and diplomatic ties with Israel.

 

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had previously said that his country did not trust Israel to conduct an impartial review of the incident, and Turkish President Abdullah Gul said Turkey would not rule out severing ties if three demands — an international probe, a public Israeli apology, and an end to the Gaza blockade — were not met. Turkey has been seeking American support to press the Israelis into heeding these demands, but Ankara realizes that Washington has to balance between Turkey and Israel. If the United States cannot be relied upon to pressure Israel on meeting the demands, Ankara will have to find some lever to do so itself.

 

One such lever may be military and intelligence cooperation, which Israel has historically relied upon. Turkey has already downgraded cooperation, and rumors have surfaced that Israeli intelligence operatives may be expelled from a radar post on Turkish soil near the border with Iran. The threat of cutting off such security ties completely could be enough to push Israel into accepting at least some of Ankara’s conditions, without resorting to the much more serious severing of diplomatic ties, which Turkey hopes to preserve. Turkey’s influence in large part stems from it being the lone power in the region with ties to nearly everyone, including powers antagonistic toward one another, such as the Israelis, the Syrians and the Iranians.

 

Ankara has seen its influence grow significantly in recent years, both regionally and internationally. As such, it believes its credibility hinges on extracting concessions from Israel to demonstrate that its concerns are not easily dismissed. This is all the more important because Russia and France have also supported the Israeli move toward an internal probe, which undermines the Turkish claim that their stance has broad international support. This is the same position Turkey was put in when Turkey and Brazil were the only members in the U.N. Security Council to veto a fresh resolution on Iran sanctions, and Turkey has since been battling a perception spreading among U.S. policy circles that Turkey is an “unreliable” partner that has turned its back on the West. Now that the United States and Israel have apparently dismissed Turkey’s demand for an international probe, the question moving forward is whether Turkey will risk its credibility in backing off this particular demand, or if it can manage to save face by using its intelligence cooperation with Israel to pressure the Israeli government into making an overt concession elsewhere.

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U.S.: Hurricane Season and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill

18. June 2010 by admin.

U.S.: Hurricane Season and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill

The 2010 hurricane season has kicked off with the first low-pressure weather system in the Atlantic. While this system does not appear likely to kick up a major storm, this year’s season in Hurricane Alley threatens to worsen the ongoing oil leak disaster in the Gulf.

The National Hurricane Center announced June 16 that a low-pressure weather disturbance in the Atlantic Ocean moving toward the Lesser Antilles and the Caribbean has only a 20 percent chance of turning into a tropical storm or hurricane and that conditions over the next two days should prevent it from strengthening to this level. The National Hurricane Center has predicted an 85 percent chance of above-average tropical cyclone activity in the 2010 hurricane season, which began June 1. In addition to all the usual risks, this year hurricanes could derail efforts to contain the ongoing oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico.

 

The Gulf of Mexico is of great strategic importance to the United States, as it serves as the nexus between the Mississippi River system — a region of vast agricultural and industrial output — and global seaborne trade. The Gulf area is also a crucial, though declining, location for domestic energy production and refining. It produces about 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil, or roughly one-third of total domestic production and one-tenth of the 17 million bpd of total U.S. oil consumption. It also hosts nearly half the country’s petroleum-refining capacity, with refineries in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama receiving domestic- and foreign-produced oil into refineries with a total operating capacity of 8.4 million bpd.

 

Storms during hurricane season threaten this activity. High winds and waves, tidal surges and subsea waves have the potential to disrupt shipping lanes, offshore energy production, undersea pipelines carrying oil and natural gas, and refineries and port activity. In worst-case scenarios — as with hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 — all Gulf oil and natural gas production was temporarily taken offline, along with 4.7 million bpd of refining. Adding in the nearly 5 million people forced to evacuate, and these storms, especially Katrina, created social and political disturbances, particularly in New Orleans. Ultimately, they sapped considerable political support from the Bush administration.

 

Only one major hurricane — Hurricane Ike — has slammed into the Gulf coast since 2005, though some storms have appeared capable of it. The threat of hurricane formation in 2010 is thought to be higher than the year before because of factors relating to a climatic phenomenon called the Southern Oscillation, which is divided into two phases: El Nino and La Nina. During El Nino, vertical wind shear greatly increases throughout the Atlantic basin, which decreases the chances for the development of tropical storms and hurricanes (since among other things, they require low vertical wind shear). During La Nina, the vertical wind shear is virtually nonexistent, making the climate in the ocean basin quite conducive to the development of hurricanes. The most recent El Nino phase has just concluded, and La Nina — expected to last from June to August — is now in effect. This transition factored into the National Hurricane Center’s forecast of an 85 percent chance of having above-average tropical cyclone activity in the 2010 season (as compared to 25 percent the previous year during El Nino).

The increased risk of hurricanes is especially bad news for the United States because of the ongoing massive oil leak at a BP drilling site in the Gulf deepwater, which is directly in the path of recent major hurricanes. It is feared storms could cause any number of problems. For example, while the oil well itself is 5,000 feet beneath the surface — out of the range of disturbances from a hurricane — a tropical storm or hurricane could halt the work of response teams on the surface struggling to siphon off about 15,000 bpd of oil out of the estimated 35,000-60,000 bpd total flow. If these crews are disrupted along with the ad hoc pipes and equipment they are using — which would be vulnerable to subsea waves closer to the surface — then the oil will continue spewing directly into the ocean without being dispersed by chemicals, burned off, collected or mitigated by other means. A coming storm would require disconnecting both the containment dome on the leaking pipe below and stopping the process of drilling two relief wells, and then reconnecting after the storm passes. Attempts by response teams to develop a “freestanding” riser pipe that could be disconnected rapidly in the event of a storm to enable quick reconnection afterwards could minimize delays, but while they are in use in West Africa there is some debate over whether they will work in this case. The risk of interruption of containment efforts on the sea surface was highlighted June 15, when lightning struck an oil collection vessel, causing a fire and a 25 percent decrease in oil collection for half the day.

The oil slick from the leak has expanded across the gulf since late April. The slick now covers large swaths offshore of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. In the past, major hurricanes have caused fierce winds and tidal surges that drenched anywhere from 20-40 miles of land with seawater — seawater that would be contaminated with a thin slick of oil this season. Authorities readily admit the situation is unprecedented. Depending on which side of the slick the storm passes over, it could have a greater or lesser effect on the oil drift. Hurricanes spin counter clockwise, so if the storm passes west of the oil slick it could push the oil toward the coast and if to the east it could push it out to sea. If the storm scores a direct hit on the oil slick, the surge could maximize the amount of oil-contaminated water that pours into the coastline. In short, there is a great deal of uncertainty. Several scenarios could see a multitude of problems for those onshore, to say nothing of the even stronger political backlash they would spark.

 

As mentioned, while the gulf is important to U.S. domestic energy production, its importance has been declining. Output mostly has fallen since 2003, worsened by the aforementioned hurricanes, which took years to recover from. The BP oil spill itself threatens to create such a heavy political and regulatory cost for offshore drilling, especially deepwater offshore (highlighted by U.S. President Barack Obama’s call for tougher legislation during his June 15 speech on the subject, evidence of the already strong political backlash on the subject), that the region’s energy relevance will be under even greater pressure. The full ramifications for the industry will not be known until long after the leak stops.

 

One potentially positive note is that about 96 percent of major hurricanes occur in the peak period between late August and early October, and BP hopes to have completed the drilling of two relief wells to gather up the oil by that time (effectively stopping the leak). But while the relief wells have a high chance of succeeding once they reach their target, they are not guaranteed to do so immediately, and months could pass as drillers redirect their aim to get directly at the existing well and oil flow. This period would overlap with peak hurricane season.

 

The question of what happens if the relief wells do not solve the problem is creating headaches behind closed doors in the U.S. government. The Gulf of Mexico has already hurt Obama, distracting him from dealing with urgent foreign policy matters, including military engagements and withdrawals in the Middle East and the ongoing challenges of a troubled economic recovery. A hurricane would only make matters worse.

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Next Steps for Ankara and Moscow

9. June 2010 by admin.

Next Steps for Ankara and Moscow

June 8, 2010 

 

WORLD LEADERS FROM ACROSS EURASIA and the Middle East will be gathering in Istanbul Tuesday for a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit hosted by the Turkish leadership. Some of the high-profile attendees include Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syrian President Bashar al Assad, Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

 

With Turkish-Israeli relations in serious jeopardy in the wake of the flotilla crisis, the war in Afghanistan in flux, Moscow contemplating a shift in foreign policy with the West and the United States trying to juggle all of the above, the geopolitical intensity surrounding the summit is all too apparent.

 

The headlining issue of the conference will of course be the Turkish-Israeli flotilla crisis. Not surprisingly, Israel decided to send a lower level diplomat from its consulate in Turkey rather than having a senior official come under fire by the Turkish hosts. Turkey will use the CICA platform — as well as a summit beginning Wednesday in Istanbul with Arab foreign ministers as part of the Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum — to highlight what Turkey sees as the gross illegality of Israel’s actions that resulted in the death of eight Turkish citizens in international waters off the Gaza coast. Turkey does not intend to let this issue rest. The issue is not even really about Gaza, anymore. On the contrary, Turkey views its current crisis with Israel as an opportunity to accelerate its regional rise to fame.

For this plan to work, Turkey needs to go beyond the public censures and pressure Israel into making a very public concession to Ankara. The problem for Turkey is that there is no Arab consensus to build on in forging this campaign against Israel. The Arab states are happy to engage in the rhetoric alongside Turkey, but when it comes to taking action against Israel, the impetus falls flat. Though Turkey will attempt to galvanize the Arabs at the Wednesday summit, it is not clear to STRATFOR that Ankara will be able to overcome the challenge of Arab fractiousness and weakness in formulating its response to Israel.

 

Turkey will also be spending some quality time during the CICA summit with the Iranian president. Iran is happy to see the flotilla crisis deflect attention away from its own nuclear controversy with the West, but it’s also not enthused about Turkey soaking up the spotlight and hijacking Iran’s role in defending the Palestinians. Wanting their piece of the action, the Iranians have announced that they will send their own aid ships to the Gaza coast, while privately hinting that they will try to score a moral victory in attempting to recreate the Mavi Marmara incident by provoking Israeli forces into an attack. An Iranian-provoked confrontation with Israel in the Mediterranean is precisely what the Turks cannot afford. Such a move would draw the United States to Israel’s side and undercut Turkish momentum in a snap. The Turks will use the summit as an opportunity to share some of the spotlight with Ahmadinejad and thus try to keep Tehran from scuttling its own agenda, but Iranian tenacity on this issue may also be hard to beat.

 

Turkey is not the only one with its hands full at this summit. Putin has a slew of private meetings lined up with the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. His sideline meetings in Istanbul come after Russia held a week of meetings in Germany and the Baltic states and ahead of a visit to France. Rather than an attempt to rack up frequent flyer miles, the prime minister’s busy agenda stems from a major shift Russia is seriously contemplating making in its foreign policy toward the West.

 

The strategic thrust behind the shift is a Russian desire to obtain Western technology to modernize the Russian economy in everything from energy to space to telecommunications. Russia has internally acknowledged that for it to get its hands on this technology –- and ensure Russia’s competitiveness as a global power in the years to come –- it needs to appear more pragmatic to the West in making its foreign policy moves. This doesn’t mean Russia is ready to be any less nationalistic, just a little more willing to strike deals to get what it wants. The only reason Russia can even think about making such a dramatic shift is because it has spent the past several years carefully laying the groundwork in the former Soviet Union states in preparation for this very moment.

 

Russia wants to make sure that before it follows through with this plan, it gets some assurances from Europe and the United States that they will reward Russian cooperation with the technological cooperation Moscow is seeking and respect the sphere of influence Russia has recreated. At the same time, Putin -– acting as the enforcer on this issue -– is talking to the former Soviet states to make sure they understand that any Russian opening to the West is not a signal of Russia relenting in its former Soviet space, but a sign of Moscow dealing with the West on its own terms and in the time of its choosing. In other words, Putin wants to make sure Ukraine, Georgia, the Central Asians and the Baltic states don’t get any ideas about trying to flirt with the West the second they see Moscow shift.

 

While Putin delivers this stern reminder to Ukraine and the Central Asians, he will also be meeting separately with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Russians are wary of Turkey’s regional resurgence and want to ensure that the two don’t bump heads in pursuing their respective agendas. But the Russians have a plan for this, too. By regularly waving deals on energy and peace agreements in the Caucasus, Russia is keeping its relationship with Turkey on an even keel. Putin is not (yet), however, scheduled to meet with the Iranian president, something that will not go unnoticed in Tehran. The Iranians, picking up on the leaks of a coming Russian foreign policy shift, have already spent the past weeks publicizing their ire against Moscow and warning the Russians against turning on them for a grand bargain with the United States. The Russians are not at the point of throwing Iran under the bus (Iran is still a very useful lever for them in dealing with Washington), but it doesn’t hurt Moscow to keep the Iranians on edge as Russia feels out the West and contemplates a major foreign policy shift that may be on the horizon.

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Arabs, Israelis and the Strategic Balance

8. June 2010 by admin.

Arabs, Israelis and the Strategic Balance  Last week’s events off the coast of Israel continue to resonate. Turkish-Israeli relations have not quite collapsed since then but are at their lowest level since Israel’s founding. U.S.-Israeli tensions have emerged, and European hostility toward Israel continues to intensify. The question has now become whether substantial consequences will follow from the incident. Put differently, the question is whether and how it will be exploited beyond the arena of public opinion. The most significant threat to Israel would, of course, be military. International criticism is not without significance, but nations do not change direction absent direct threats to their interests. But powers outside the region are unlikely to exert military power against Israel, and even significant economic or political sanctions are unlikely to happen. Apart from the desire of outside powers to limit their involvement, this is rooted in the fact that significant actions are unlikely from inside the region either.The first generations of Israelis lived under the threat of conventional military defeat by neighboring countries. More recent generations still faced threats, but not this one. Israel is operating in an advantageous strategic context save for the arena of public opinion and diplomatic relations and the question of Iranian nuclear weapons. All of these issues are significant, but none is as immediate a threat as the specter of a defeat in conventional warfare had been. Israel’s regional enemies are so profoundly divided among themselves and have such divergent relations with Israel that an effective coalition against Israel does not exist — and is unlikely to arise in the near future. Given this, the probability of an effective, as opposed to rhetorical, shift in the behavior of powers outside the region is unlikely. At every level, Israel’s Arab neighbors are incapable of forming even a partial coalition against Israel. Israel is not forced to calibrate its actions with an eye toward regional consequences, explaining Israel’s willingness to accept broad international condemnation.

Palestinian Divisions

To begin to understand how deeply the Arabs are split, simply consider the split among the Palestinians themselves. They are currently divided between two very different and hostile factions. On one side is Fatah, which dominates the West Bank. On the other side is Hamas, which dominates the Gaza Strip. Aside from the geographic division of the Palestinian territories — which causes the Palestinians to behave almost as if they comprised two separate and hostile countries — the two groups have profoundly different ideologies.Fatah arose from the secular, socialist, Arab-nationalist and militarist movement of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser in the 1950s. Created in the 1960s, Fatah was closely aligned with the Soviet Union. It was the dominant, though far from the only, faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO was an umbrella group that brought together the highly fragmented elements of the Palestinian movement. Yasser Arafat long dominated Fatah; his death left Fatah without a charismatic leader, but with a strong bureaucracy increasingly devoid of a coherent ideology or strategy.Hamas arose from the Islamist movement. It was driven by religious motivations quite alien from Fatah and hostile to it. For Hamas, the liberation of Palestine was not simply a nationalist imperative, but also a religious requirement. Hamas was also hostile to what it saw as the financial corruption Arafat brought to the Palestinian movement, as well as to Fatah’s secularism.Hamas and Fatah are playing a zero-sum game. Given their inability to form a coalition and their mutual desire for the other to fail, a victory for one is a defeat for the other. This means that whatever public statements Fatah makes, the current international focus on Gaza and Hamas weakens Fatah. And this means that at some point, Fatah will try to undermine the political gains the flotilla has offered Hamas.The Palestinians’ deep geographic, ideological and historical divisions occasionally flare up into violence. Their movement has always been split, its single greatest weakness. Though revolutionary movements frequently are torn by sectarianism, these divisions are so deep that even without Israeli manipulation, the threat the Palestinians pose to the Israelis is diminished. With manipulation, the Israelis can pit Fatah against Hamas.

The Arab States and the Palestinians

The split within the Palestinians is also reflected in divergent opinions among what used to be called the confrontation states surrounding Israel — Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Egypt, for example, is directly hostile to Hamas, a religious movement amid a sea of essentially secular Arab states. Hamas’ roots are in Egypt’s largest Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Egyptian state has historically considered its main domestic threat. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s regime has moved aggressively against Egyptian Islamists and sees Hamas’ ideology as a threat, as it could spread back to Egypt. For this and other reasons, Egypt has maintained its own blockade of Gaza. Egypt is much closer to Fatah, whose ideology derives from Egyptian secularism, and for this reason, Hamas deeply distrusts Cairo. Jordan views Fatah with deep distrust. In 1970, Fatah under Arafat tried to stage a revolution against the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. The resulting massacres, referred to as Black September, cost about 10,000 Palestinian lives. Fatah has never truly forgiven Jordan for Black September, and the Jordanians have never really trusted Fatah since then. The idea of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank unsettles the Hashemite regime, as Jordan’s population is mostly Palestinian. Meanwhile, Hamas with its Islamist ideology worries Jordan, which has had its own problems with the Muslim Brotherhood. So rhetoric aside, the Jordanians are uneasy at best with the Palestinians, and despite years of Israeli-Palestinian hostility, Jordan (and Egypt) has a peace treaty with Israel that remains in place.Syria is far more interested in Lebanon than it is in the Palestinians. Its co-sponsorship (along with Iran) of Hezbollah has more to do with Syria’s desire to dominate Lebanon than it does with Hezbollah as an anti-Israeli force. Indeed, whenever fighting breaks out between Hezbollah and Israel, the Syrians get nervous and their tensions with Iran increase. And of course, while Hezbollah is anti-Israeli, it is not a Palestinian movement. It is a Lebanese Shiite movement. Most Palestinians are Sunni, and while they share a common goal — the destruction of Israel — it is not clear that Hezbollah would want the same kind of regime in Palestine that either Hamas or Fatah would want. So Syria is playing a side game with an anti-Israeli movement that isn’t Palestinian, while also maintaining relations with both factions of the Palestinian movement. Outside the confrontation states, the Saudis and other Arabian Peninsula regimes remember the threat that Nasser and the PLO posed to their regimes. They do not easily forgive, and their support for Fatah comes in full awareness of the potential destabilizing influence of the Palestinians. And while the Iranians would love to have influence over the Palestinians, Tehran is more than 1,000 miles away. Sometimes Iranian arms get through to the Palestinians. But Fatah doesn’t trust the Iranians, and Hamas, though a religious movement, is Sunni while Iran is Shiite. Hamas and the Iranians may cooperate on some tactical issues, but they do not share the same vision.

Israel’s Short-term Free Hand and Long-term Challenge

Given this environment, it is extremely difficult to translate hostility to Israeli policies in Europe and other areas into meaningful levers against Israel. Under these circumstances, the Israelis see the consequences of actions that excite hostility toward Israel from the Arabs and the rest of the world as less dangerous than losing control of Gaza. The more independent Gaza becomes, the greater the threat it poses to Israel. The suppression of Gaza is much safer and is something Fatah ultimately supports, Egypt participates in, Jordan is relieved by and Syria is ultimately indifferent to. Nations base their actions on risks and rewards. The configuration of the Palestinians and Arabs rewards Israeli assertiveness and provides few rewards for caution. The Israelis do not see global hostility toward Israel translating into a meaningful threat because the Arab reality cancels it out. Therefore, relieving pressure on Hamas makes no sense to the Israelis. Doing so would be as likely to alienate Fatah and Egypt as it would to satisfy the Swedes, for example. As Israel has less interest in the Swedes than in Egypt and Fatah, it proceeds as it has.A single point sums up the story of Israel and the Gaza blockade-runners: Not one Egyptian aircraft threatened the Israeli naval vessels, nor did any Syrian warship approach the intercept point. The Israelis could be certain of complete command of the sea and air without challenge. And this underscores how the Arab countries no longer have a military force that can challenge the Israelis, nor the will nor interest to acquire one. Where Egyptian and Syrian forces posed a profound threat to Israeli forces in 1973, no such threat exists now. Israel has a completely free hand in the region militarily; it does not have to take into account military counteraction. The threat posed by intifada, suicide bombers, rockets from Lebanon and Gaza, and Hezbollah fighters is real, but it does not threaten the survival of Israel the way the threat from Egypt and Syria once did (and the Israelis see actions like the Gaza blockade as actually reducing the threat of intifada, suicide bombers and rockets). Non-state actors simply lack the force needed to reach this threshold. When we search for the reasons behind Israeli actions, it is this singular military fact that explains Israeli decision-making. And while the break between Turkey and Israel is real, Turkey alone cannot bring significant pressure to bear on Israel beyond the sphere of public opinion and diplomacy because of the profound divisions in the region. Turkey has the option to reduce or end cooperation with Israel, but it does not have potential allies in the Arab world it would need against Israel. Israel therefore feels buffered against the Turkish reaction. Though its relationship with Turkey is significant to Israel, it is clearly not significant enough for Israel to give in on the blockade and accept the risks from Gaza. At present, Israel takes the same view of the United States. While the United States became essential to Israeli security after 1967, Israel is far less dependent on the United States today. The quantity of aid the United States supplies Israel has shrunk in significance as the Israeli economy has grown. In the long run, a split with the United States would be significant, but interestingly, in the short run, the Israelis would be able to function quite effectively.Israel does, however, face this strategic problem: In the short run, it has freedom of action, but its actions could change the strategic framework in which it operates over the long run. The most significant threat to Israel is not world opinion; though not trivial, world opinion is not decisive. The threat to Israel is that its actions will generate forces in the Arab world that eventually change the balance of power. The politico-military consequences of public opinion is the key question, and it is in this context that Israel must evaluate its split with Turkey. The most important change for Israel would not be unity among the Palestinians, but a shift in Egyptian policy back toward the position it held prior to Camp David. Egypt is the center of gravity of the Arab world, the largest country and formerly the driving force behind Arab unity. It was the power Israel feared above all others. But Egypt under Mubarak has shifted its stance versus the Palestinians, and far more important, allowed Egypt’s military capability to atrophy. Should Mubarak’s successor choose to align with these forces and move to rebuild Egypt’s military capability, however, Israel would face a very different regional equation. A hostile Turkey aligned with Egypt could speed Egyptian military recovery and create a significant threat to Israel. Turkish sponsorship of Syrian military expansion would increase the pressure further. Imagine a world in which the Egyptians, Syrians and Turks formed a coalition that revived the Arab threat to Israel and the United States returned to its position of the 1950s when it did not materially support Israel, and it becomes clear that Turkey’s emerging power combined with a political shift in the Arab world could represent a profound danger to Israel.Where there is no balance of power, the dominant nation can act freely. The problem with this is that doing so tends to force neighbors to try to create a balance of power. Egypt and Syria were not a negligible threat to Israel in the past. It is in Israel’s interest to keep them passive. The Israelis can’t dismiss the threat that its actions could trigger political processes that cause these countries to revert to prior behavior. They still remember what underestimating Egypt and Syria cost them in 1973. It is remarkable how rapidly military capabilities can revive: Recall that the Egyptian army was shattered in 1967, but by 1973 was able to mount an offensive that frightened Israel quite a bit.The Israelis have the upper hand in the short term. What they must calculate is whether they will retain the upper hand if they continue on their course. Division in the Arab world, including among the Palestinians, cannot disappear overnight, nor can it quickly generate a strategic military threat. But the current configuration of the Arab world is not fixed. Therefore, defusing the current crisis would seem to be a long-term strategic necessity for Israel.Israel’s actions have generated shifts in public opinion and diplomacy regionally and globally. The Israelis are calculating that these actions will not generate a long-term shift in the strategic posture of the Arab world. If they are wrong about this, recent actions will have been a significant strategic error. If they are right, then this is simply another passing incident. In the end, the profound divisions in the Arab world both protect Israel and make diplomatic solutions to its challenge almost impossible — you don’t need to fight forces that are so divided, but it is very difficult to negotiate comprehensively with a group that lacks anything approaching a unified voice.

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Sins Committed By Indian National Congress

8. June 2010 by admin.

SINS COMMITTED BY CONGRESS

Written By Jaan

Sin No. 1 - Offences of Congress before partition
In the year 1919, the Muslims from Hindustan started ‘Khilafat’ movement to enthrone the Khalifa of Turkstan who was deposed by the British after the First World War. The Congress, with Gandhi as its President, took part in that movement although it was in no way connected to the freedom fight of ‘Bharat’ and therefore, the demon of fanatic Muslims bottled by Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj was let lose once again in Indian politics. 

 

Sin No. 2 - Offences of Congress before partition
Owing to the sermons given by the Congress, Hindus got in the habit of being under intimidation of those who refused to bow before ‘Bharatmata’, those who called worshippers of idols of Sree Ram and Sree Krushna as ‘kafirs’, those who used to treat Hindu women as a thing for taking advantage of and those who troubled ‘Gou-mata’. At the time of partition, those who asked Hindus to retaliate against Muslims were termed as maniacs by the Congress. Only the Congress is responsible for committing one of the highest sins of creating such collective impotency among Hindus !

Sin No. 3 - Offences of Congress before partition
From August 1921, the ‘Moplas’ started attacking Hindus in Malabar, Kerala, who were unprepared because of the Congress’ ‘Khilafat’ movement. Hundreds of Hindus were killed, Hindu women were raped even during day time and hundreds of houses were burning for days together. There is no count of the Hindus who were circumcised. Hindus were in no position to retaliate due to Gandhi’s false idea of Hindu-Muslim unity. These atrocities against Hindus went on for 4 months but Congress and Gandhi said “‘Moplas’ acted as per their religion; ‘Moplas’ are valiant” and completely ignored oppressed Hindus!

 

Sin No. 4 - Offences of Congress before partition

A convention was held by the Congress at Lahore, in the year 1929, under the presidency of Nehru. That was the first time, the Congress passed a resolution, for complete freedom of Hindustan. During the first 20 years of its formation, the Congress, that was afraid to even utter the word ‘freedom’ in front of the British, slowly started demanding colonial self-government. It took 45 years for Congress to demand complete freedom for ‘Bharat’ since its inception. Such lack of prudence on the part of Congress led to delay of 50 years in acquiring freedom for the country.

 

Sin No. 5 - Offences of Congress before partition
Congress had boycotted the census of 1931 and 1941 as there used to be a noting of ‘caste’ in the same. The scheming Muslims took advantage of the situation. At the time of partition, the British earmarked border of the two countries based on the population of Hindus and Muslims as per those censuses and allocated more land to Pakistan !

 

Sin No. 6 - Offences of Congress before partition
Barrister Jina complained to the Congress that singing of the national song ‘Vande Mataram’ insulted Muslims and hoisting the ‘tri-colour’ flag of Congress at public places hurt their religious sentiments. The complaint was immediately taken note of by Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee instructed all the regional Committees to ban display of both the things at public places as advised by Gandhi.

 

Sin No. 7 - Offences of Congress before partition
During the conference held by the Muslim League at Lahore in 1940, a resolution was passed demanding Pakistan. The Congress never realized the ambition of separate power   of Muslims and it committed unpardonable sin of partition of ‘Bharatmata’. During the general election of 1945, Congress promised that there would be no partition; but it did not keep its promise. 

 

Sin No. 8 – Offences of Congress before partition
On 16th August 1946, Muslim League started oppression of Hindus by undertaking an ‘Action Plan’ at Naukhali in Bengal for creation of Pakistan. The Congress Government led by Nehru did nothing to stop the oppression. In retaliation to the dreadful incidents taking place in Bengal, Hindus from Bihar started destruction of Muslims in number of villages. As Muslims stood at the receiving end, Gandhi talked to Nehru over phone.  Nehru rushed to Bihar and threatened to bomb the Hindu areas. He deployed army to protect Muslims !

 

Sin No. 9 - Sins committed by Congress at the time of Partition
Congressmen never waged a war for freedom. Even before partition, Congress leaders were busy in appeasement of Muslims and groveling before the British. They committed the sin of dividing ‘Bharatkhand’ in two (actually 3) parts by creating Pakistan and grabbed the power. On 15.8.1947, only the Congress was celebrating festival of freedom. Everywhere, there were heaps of dead bodies; but the Congress was portraying to the whole nation that they had acquired freedom with their non-violence movement. 

 

Sin No. 10 - Sins committed by Congress before Partition
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar writes in his book titled ‘Pakistan vishayiche vichar (Thoughts about Pakistan)’, ‘If the partition of the country is to be accepted, it should be accepted on the pre-condition of exchange of Hindu – Muslim citizens.’ His invaluable and basic advice was, however, discarded by Nehru’s Congress Government. He declared ‘Bharat’ as a secular country instead of giving it the status of a Hindu Nation. As such, ‘Bharat’ came to be known as the country of mainly followers of 3 religions i.e. Hindu, Muslims and Christians although Hindus were in majority.

 

Sin No. 11 - Sins committed by Congress before Partition
The number of people who died due to the decision of partition taken by the Congress was much higher than the people killed by dictators. The homeless Hindus from Pakistan were not given any protection by the Congress Government, therefore, nearly a million Hindus were killed and fifteen million Hindus became homeless. A train full of Hindu refugees started from Rawalpindi station to come to Delhi; but just after it left the station, Muslim butchers stopped the train, opened every compartment and methodically started destruction. They did not feel anything to pull a child from its mother’s lap or a sister clinging to her brother. They ripped off the legs of small children and banged them; this action was the extremity of brutality. Young girls were dragged out and their legs were tied, one’s left leg and another’s right leg, so that they did not run away. The Hindu women who were abducted till 15th August, were later disrobed and taken out in a procession. Owing to the indifference and inaction of the Congress Government, only in Lahore, there were 900 women, who were disrobed and taken out in a procession by the Muslim beasts. 

 

Sin No. 12 - Sins committed by Congress before Partition
River Sindhu, on the banks of which our culture flourished, where our sages recited ‘Vedrhucha’, was taken away from us due to partition of this country by the Congress. The River Ganga which is always hailed in all our religious ceremonies, one-fifth part of such River went to East Pakistan (Bangla Desh); even River Brahmaputra, that meets River Ganga, became unhappy as she had to flow through Bangla Desh. The birth place of Panini who wrote the grammar of Sanskrut, the language of Gods, ‘Nankana’, the birth place of Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikh Sect, went to Pakistan. Lahore, the place established by Luv, the son of Prabhu Ramchandra, city Dhaka which got its name from the Goddess Dhakeshwari, all these too went to Pakistan !

 

Sin No. 13 - Sins committed by Congress before Partition
Congress did grave injustice to Hindus living in Pakistan by deciding about partition of this country. Hindus owned 90% of the land in Pakistan. In cities like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, Peshavar, Rawalpindi, Quetta, Layalpur etc., affluent Hindus had hundreds of palatial houses, lending business, shops, mills, charitable organizations, hospitals, schools, and colleges etc. Punjab University in Lahore was built on 5000 acres of land belonging to a rich Hindu named Gangaram. There was a hospital known as Sir Gangaram Hospital there. The property owned by this family in Lahore was worth 500 millions of rupees. The famous markets like Raja Bazar in Peshawar, Anarkali in Lahore, Saddar in Karachi, Sindh Bazar in Hyderabad, Punjab Bazar in Multan, Hindumal Bazar in Quetta had 95% of shops owned by Hindus. Today, there is not a single Hindu shop. All the jute mills and rice mills in Bangla Desh were owned by Hindus. There too, today nothing belongs to Hindus. 

 

Sin No. 14 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
Without taking consent of Hindus, Congress committed the sin of creating Pakistan dividing (in fact, making 3 parts) of India and ascended the throne of power.

 

Sin No. 15 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
25% of the population of Lahore was Muslim. When Hindus objected to this decision, Radcliffe, the ‘Partition Officer’ asked, “How can Hindustan be given both the cities viz. Kolkata and Lahore?” 38% of land of Punjab was given to 45 % of Hindus (that included even Sikhs) and 62% land was given to 55% of Muslims. The Congress, however, raised no objection to this decision.

 

Sin No. 16 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
In the Tharparkar District in Sindh, 94% of the population was Hindu. There, the Partition Officer Radcliffe said that partition of the country could not be done as per the districts; but the demand to mark ‘Silhet’ under Pakistan was immediately agreed to although the Muslims in the area were 51%. The Congress leaders raised no objection against these decisions. 

 

Sin No. 17 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
In ‘Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT)’ comprising of 13000 sq. km. area in Bengal, 98% of the people were Buddhists, Hindus and Christians.
In the year 1947, those people opted to remain with Hindustan. On 16.8.1947, the Partition Officer Radcliffe declared that the said part was allocated to Pakistan without discussing the matter with the local leaders and without giving any reasons. Indian leaders did not object to even this decision. On 20.8.1947, Pakistan sent its army and quashed the opposition.

 

Sin No. 18 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
Muslims do not address the land of this country as ‘mother’ and in the song ‘Vande Mataram’, tribute is paid to Goddess Durga; therefore, the Congress Government decided that ‘Vande Mataram’ would not be our the national song. The Congress omitted the praise of Goddess Durga from the song giving it the status of second national song and the song praising the British King as India’s ‘Adhinayak and Bhagyavidhata’ i.e. ‘Jan Gan Man’ became the national song!

 

Sin No. 19 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
After partition, Congress conferred higher posts to those Muslims who were loyal to Pakistan. The former Governor of Maharashtra Ali Yavar Jung was an advocate of Nizam, his loyalty was with Nizam and he was given the post of Governor of Maharashtra! Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad was the first Education Minister of India who returned to India with a dream of ‘Pan Islam’ from Arab countries. He wanted all of Bharat to become Pakistan and therefore, he was against creation of Pakistan. Barrister Asaf Ali was made an ambassador in USA who wrote wrong address and sent the shipment of weapons to Karachi, Pakistan. It was Indian money, Indian ambassador, sending weapons to Pakistan i.e. loyalty to Pakistan. How terrible was all these things?

 

Sin No. 20 - Sins committed by Congress in the aftermath of Gandhi’s killing ! 
‘Killing of innocent Brahmins after the death of Gandhi, killing of Sikhs after the death of Indira Gandhi, these killings were carried out on the suggestions of Congress leaders!’

 

Sin N0. 21 - Sins committed by Congress in the aftermath of Gandhi’s killing ! 
Veer Savarkar, who devoted his life to gain independence and who suffered a punishment in the Black waters of Andaman, was forcibly imprisoned for one year by the government led by Nehru after accusing him of being involved in the assassination of Gandhi. The Nehru government said in court that Veer Savarkar was either responsible for the assassination of Gandhi or he had full knowledge of this act forehand. Even after such accusations, the court decided and declared that Veer Savarkar was not involved in the assassination of Gandhi and set him free.  Unfortunately even today Congressmen object to the release of Veer Savarkar from the case related to Gandhi’s assassination and talk suspiciously; is this not Contempt of Court ?

 

Sin No. 22 - Sins committed by Congress in the aftermath of Gandhi’s killing ! 
In relation to Gandhi killing, on the instructions of Nehru, Sarsanchalak Pujya Golvalkar Guruji was imprisoned without any reason for 18 months. In relation to Gandhi killing Nehru banned Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for 18 months and arrested seventeen thousand swayamsevaks and subjected them to torture. All over the country there were demonstrations against this injustice; on the instructions from Nehru the police severely lathi charged and beat thousands of swayamsevaks. A number of swayamsevaks died as a result of this police action. To explain the non-involvement of RSS and its explanation Pujya Golvalkar Guruji requested a meeting with Nehru repeatedly. All requests were always denied and Pujya Guruji was repeatedly insulted !

 

Sin No. 23 - Sins committed by Congress with relation to Kashmir ! 
Just approximately 3 months after the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan attacks Kashmir with all its military might. Hari Singh, the King of Kashmir requests Nehru for help. Nehru put forth a precondition namely ‘If you hand over the reins of Kashmir to Sheikh Abdullah, only then I will provide help.’ Before the Indian army which had gone to help in securing Kashmir, could secure Kashmir fully Nehru orders the army to stop all operations. Nehru himself handed over a large part of Kashmir to Pakistan and handed over Kashmir, a Hindu kingdom, to Abdullah in order to please Muslims. The wound inflicted on Kashmir has been kept bleeding continuously. King Hari Singh did not get even a single penny from Nehru !

 

Sin No. 24 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
Congress did not defend Kashmir from Pakistani militants and raised question of Kashmir in United Nations. It gifted one third of Kashmir to Pakistan and made another partition of India after partition of 1947.

 

Sin No. 25 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
The article 370 initially adopted on temporary basis for Jammu and Kashmir was made permanent by the power-hungry Congress instead of discarding the same after some time. This article was made applicable to even States like Nagaland, Mizoram and few other States. Kashmir is an integral part of India but even the President of India cannot buy any property in Kashmir. What kind of integration is this? Kashmir is a place where Muslims are in majority and therefore, the Congress has made such special Constitutional provision. 

 

Sin No. 26 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
The Congress Government did not provide protection to Kashmiri Hindus in the year 1990 when the Muslim fanaticism had crossed all the limits; as a result, 400000 Kashmiri Hindus had to leave their own land. Their apple orchards, farms where they used to grow ‘Basmati’ rice, their houses and shops have been grabbed by Muslims and the Congress Government has not given any compensation to them so far. These 400000 Hindus are now leading life of a refugee in their own country and have been facing lot of hardships. In the refugee camps erected for them 20 years back, no electricity, water, cleanliness, facility to get education or avenue to earn own living have been provided by governments of any of the parties. In fact, Kashmiri Hindus have not been rehabilitated in Kashmir even after all these years.    

 

Sin No. 27 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
Congress Government started bus service from Srinagar to Muzaffarbad but the terrorists blew up 18 government offices to register their protest. The Central Government and the State Government of Jammu and Kashmir, however, kept mum in the matter.

 

Sin No. 28 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
Jammu-Kashmir (J & K) has population of ten million and get aid of Rs.2400 millions i.e. Rs.24000/- per head; but the aid given to other States is not even 5% of what is given to J&K. The assistance provided to J&K by the Central Government is 7-10% more than what other States receive because there are Muslims in majority in that State. The Congress Government is pouring money in J & K and in a way levying a type of ‘Jizia’ tax on Hindus as it is the money paid by Hindus by way of taxes on their earnings after putting lot of hard work.

 

Sin No. 29 - Sins committed by Congress during the period of assassination of Gandhi
In the war against Pakistan fought in the year 1965 on the issue of ‘Kutchh Desert’, India had won 5000 sq. kms. of land sacrificing 3200 of her soldiers; but the Congress Government returned the same to Pakistan by entering into ‘Tashkent Agreement’.

 

Sin No. 30 - Sins committed by Congress during various wars
In the war fought in the year 1971, India created Bangla Desh at the cost of sacrificing 4000 soldiers; but Indira Gandhi was deceived by the ‘Shimla Agreement’. Congress Government lost the golden opportunity of to solve Kashmir problem. India returned 93000 prisoners of war to Pakistan so also the land won in the war; but Pakistan has not returned India’s 100 prisoners of war even now. They are still rotting in the Pakistani jails. None of the Congress Governments has so far made any effort towards their release.

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